Politics and Bureaucracy in the Revitalization of the London Docklands

The development of the London Docklands, like all other public decisions was effected by political interests. There were many opinions as to what to do with the Docklands under both Conservative and Labour governments. The first was a Conservative plan developed in 1973. It saw the Docklands as "a high value commercial and leisure area."(Batley). However, the boroughs in the Docklands were under Labour control and felt that the land "should be developed in response to local consultation and local needs."(Ibid.). Similar differences between Conservative and Labour policies have continued.


Local Versus Central Government Control

The Docklands Joint Committee was set up by the Labour Party in 1973 when it gained control of the Greater London Council. Three years later it produced the London Docklands Strategic Plan,(Ibid.). This plan addressed local needs and gave significant power to the individual boroughs. Many would say that the problem with current Docklands revitalization has much to do with the abrupt change in strategy in 1981 with the "establishment by the Conservative government of the London Docklands Development Corporation. . .[which] removed the initiative from local government and signaled abandonment of the primary concern with provision for local needs by the public sector,"(Ibid.).

Proponents of current Docklands development strategies which rely heavily on private investment claim that a project of this size could not have happened without overriding local governments. They claim a cohesive plan including the entire region is essential. No individual would ever have the courage to undertake something of this magnitude without the support that the LDDC had. Perhaps so, but it is important to see how the LDDC accomplished what it did, and at what price.


The London Docklands Development Corporation

The LDDC has extensive power and is "freed from local accountability and from statutory service provision obligations, and unburdened by principles of universality or of equitable treatment,"(Ibid.). This does not sit well with the communities who feel their voices are being ignored and that they have been invaded by a hostile agency. However, the LDDC is funded by the government and its board members are appointed by the government, thus locals are at the mercy of the LDDC, (Ibid.).

The LDDC is at the mercy of essentially no one. The Canary Wharf project "responds neither to market forces nor to any identifiable need,"(Davies). Canary Wharf was developed by the Canadian firm, Olympia & York. While Canary Wharf is a special case, the LDDC also has the benefit of government protection with private flexibility and lack of accountability to voters. As for Canary Wharf, Olympia & York seem unaffected even by bankruptcy. On May 28, 1992 Olympia & York failed owing banks 550 million pounds and still needing 600 million pounds for the completion of the project including the funding promised to complete the Jubilee Line extension, (Kershen). With a project of this magnitude, it is the tax payers who suffer for private mistakes when the government must step in.


The Role of Government

The role of the government in the Docklands Development has been an ambiguous one from the onset of the project. This has contributed to the barrage of criticism for the development. The "government, though it preferred to disguise its presence, sat at the heart of the Docklands project,"(Lessons of Canary Wharf). One of the government's primary influences was the fact that it "exempted developers in the area from property taxes for ten years,"(Ibid.). Again, the burden fell on the tax payers and not on the private developers who are reaping the benefits. The government should "recover the costs of infrastructure from the chief beneficiaries. . . [There has been no] attempt to charge property- owners, [thus] tax-payers are being asked to put money into developers' pockets,"(Ibid.).

In the case of Canary Wharf, Olympia & York are able to "create at least the illusion of a thriving urban environment,"(Davies). According to one critic, "it is common knowledge that the tenants who have signed up have been enticed by very generous financial deals. A favorite O&Y ploy, for example, is to offer to buy prospective tenants' existing premises from them,"(Ibid.). In this way, demand is created artificially, (Ibid.).

All of this means that "Olympia & York are rich enough to be able to wait if necessary into the next century for a return on its investment,"(Davies). There's no need to worry about the fate of O&Y. However, what does the success of Docklands development mean for future redevelopment everywhere? If Canary Wharf succeeds "it will be at the expense of other areas of the city, including other areas of Docklands. In the long run that will be good for O&Y but bad for London,"(Ibid.). When development projects succeed only because of financial games, despite market forces, and despite consumer needs and wants; society is left with urban systems that don't meet the needs of society and will rapidly decline as a result. This is less than we deserve.


Shannon Cairns