Sustaining Civilization:
An Introduction
The average American is involved with his or her
automobile-the time spent working in order to buy it, driving it, getting it
repaired, etc.- for sixteen hundred hours a year.
This means that when all mileage in a given year is divided by the time
spent supporting the car, the average owner is traveling at an average speed of
five miles an hour (Hawken, 1993). In
other words we are exchanging the human energy that could be used to power a
bicycle for hydrocarbon-derived energy that devastates our air, water, earth and
bodies. According to a recent
report from the United Nations-sponsored Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), the effects of the most serious consequence of the combustion of
fossil fuels, the onslaught of global warming, are predicted to be significantly
worse than previously thought. In
addition, not surprisingly, the study also concluded that the negative effects
of global warming will fall disproportionately on the developing world (IPCC,
2001).
Thus the wealthiest nation on Earth, which holds a mere five percent of
the world’s population and consumes approximately a third of global energy,
will largely externalize the costs of its lavish lifestyle onto populations that
can ill afford to absorb them.
The alternative to this grim future is the promise sustainable
development, though its concepts vary widely and are at times frustratingly
abstract. The heart of the phrase
however, is simply the idea that development should maintain or improve the
quality of life today without sacrificing the rights of future generations to do
the same. When put in these terms,
current patterns of consumption are unquestionably the antithesis of
sustainability. Modern production
of energy, the force that is driving our instruments of destruction, ironically
enough, if generated through alternative means, holds the key to the realization
of a sustainable future.
At the same time that academics and environmental policy experts are
developing strategies for sustainable development around the world,
transnational energy corporations and national and international governing
bodies are accelerating the pace of hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation.
Hoping to satisfy short term energy needs and/or realize new profits
sources by exploiting the Earth’s few remaining natural, non-renewable
resources at public environmental cost, these powerful entities are racing
toward a global Tragedy of the Commons. Although
this process is being conducted by and for the private benefit of global elites,
one cannot place blame entirely on their shoulders.
Indeed another overwhelming force, that of public demand stemming from
the need to fulfill basic everyday needs is driving and obscuring the global
meltdown that is occurring before our very eyes. Thus as Paul Hawken notes in his book The Ecology of
Commerce: while business “does not discern whether profit is of quality or
mere quantity,” countless ordinary, even environmentally conscious people are
consuming the world by many common practices about which they have little
practical choice (ibid, p. 10-15).
When the intricacies of the economic system under which we live touch
down in local areas, and intersect with the politics and culture of the society,
the results are often unpredictable and inevitably complex.
When the situation involves the more visibly dark side of energy creation
in a community with visions of a sustainable future as well as practical
problems of the present, the mixture is extremely volatile.
Although cryptic, these factors describe the current conflict between and
amongst environmental and economic forces in the small Central American nation
of Costa Rica. The following
project is a case study of the political impacts of petroleum exploration and
the concepts it reveals about relationships between elements of the complex
system that shapes modern civilization.
The purpose of this project was thus twofold: first to conduct a
self-contained investigation of the politics of petroleum exploration in the
Province of Límon, on the Caribbean coast of Costa Rica; and secondly to create
a case study to illustrate the larger relationships mentioned above.
In regard to the former, the first goal was to research the influences on
and the decision-making processes of institutions of the Costa Rican national
government, both legislatively and judicially, that have led to the current
state of this issue. The second
primary goal was to explore the values, attitudes, strategies and overall
identities of groups of actors and organizations actively supporting or opposing
the current exploration project in order to demonstrate perceptions and
realities of relationships between humans and the natural environment.
As for the case study function of this project, the primary aim was to
place this particular situation in the context of tensions between the concepts
and ideals of sustainable development and the current reality of contemporary
global energy policies.
The study was undertaken during a two-and-a-half month period
beginning in mid-February and ending at the close of April 2001.
It was conducted incorporating two basic methods-namely literature review
and analysis and approximately forty personal interviews-both in locations
within the Province of Límon and in and around the national capital of San
Jose. In addition, a small amount
of participant observation was used during several meetings between opposition
campaign leaders and local government officials, as well as between opposition
representatives and local fishermen.
The literature review included studies and documents in relevant areas of
disciplines ranging from Anthropology to Economics, from Political Science to
Biology and Geology. Information
from these various works is included throughout the paper and a full list of
references is located at the conclusion of the work.
The interviews ranged from well-structured, formal appointments to
unstructured, informal conversations, which is why the total number is
approximate. In some instances a
tape recorder was used, in others simply notes were taken; and in cases of
informal conversations, summaries were written down as soon as possible
afterwards from memory. Interviews
were conducted in Spanish and in English; in cases of the former, the
translations are mine. In order to
protect identities, the names of all informants have been changed, with the
exception of public officials and aspirants for public office.
All names of organizations, businesses and institutions however, are
actual.
In
all cases I attempted to remain as objective as possible in order to learn
individual perspectives, opinions and conceptualizations-I did not attempt to
argue with informants or disprove their information, however factually flawed.
Despite this focus, I cannot deny the fact that my own values,
perceptions, educational background and political leanings influenced the
conduction and results of this study. It
is important to note however, that this project was conceived and conducted by
myself purely for academic purposes, and was paid for by educational
institutions. I was not affiliated
with or receiving financial support from any of the organizations, businesses or
actors studied in this project.
The
paper that follows consists of five parts and a short conclusion, the purpose of
which is to return to the concepts introduced in this section.
Part One provides a general background sketch of environmental, economic
and energy topics in Costa Rica. It
includes relevant history of the nation as well as a look into the current legal
structure in these areas. Part Two
takes a look at the historic and contemporary conditions in the Province of Límon,
focusing on the impacts of outside economic forces and the unique culture of the
area. Part Three delves into the
basics of the current petroleum exploration situation in Límon, providing
political and legal history of the issue, as well as an introduction to the
identities and arguments of basic actors involved in the controversy.
The largest and most in-depth section, Part Four, expands upon the
information provided in its predecessor to an analysis of the perceptions,
motivations and arguments of groups both actively supporting and opposing the
exploration project. Finally, Part Five asks questions of the political salience
and larger impacts of the issue. Drawing
from interviews with members of the political class in Límon as well as a
wealth of other information, this chapter speaks of the future of this issue and
its possible consequences for Costa Rican politics.
Part I: Costa Rica: Environment, Economy and Economy
A poster sporting
vivid color photos of waterfalls, rainforests, mountains and animals created by
the National Tourism Institute (Instituto National de Turismo) proclaims:
“Costa Rica, No Artificial Ingredients” (2000). It makes me think of
the popular Tico phrase “pura vida” which literally translated means “pure
life.” The ideas that these images conjure, those of a paradise of natural
wonders, of an island of peace, democracy and tranquillity amidst the general
turbulence of Central America, are extremely appealing to foreign tourists and
Ticos alike. Not surprisingly,
Costa Ricans are proud of their nation, and the world, when it notices, is proud
of Costa Rica. Images, however, are
often deceiving, and patriotism and exoticism
often mask the less appealing truths about a nation. This section is not
intended to shatter the positive images of Costa Rica, but rather to draw
attention to the issues and the contradictions that are inherent in all nations
in the world today when one talks about the relationship between economy and
environment.
The following chapter serves to provide a general sketch of Costa Rica in
terms of the present-day structure of the economy and the state of the
environment in the nation. It seeks
to explore the national policies in these areas and the legal and political
structure that supports them. It
will begin with an identification and examination of the national images and
discourses put forward by the state that affects perceptions of the country both
nationally and internationally. It
will then move into a description of the Costa Rican economy, both historically
and presently, paying particular attention to the national energy situation.
The effects of economic forces on the natural environment will then be
presented, leading into an
identification of the relevant laws and policies that have shaped and are
shaping relationships between the two areas in the country.
The
Land of Pura Vida?
In
an area historically dominated by foreigners and powerful minorities, Costa Rica
has always been the independent sibling. Though colonized by the Spanish in the
1500’s, the extremely rugged terrain and lack of obvious mineral or other
resources led the imperial power to pay it little mind in favor of other areas
of Central America such as Guatemala. The indigenous populations which existed
when the Spanish arrived were rapidly diminished by disease and conflict, and
thus the few settlers that chose to stay and cultivate small farms were more or
less left to their own devices until word of independence arrived in 1821.
Experts generally cite these historic conditions as the explanation for
the nation’s long history of democracy and stability. The short and relatively
bloodless revolution of 1948, ended in a new constitution that served to
strengthen democracy and abolish the already declining military.
It fortified sentiments of Costa Ricans as democratic, peace loving
people.
As
for the ecological paradise narrative, recognition of the nation’s natural
wonders as valuable and worth protecting dates back to the 1970’s with the
dedication of the first national park, Santa Rosa in 1971. Throughout the decade and continuing to this day, a
combination of native environmental supporters and foreign individuals and
organizations have helped to expand Costa Rican preservation to include scores
of protected areas, a strong ministry of Environment and Energy and a national
plan for sustainable development. Despite
this impressive history, the nation still has one of the highest rates of
deforestation in the world and a host of other environmental concerns, which
will be discussed later in this chapter and throughout this study.
Democracy,
peace, equality and environmentalism, these values are at the heart of Costa
Rican and international perceptions of the country. Although all of these narratives are grounded in history and
fact, some are certainly more accurate than others. While certainly it is beyond the scope of this investigation
to attempt to deconstruct and assess the validity of them all, this paper does
focus explicitly on the realm of environmental protection in nation, and
indirectly on the state of democracy in Costa Rica as well.
National
Economic Structure
Like much of the developing world, the forces of globalization have had a
profound effect on the economic structure of Costa Rica, not to mention on the
lives of its inhabitants. Although
the policy of the 1960’s and 1970’s was to become more self- sufficient
agriculturally and industrially, the need for imported products and the
development of infrastructure for modernization led Costa Rica, like much of the
Third World-especially Central America-to accept large First World loans.
Due to a combination of rising oil prices and falling coffee, banana and
sugar revenues, the nation found itself unable to repay the loans and in the
midst of a severe economic crisis as it entered the 1980’s (Blake & Becher,
1999). During the past two decades
the economy has been reconfigured by a combination of World Bank and IMF
structural readjustment loans as well as funds from the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID). These
policies, which have sought to increase foreign investment and stimulate job
creation through the development of an export-based economy, have had numerous
far reaching effects on the nature of the Costa Rican state.
In addition to the breakdown of the social welfare state, they have
eroded the tradition of the small farmer and replaced it with large-scale
monoculture and a booming tourism industry.
The land that was once almost “self-sufficient in its poverty,”
(ibid, p. 3) now for better or worse, fills a niche in a global economy on which
is it also heavily dependent for its very survival.
The backbone of the present-day economy is bananas, coffee and tourism,
though a group of other agricultural and “non-traditional” exports such as
cut flowers and macadamia nuts play an important role as well. Although these neo-liberal economic policies have stabilized
the economy, led to a substantial rise in the GDP and curbed unemployment, they
raise serious questions about job quality, social stratification, food
dependency and certainly for a number of reasons, the long-term sustainability
of the economy itself (Korten, 1992).
The energy that
powers the Costa Rican economy is, like the rest of the modern world,
overwhelmingly dependent on fossil fuels. Although the vast majority of all
electricity generated comes from hydropower, 60% of all the energy consumed in
the country is derived from petroleum, and due to the rapid increase in
automobiles (72% of all hydrocarbon consumption comes from transportation) that
number is growing rapidly (representing 46% of all energy demand in 1990, and
72% in 1999) (Estado de La Nación, 2000).
Due to the fact that it does not produce any petroleum domestically,
Costa Rica is extremely sensitive to the pressures of global oil supplies and
prices (as was demonstrated in the 1970’s).
The vast bulk of imported petroleum arrives from other nations in Latin
America-namely Mexico, Venezuela and Columbia-and is refined and distributed by
the government-owned Costa Rican Petroleum Refinery (RECOPE).
Certainly the refinement, transportation and consumption of petroleum
have numerous environmental consequences including contribution to global
climate change as well as air and water pollution.
State of the
Environment
As noted by Silvia Lara in her book Inside Costa Rica, “environmentalism
in Costa Rica is marked by contradiction”(Lara, p. 115). Though the image of the eco-paradise is backed up by
primarily by the nation’s extensive system of national parks and protected
areas (25.4% of all national territory-Estado de la Nacion, p. 196), as
mentioned earlier, Costa Rica has one of the highest rates of deforestation in
the world (Lara, 1995). Historically,
two-thirds of the country’s area was covered by forests; today almost three
quarters of traditional woodlands have been destroyed (ibid). Commercial cattle
grazing as well as the coffee and banana industries are responsible for much of
the loss. The nation’s
biodiversity-5% of all living organisms in the world-is also rapidly
deteriorating.
In
contrast to the relatively self-sustaining practices of the small farmers of the
nation’s past, the contemporary agro-industry promoted by international
lending institutions and national politicians makes extremely inefficient use of
the natural resources it exploits. Forty percent of the organic matter collected in banana
harvests and seventy percent of the products from coffee are wasted, dumped into
rivers where they generate most of the country’s water pollution (ibid). These
industries also give Costa Rica the distinction of having one of the world’s
highest rates of agro-chemical use per capita in the world, and their use is the
source of numerous human health and biological problems.
Finally, deforestation and inappropriate land use also produce high rates
of soil erosion, damage to watersheds and declining water levels in rivers
throughout the country: “An estimated 42% of all soils in Costa Rica show
traces of severe erosion…At least half of drainage basins are overexploited by
agriculture and grazing, and some areas even suffer incipient desertification”
(Lara, p. 117).
Other
serious environmental problems stem from population growth and increasing
consumption patterns, especially in urban areas.
Difficulties with solid waste disposal and increasing air pollution,
caused from the large increase in motor vehicles noted earlier, are both worth
mentioning. In addition,
uncontrolled urban growth spreading out from San Jose is consuming vegetable and
dairy farms and destroying some of the richest coffee producing land in the
world (Estado de la Nacion, 2000).
The
myriad of environmental threats currently facing the nation have not been lost
upon national legislators, and indeed much progress has been made to address the
problems mentioned above and others as well. Focusing on terms relevant to
energy production, the following section aims to acknowledge the well-developed
legal structure of environmental protection in Costa Rica, while still
continuing to point out the contradictions that exist in the country.
Legal Structure:
Environment and Energy
A common remark during my interviews with environmental lawyers during my
investigation was: “In Costa Rica, the problem is not that there aren’t
laws, but rather that they are not followed” (V. Ortiz, personal
communication, February 7, 2001). Indeed much of the country’s environmental legislation is
very progressive, if vague and hard to enforce.
Crucial sections of the national Constitution in this respect include
Article 50, which guarantees all citizens the right to a “healthy and
ecologically balanced environment” (Zeledon, p. 3), and Article 46, which
states “consumers and users have the right to protection of their health,
environment, security and economic interests…” (Ibid.).
Although
28 environmental laws were passed between 1965 and 1985 (Lara, 1995), a number
of the most far-reaching and significant have been adopted in just the last ten
years. Perhaps most important among
them is the Organic Law of the Environment (Ley Organica Del Ambiente), passed
in 1995 under the Figueres administration, which covers a range of environmental
topics from protected areas to air, water and soil. Of particular importance to
this case study is a section outlining methods for citizen participation in
environmental decision making and a chapter on energy resources that guarantees
that all energy projects should be realized in a manner that protects and
conserves the environment-giving special attention to the development of
alternative forms of energy (ibid). Another
recent law, the Biodiversity Law (Ley de Biodiversidad), passed in 1998, is
particularly notable for its comprehensiveness and focus on long term, and
non-economic values of the natural environment: “Respect life in all of its
forms. All living things have a
right to life, independent of either their actual or potential economic value”
(ibid, p. 4). In addition, the
legislation addresses intergenerational equity, respect for cultural diversity
and the need for all sectors of society to actively participate in the
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.
The
Hydrocarbons Law (Ley de Hidrocarburos), on the other hand, points out the
contrasts, not simply between law and everyday policy in Costa Rica, but among
even environmentally related laws themselves.
The stated purpose of the law, “is to develop, promote, regulate and
control the deposits of petroleum and whatever other hydrocarbon derivatives
…to preserve and protect the environment, with an end to assure their rational
use and to guaranty the interests of the state” (ibid. p. 223) If this sounds
like an oxymoron, the law continues on to outline the procedure for dividing
(“like a cake” –Rodriguez personal communication, February 13, 2001) the
nation into blocks for purchase by foreign energy companies, and explicitly
allows for exploration activities in protected areas other than those designated
as national parks. Although the law
does include a section on environmental protection, of which the basis is the
necessity for environmental impact assessments for all projects (which was
previously included in the Organic Law), its ideological foundation and language
are far different from those previously mentioned.
Interestingly enough, this law, like the Biodiversity Law, and the
Organic Law of the Environment, was passed during the 1994-1998 Figueres
administration.
Another
crucial piece to the Costa Rican legal structure in regard to environmental
issues is the plethora of international environmental treaties that have been
signed and ratified by the government. According
to Article 7 of the Costa Rican constitution, all ratified international
treaties take precedence over national laws (Constitución Politíca, 1948).
Four important agreements relevant to this case study are the 1992 Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1971 Ramsar Convention on
Wetlands of International Importance, the 1973 Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITIES) and the 1989 Indigenous
and Tribal People’s Convention of the International Labour Organization. The
significance of these treaties will be addressed in Part III.
Part II:
Límon, the
Forgotten Province
Nowhere in Costa Rica is the difference between image and reality,
between law and practice more apparent than in the Province of Límon. With a
large gouge in its central-western boundary with Cartago, and boundaries with
two other nations and the Caribbean Sea, the province physically looks as if it
is being intruded on by outside entities. The
most sparsely populated, poorest and most culturally distinct of the seven
provinces, many say that traveling to Límon is like entering another country.
Indeed, Límon has always followed a different course of development,
often times with more influence from transnational companies or the Caribbean
than from the central government or other national institutions.
At the same time however, its past, present and future course of
development have been and will continue to be essential to the survival and
quality of life of the rest of the nation.
This chapter seeks to provide a brief economic and socio-cultural history
of the Límon area, as well as a description of contemporary cultural and
economic issues. For the purposes
of this study, the Límon area refers to the Caribbean coastline, from the city
of Puerto Límon to the Panama boarder, as well as the inland areas on the
southern Caribbean, known as Talamanca. It
will begin with a focus on both the Afro-Caribbean and Indigenous populations of
the area, their historical situation and relationship to the Hispanic majority
in Costa Rica. The discussion will
then turn to the influence of foreign business on the society and economy of the
area before moving into the present day issues that have resulted from that
influence. On a related note, the
chapter will end with a focus on the impact of past and present hydrocarbons
exploration on the region.
Historical
Background
According to Bribri legend, Sibö created the indigenous people out of
the seeds of corn brought from the Place of Destiny (Palmer et. al 1991).
Historically, there were numerous tribes scattered about the eastern
portion of Costa Rica, concentrated in the mountains inland from the coast.
Columbus first landed on the Caribbean near Límon in 1502; his
description of the “Rich Coast” is the origin of the country’s name.
Due to resistance of the native tribes and the inhospitability of the
region, numerous Spanish efforts to explore and conquer the area ended in
miserable failure (Molina & Palmer, 1998). In fact it was not until the U.S.
based United Fruit Company began operations in the area in the nineteenth
century that the indigenous populations of Talamanca were finally subdued (FUNCOOPA
& JETSAY, 1999). At this time
the two main tribes in the area, the Bribris and the Cabécars, retreated father
into the mountains where they still live today.
In
1977 the Indigenous Law (Ley Indigena) was created, establishing 22 indigenous
reserves and giving indigenous populations rights to limited self-government
within their borders. Five of these
reserves are located in the Talamanca area, and currently have populations
approaching 10,000 habitants (ibid). The majority of the residents there are engaged in
agricultural endeavors, both subsistence based farming and larger scale organic
cooperatives exist there. Unlike
some other tribes in Costa Rica, both the Bribris and the Cabácars still
maintain their native languages.
The
Afro-Caribbean population of the area began arriving in the 1800’s primarily
from Jamaica and other Caribbean islands, but also from Panama and Nicaragua.
Due to the fact that they were better able to withstand the hot and humid
climate and the malaria virus, many were brought to the area to work on
constructing Minor Keith’s railroad between San Jose and Límon between 1870
and 1890. Many then stayed to work
on United Fruit Company banana plantations, in the dockyards in Puerto Límon,
or to establish their own farms along the Talamanca coast and sell their goods
to the United Fruit Company. These
independent farmers, as well as fishermen in search of turtles, founded small
towns such as Cahuita and Puerto Viejo along the southern Caribbean coast
(Palmer, 1993).
These
populations represent a second distinct culture from the Hispanic majority of
Costa Rica. Their skin color,
English language and Protestantism historically have caused them to be
discriminated against, or simply ignored by the central government of the
nation. Laws forbade blacks to be
allowed outside of the province, and citizenship was denied to them until after
the civil war of 1948 (prior to that they were considered Jamaicans).
In the late nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth, the
Afro-Caribbean settlers were joined by migrating Hispanics as well as a sizable
Asian immigrant population. The
resulting melting pot, combined with the natural isolation of the area and
neglect from the central government, caused the Límon area to develop very
independently from the rest of Costa Rica (ibid).
As
hinted at earlier, major influences on the culture and economy of the region
were a number of foreign businesses, especially the United Fruit Company: “The
Company’s impact on the Atlantic zone is so great that it is impossible to
imagine what course of history Límon might have followed without it” (Palmer,
p.113). In 1884, the government of
Próspero Fernandez, signed a contract with Minor Keith, a young English
entrepreneur, to complete the railway to Límon began in 1870 but unfinished due
to technical and financial difficulties, as well as corruption.
The contract, which Keith undertook to renegotiate Costa Rica’s debt
with England, landed him a 99-year lease on the railway and the port of Límon
as well as ownership of vast extensions of the Caribbean lowlands (about 800,000
acres). Keith’s strategy was to
finance part of the project by growing bananas and exporting them to the United
States, and thus the United Fruit Company (UFCO) was born in 1899 (Molina &
Palmer, 1998).
The
company’s operations expanded rapidly and soon dominated the region.
Between 1910 and 1920, the value of banana exports exceeded that of
coffee, but soon afterwards prices fell dramatically, only to recover again in
the early 1930’s. This cycle of
boom and bust was largely caused by the UFCO’s predatory production process,
which relied on the exploitation of virgin lands acquired for little or no
money. Once lands were exhausted or
struck by disease, the company simply moved somewhere else (ibid).
Many of the lands taken over had been inhabited by indigenous tribes,
when the tribes refused to sell them, UFCO used whatever means necessary to run
them off. In fact many suspect that
administrators of the company arranged the assassination of Antonio Saldaña,
the last king of the Bribris, who died by poisoning in 1910 (Palmer, 1993).
The lives of the
workers and their families who lived on the banana, and later cocoa, plantations
were completely controlled by and dependent on the company.
Working conditions were atrocious, as employees suffered from malaria,
snakebites and machete wounds for little pay and no benefits.
Educational opportunities were severely limited as well; schools were few
and far between and teachers were scarce, those that there were only taught in
Spanish which was no use to the Afro-Caribbean population.
The company generally took several children from each village to teach
them how to read and write so that they could work in specialized positions such
as the merchandise and accounting departments.
There was also a great deal of racial tension between the black and
Hispanic villagers, which the UFCO encouraged in order to divide the workers and
prevent them from organizing against the company. In an interview in Paula Palmer’s book What Happen: A
Folk History of Costa Rica’s Talamanca Coast, a local man named Mr. Paul
elaborates on this situation:
The problem is, the
man that made the most benefit from this was the United Fruit Company.
Because if we had stopped bickering among ourselves we could have united
against the Company, stopped picking his cocoa, chopping his bush until he paid
us plenty more, made us better homes, water, electricity, better conditions.
But instead of fighting together against the company we were fighting
among ourselves. It’s sad to say
but we really didn’t realize it at the time. (Palmer, p. 120)
The United Fruit
Company thus exemplifies the negative impacts of foreign influence on the
region; indeed the effects of many of the problems it created or exacerbated can
still be seen in Límon today.
Contemporary
Cultural and Economic Issues
Before I traveled to Límon
to begin my fieldwork I was told numerous times, subtly and not so subtly, that
if it was the beach I was looking for, I should instead make my way to
Guanacaste. Comments made to me
such as “Límon Centro is the most dangerous place in Costa Rica” and “the
culture is very ugly there” demonstrate some of the racial and cultural
stereotypes that many Ticos hold of the area.
Indeed Límon for its cultural diversity and its poverty stands in great
contrast to the images projected by and on Costa Rica of a “classless,
European descended society.” Although many blame the “lazy
Rasta-lifestyle”, for the twice the national average unemployment rate, the
actual causes are far more complicated, involving the area’s dependence on
global demand for cocoa and bananas, as well as tourism, another major industry
and foreign influence on the region.
Tourism has
been increasing on the southern Caribbean coast since the 1970’s, but has seen
quite an explosion in recent years as the road from Límon south to Manzanillo
has been paved. A wave of foreign
investment has changed the complexion of the area, injecting money into the
local economy but also raising property values in towns such as Cahuita well
past the point where locals can afford to buy it.
Thus the tradition of small farming is dying out, as well as the
self-sufficient lifestyle of the population. Those that cannot afford to start
their own business in this new economy are forced to work as servants cleaning
cabins or serving food to vacationers.
In addition to psychological effects that this change has had on the
population, foreigners and tourism have introduced a number of social problems
to the area. Chief among these is the introduction of hard drugs, most
notably cocaine and crack. According to many local residents, this is the most
serious problem the region faces today; during my time in the area I heard many
a heartbreaking story from youths trying to sell me drugs or simply begging for
money in order to support their addictions.
In regard to the impacts of tourism on the area, one local man remarked
to me: “In some ways tourism has been good and in some ways not very
good…but I don’t see no future nowhere.
I hope that the government mentality change and do something for these
local communities” (H. Taylor, personal communication, March 21, 2000).
There have been however, many positive developments as of late in the Límon
area. Projects such as Namasöl, funded by the Dutch embassy, are
allowing indigenous communities to preserve their language and culture, as well
as boost the economic situation of their inhabitants through sustainable
development projects. Other
small-scale development projects are being organized by local boards throughout
the area, and social organizations are working to combat the drug problem.
In addition, the central government has begun to pay more attention to
the area; sadly enough much of the new attention has come as a result of the
murders of two American students in the area a year ago.
Since the incident, the government has been improving roads and
increasing the police force in towns such as Puerto Viejo; according to locals,
crime has decreased 90% in the town in the last year.
Hydrocarbons
Exploration and Límon
The history of Hydrocarbons exploration in the province is long and
controversial, and its impacts run side by side with other foreign influences
and contemporary social and economic issues. Due to its importance to this
study, it is treated separately.
The first exploration in the area was conducted near Puerto Viejo in the
1920’s by the Sinclair Oil Company. Although
their search for oil proved fruitless, they did find natural gas deposits, which
they abandoned after a fire destroyed most of their equipment. Sinclair’s
search was extended in the early 1950’s by the Loffland Oil Company, which
although the oil that they did find was not of commercial grade, spawned the
string of foreign exploration projects that continues to this day (Palmer,
1977).
The most extensive and controversial exploration in the Talamanca area
was conducted in the 1980’s by a partnership between RECOPE and the Mexican
petroleum company PEMEX. The
project took place on indigenous reserves, and according to a study conducted by
Carlos Borge and Victoria Villalobos entitled Talamanca en la Encrucijada
as well as my own interviews with local residents, caused a number of
significant effects on the native communities.
In addition to bringing outside workers to the area, the project
contracted numerous indigenous workers, in many cases causing them to leave
their communities for extended periods. In
some areas this was the first the natives had seen of a wage-based labor system.
The breakup of families that this caused combined with the environmental
effects of deforestation and other project activities disrupted the subsistence
based agricultural tradition of the area. Many
outside workers fathered children with native women and then abandoned them at
the conclusion of the project. The
introduction of drugs, prostitution and a sharp rise in alcoholism were all also
consequences of exploration activities (Borge, 1994).
Many people involved in the exploration project however dispute these
findings. They claim that during the exploration period, the local
communities were much more prosperous than they are today: “…the Indians
will tell you that they were starving to death, and only during that period of
time they worked up there-they made money-after that things became worse
again” (T. Maxwell, personal communication, March 6, 2001). The exploration, they assert, brought jobs, increased
transportation to the area and educational opportunities to local residents.
“There are Indians in the reserves today who are living off of the
pensions that they received from the company” (H. Taylor, personal
communication, March 21, 2001). Certainly
these conflicting perceptions have influenced the views of many important actors
involved the current exploration controversy.
Part III:
El Acuerdo
Sospechoso?
Límon, which as we have seen, has been dominated for much of its history
by foreign projects and influences, now faces another new development that could
potentially alter its landscape. Like
many others in the past, the project has been conceived by the central
government and a transnational corporation and placed in front of local people
seemingly out of the sky; though this time around both local people and forces
around the country are taking notice. Some
are outraged, others are enthusiastic, many others are simply confused; whatever
the viewpoint however, the fact remains that the outcome of the current
petroleum exploration controversy will significantly effect the future direction
of the area, for better or for worse.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the basic facts of the current
petroleum exploration situation in the Límon area, as well as to introduce the
principal actors, organizations and arguments in favor and in opposition to the
project. It will begin by reviewing the Hydrocarbons Law presented in
Part One and the subsequent actions of the Figueres administration to encourage
the development of hydrocarbon resources in Costa Rica. It will then continue to outline the contract agreement
between the national government and the American energy company conducting the
project as well as the progress of the exploration thus far. The discussion will then focus on the formation of the
opposition campaign, the legal arguments used in the subsequent court cases and
the results of those actions up to this point.
Finally, this section will introduce the basic perceptions and narratives
put forward by the two side of the issue, setting up for the more in-depth
analysis of Part Four.
Hydrocarbons
Promotion and Environmental Consciousness: The Figueres Administration
As described in Part I, the Hydrocarbons
Law was designed to promote and regulate the use of petroleum deposits within
the state. Although certainly petroleum exploration, as mentioned in the
previous chapter, had been occurring for decades in Costa Rica, the actions of
the 1994-1998 Figueres administration after passing the law demonstrate an
organized plan for the development of eventual petroleum exploitation as an
important industry in the country. In
addition, the need for such a law to control or justify such projects reflects
the changing values within the country and around the world.
In 1997, Jose María Figueres traveled to the United States to solicit
business from energy companies within the country to explore and eventually
exploit Costa Rica’s hydrocarbon resources.
The Hydrocarbons Law, which was adopted in 1994 and updated in 1997, had
specifically laid out procedures for dividing the country into purchasable
segments for this purpose. Figueres
thus could be described to have acted as a type of auctioneer, looking for the
highest bidder in the nation that could afford to give him the best price.
Although due to previous exploration it was known that the Límon area
held the best potential pool of these resources, Figueres was only able to
secure one bid for the four-block package that he was looking to sell.
Though the reasons for this lack of interest were not clearly discerned
during my investigation, a lawyer for the San Jose-based Justicia para la
Naturaleza asserts that due to the sensitive geology and biological richness of
the area, larger energy corporations refused to touch the project because of the
environmental risks involved (J. Rodriguez, personal communication, February 13,
2001).
Texas Comes to Costa
Rica
The
one company that did show interest was MJK Xplorations, which after signing the
contract subsequently sold 80% of its holdings to Texas-based Harken Energy.
The History of Harken in regard to exploration projects on foreign soil
and water is very interesting and fairly controversial, involving the current
president of the United States, his father, former president George H.W. Bush
and the Persian Gulf War.
In
the late 1970´s George W. Bush started an oil company by the name of Arbusto
(Spanish for bush), which failed miserably, and after several bailouts from
family friends and Republican contributors, Bush sold Arbusto to a company by
the name of Spectrum 7, becoming its third-largest shareholder.
After Spectrum 7 ran into problems as well, it was sold to Harken Energy
in 1986; a company referred to by Time Magazine as “One of the most mysterious
and eccentric outfits ever to drill for oil” (Ivins & Dubose, 2000).
Bush received stock worth about $500,000 and an annual consulting fee of
$120,000. According to Mother Jones
magazine, Harken director E. Stuart Watson, said of Bush:
We
didn’t have a fair price for oil, we just had George.
And George was very useful to Harken.
He could have been more so if he had had funds, but as far as contacts
were concerned, he was terrific. It
seemed like George knew everybody in the U.S. who was worth knowing (Ibid, p.
7).
The turning point for Harken Energy came in 1990, during the presidency
of George Bush Sr., when it landed the exclusive rights to explore for oil in
the Persian Gulf emirate of Bahrain. At
the time Harken was a small Texas company with no international or offshore
drilling experience, and had nowhere near the resources to finance the project
until the billionaire Bass family of Texas bought into the deal some time later.
The contract thus shocked the oil industry, however seven months later
the United States began sending troops into the Middle East to prepare for the
Persian Gulf War. Also around the same time, Middle Eastern investors
representing the Sheik of Saudi Arabia, a 17.6% Harken shareholder, and other
oil interests in the region, began gaining remarkable access to President Bush.
George W. Bush subsequently sold his Harken stock, and when two months
later Iraq invaded Kuwait, Harken shares plummeted (ibid.).
Today Harken Energy is a corporation with significant operations in the
U.S., Columbia, and in addition to Costa Rica, it “is currently looking for
opportunities throughout Central American region and all along the western
‘Andean’ coast of South America” (Harken Energy, 2000).
The four-block contract agreed to by the Figueres administration consists
of two offshore areas in the Caribbean and two on-shore in the Talamanca region
(see Appendix, Figure 2). The two
offshore areas span the Caribbean coast from just below Tortuguero National Park
to the Panama border. Although
there is a break in the number 3 block covering the area of Cahuita National
Park, the exploration area does include the entirety of the Manzanillo-Gandoca
wildlife refuge, in full compliance with the Hydrocarbons Law.
The on-shore blocks are both located within Bribri and Cabrácar
indigenous reserves. In total the
concession covers over one million acres (ibid.).
According
to literature on the company’s web site, Harken, though interested in
opportunities throughout “under-explored” Latin America, believes that Costa
Rica in particular offers a number of advantages including the fact that it is
“The most stable democracy in Central America” and that the “…country
did not allow foreign company exploration from the early ´70´s until now”
(Ibid, p. 2). Indeed it seems that
Costa Rica’s international reputation impresses American energy companies as
well. In return for allowing Harken
to explore for and eventually exploit oil in Límon, The Costa Rican government,
according to the contract, will receive approximately 5% of the royalties on all
profits and the province of Límon, and up to 6% (depending on the amount of
barrels produced) specifically for social and environmental profits.
The oil will then become the property of the corporation and can be sold
back to Costa Rica at market price. As
to where the oil will be refined, there was a great deal of confusion and
disagreement among my informants, and this subject will be addressed in Part IV.
Once the contract was finalized, as required by the Hydrocarbons Law, and
the Organic Law of the Environment, MINAE (actually the National Environmental
Technical Secretary [Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental-SETENA], a division
of MINAE) and Harken began the environmental impact assessment for the first
wave of the project. Although the
assessment approved the project, it has been met with much criticism (see Part
IV) from environmentalists as well as from the People’s Defender (for an
explanation of this government office see Part V).
Nevertheless Harken Energy began initial exploration off the coast of Moín
in block 12 in November of 1999.
Opposition Formation
and the Constitutional Court Case
The finalization of the contract sparked the formation of a loose
coalition of primarily southern Caribbean community leaders and tourism
interests, environmentalists, indigenous representatives and even institutions
within the Catholic Church (Pastorales Sociales).
Joined by representation from San Jose-based environmental law groups
they took up a legal fight against MINAE-the government agency responsible for
directing the situation. The
ensuing case brought before the Constitutional Court of Costa Rica in January
2000, challenged the legality of the contract on a number of grounds stemming
from the constitutional guarantees of a healthy environment introduced in Part
One, national environmental laws such as the Biodiversity Law and the Organic
Law of the Environment, as well as a myriad of international treaties.
The opposition’s primary argument was that there had been a decisive
lack of public participation in the decision-making process undertaken by the
executive branch of the government on this issue.
The Rio Declaration, for example, gives the following directive in
Principal 10:
Environmental
issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the
relevant level. At the national
level, each individual shall have access to information concerning the
environment that is held by public authorities, including information on
hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to
participate in decision-making processes. States
shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making
information widely available. Effective
access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy,
shall be provided (Rio Declaration, p. 2)
Another
important international treaty ratified by Costa Rica and utilized in the case
was the International Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of 1989, a
General Conference of the International Labour Organization.
In Article 6, the convention specifically states that indigenous
communities must be consulted whenever directly affected by government action:
“In applying the provisions of this Convention, governments shall: (a) consult
the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through
their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to
legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly”
(International Labour Organization, p 3).
Undoubtedly
the exploration agreement was reached very privately between members of the
executive branch of the Costa Rican government and representatives of Harken
Energy-neither local governments or populations were consulted, nor was the
issue even taken up by the national legislature.
On the other hand however, the contract was certainly within the bounds
of the Hydrocarbons Law, which of course was passed by the national
legislature-the representatives of the people.
Whether or not the agreement violated the vague directives of treaties
such as the Rio Declaration is rather murky and up to quite a bit of
interpretation, as well as whatever influences were present on the court, which
according to opposition leaders were many.
In September of 2000, the Constitutional Court, in record time, handed
down a ruling in favor of the opposition campaign.
Citing only the fact that the government had failed to consult indigenous
populations before signing the contract, it ordered all explorations suspended
until public hearings took place with native communities in Talamanca.
“But we were fighting for more than that” explained a lawyer for
Justicia para la Naturaleza, “the constitutional court didn’t want to touch
it…” (J. Rodriguez, personal communication, February 13, 2001), when I asked
why he simply said: “Well, it’s very hard to get into that” (ibid).
MINAE however, immediately returned to court.
Arguing that local consultations need only take place for operations in
indigenous lands, they desired that the court lift the suspension on the
exploration activities that had been under way off the coast of Moín.
The court agreed, and thus narrowed their ruling to only affect the two
on-shore blocks. Shortly
thereafter, offshore exploration resumed. The opposition was furious, all firmly
convinced that the court’s changing of its ruling reflected political
pressures placed on it by individuals in the executive branch, “There is a
great deal of pressure on the courts, and they cannot escape it” (M. Delgado,
personal communication, March 8, 2001), “A lot of pressure went under the
table to the judges” (A. Campos, personal communication, April 5, 2001).
The legal wrangling however was far from over, and by December of 2000,
the opposition was in court again. This
time around, the case, which although cited the same basic national laws and
international treaties, focused more on environmental protection.
Specifically it charged that the environmental impact assessment
conducted by SETENA and Harken was deficient in a number of ways.
Primary among these was the contention that SETENA failed to adequately
take the threat to the area’s biodiversity into account; indeed a recent study
conducted by the very same MINAE administration on the possible impacts on
endangered sea turtles concluded that there was a very real possibility that oil
exploration would substantially damage turtle populations and that there was
legal precedent to reject such activities.
The report specifically stated that:
“Based on these conclusions, we urge the Costa Rican authorities to
stop whatever exploration and exploitation of petroleum in Caribbean waters off
the coast of Costa Rica” (MINAE, 1999). In
addition the suit charged that MINAE
and Harken were not prepared for a possible spill, and that they failed to study
the impacts of seismic testing on wildlife during the first phase of the
exploration. On a similar note, the
People’s Defender became involved in the situation in February of 2001,
developing a list of concerns about the project and recommending that, in
addition to studying potential effects of exploration of turtle populations and
on the coral reef in Cahuita National Park, that local municipalities
collaborate in a process of supplying information about the project to the
public (Loaiza-Naranjo, 2001). As
of May 2001, MINAE and Harken have yet to take action on these recommendations.
Likewise, all parties are still awaiting the decision by the
Constitutional Court on this latest legal action.
Other Maneuvers
In March of 2001 Harken Energy, citing respect for native inhabitants’
opposition to the exploration, unilaterally decided to forgo exploration in
their two inland blocks. The
announcement came as a surprise to many, but the reactions were decidedly mixed.
Certainly due to their previous experience with petroleum exploration,
opposition among the native populations had been strong, and according to
sources within indigenous communities as well as lawyers in San Jose, the
indigenous communities were planning to boycott the public hearings MINAE was
planning for them. Had the
government continued with their previous course of action, this lack of good
faith would have certainly presented a problem.
Certainly both Harken and the national government see this decision as
proof positive that they have only the nation and the people’s best interests
at heart with this project. Indigenous
leaders as well have taken this as a positive sign that the energy company is
concerned with their well being and is respecting their rights: “It is very
significant that a private company would respect international
legislation…they are respecting our decision to be against oil exploration in
our territory” (M. Fernandez, personal communication, April 10, 2001). Other segments of the opposition campaign however, perceive
the decision as a strategic political move designed to take the indigenous
community out of the opposition, as well as to improve public relations
domestically and internationally. Indeed
in an interview conducted before the decision was made, a company representative
informed me of Harken's plans in the Indigenous reserves:
…for
sure they don’t want to move in to the Indian reservations-I was in the
reservation in the Eighties, and what we found there was that the sedimentary
rocks are not good enough to have oil so the recommendation is against going in
to the Indian reservation. And why,
they say, would they want to go in and make troubles if they know there is
nothing there to be extracted? (Ó. Castro, personal communication, March 6,
2001)
While
this interview seems to suggest some middle ground between the two perceptions,
the opinions about this specific decision are demonstrative of the larger
viewpoints of forces both in favor and in opposition to the project.
The opposition in general adamantly believes that the project will not
benefit anyone but the private interests associated with the company, that the
environmental risks are great, and that exploration and eventual petroleum
exploitation represent a major threat to the way of life of residents along the
Caribbean as well as to any hope of sustainable development for the province.
The agreement is so ludicrous they believe, that the only possible
motivation for signing the agreement is that individuals in the government are
surely benefiting personally from the project.
Advocates of petroleum exploration for their part believe that the
project represents an important economic opportunity for the country and the
region, and that due to modern technology environmental risks will be minimal.
Part IV: Actors, Organizations, Motivations and Validity
The
coalitions of forces on each side of this issue are without a doubt bitterly
divided. How can two groups of
people look at the same project and reach two completely different conclusions?
The answer of course lies in the differing motivations, perceptions and
information, among other things, that various actors and organizations hold of
the project. The concept of
political identity is crucial here, and differences in economic situation,
culture, and overall worldviews and ideologies play a large part in the
formulation of opinion and the impetus to act on those beliefs.
Continuing from the remarks of the previous chapter to a more
in-depth description of the current exploration project in Límon, the purpose
of this chapter is primarily analytic. First
of all it seeks to identify major actors, institutions and organizations
involved in actively supporting or opposing the exploration in the province of Límon
and in the capital city of San Jose. Secondly,
this section will attempt to conduct an analysis of their motivations, arguments
and overall positions as determined from literature review, and more
significantly, from personal interviews conducted during over two months of
fieldwork on the Caribbean and in San Jose.
In conclusion, drawing from this information as well as my background in
Political Science and Environmental Studies and my own personal values and
worldview, I will provide an overall evaluation of the soundness of the project
for the province of Límon and the nation of Costa Rica.
The
Legal Crowd
In addition to the organization Justicia para la Naturaleza mentioned
earlier, there are two other main environmental law organizations based in San
Jose active in the opposition campaign. Though
all three are following the same direction in the campaign, Fundación Ambio
stresses its more expansive purpose than the strictly legally focused Justicia
and Center for Environmental Law and Natural Resources (CEDERENA) (S. Jimémez,
personal communication April 3, 2001). All
three of these organizations are affiliated with the Eugene, Oregon-based
Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide (ELAW) which has provided legal and
technical support to the project. Specifically,
ELAW provided information on the effect of seismic blasts on marine mammals
(2000). Other international
support has come from EarthJustice Legal Defense Fund (formally Sierra Club
Legal Defense Fund), which had extensive communication with Justicia in
preparation for both court cases, as well as the Natural Resources Defense
Council, which through a contact with an American lawyer living on the South
Caribbean, is providing primarily monetary and media support.
The involvement of foreign,
U.S.-based environmental organizations in this issue has raised several
interesting questions. Chief among these is the idea of environmental
imperialism-that foreign groups are attempting to prevent local people from
making decisions about how to use their own local resources.
In addition to foreign organizations entering the campaign, it is
important to note that all of the environmental organizations I spoke with
during this research were funded by foreign sources, particularly foreign
embassies and foundations. Considering
the myriad of international influences at play on both side of this issue
however, the environmental imperialism argument is highly suspect; yet it has
gained favor among some segments of the population in Límon.
Another
concern among the Costa Rican environmental law organizations, especially
CEDERENA, is that the entrance of foreign groups, with less stake in the outcome
of the issue such as the NRDC, will overshadow their own work and may perhaps
damage their working reputation with the Costa Rican Government or other
important entities. “The NRDC has
nothing to lose because they don't work here every day” (A. Campos, personal
communication, April 5, 2001). In the same interview, Alvaro Campos informed me of past
instances that he was aware of where the NRDC had taken out inflammatory
advertisements in local newspapers using the names of local organizations.
When the ads angered various parties, he said, the reputations of the
local parties suffered. Whether Campos’ fears are justified in this specific case
is not known, however one significant problem in the American environmental
movement certainly is that the need for organizations such as the NRDC to
generate funds by constantly attempting to increase their membership base forces
them into taking actions purely to please their contributors-whether or not
those actions actually accomplish stated environmental goals.
Currently, in addition to eagerly awaiting the Constitutional
Court’s ruling on their lawsuit, the law organizations are also preparing for
future legal action. According to
CEDERENA, the method by which they structured their latest court battle leaves
them prepared, in case of an unfavorable ruling, to bring a suit before an
international human rights court on the grounds that the national government of
Costa Rica is ignoring the basic rights guaranteed to their citizens (ibid).
In addition, they are exploring charges that seismic exploration of the
coast of Moín has negatively impacted the fishing industry in the area.
Indeed during certain periods of exploration, representatives from Harken
Energy paid fishermen either not to fish, or to leave the area temporarily due
to danger to them by seismic blasts in the ocean.
Through the course of numerous meetings with local fishermen near Moín,
of which I attended three, opposition representatives attempted to gather
accurate information about who was paid and by whom, in what manner as well as
in what quantities in order to determine whether fishermen were justly
compensated for the time they were prohibited from fishing.
Although
the results have not yet been compiled, according to sources within the
opposition campaign, it appears as though fishermen were generally paid in cash
or gasoline, thus making it more difficult to trace the money source. Those who
were especially cooperative or who wield more power in the industry were paid
more, though no one was paid nearly enough for the money they would have made if
they would have been able to fish (C. Evens, personal communication, March 9,
2001). A larger concern however, is
that as a result of the seismic tests conducted by the company
the number of fish and lobsters in the area has drastically decreased.
Although as of yet there have been no scientific studies to confirm
population decreases, reports from fishermen I spoke with, in addition to
second-hand accounts from numerous community members, indicate that this is the
case. This does not however, prove
that the population decrease has been caused by exploration activities, and
indeed the causation reports I heard were decidedly mixed.
The Ministry of Hydrocarbons, a division of MINAE, claims that La Niña
is the culprit, Alvero Campos believes that there has been significant
overfishing in the area, though Jessica Hampton, who in addition to acting as
the NRDC representative in the area, is also highly active in a number of
environmental pursuits, adamantly denies this.
Another possible, though less likely explanation involves natural
migration patterns of lobsters in the area.
The
fishermen, for their part are a divided group.
Currently the only significant population segment being directly affected
by the exploration, they have not traditionally been an ally of either
environmentalists or transnational energy corporations.
A group of low economic standing, educational levels, and political
power, they have always had laws and regulations imposed on them from above.
Their distrust of both lawyers and politicians runs high, and as of late
they have been especially angry at environmentalists who have prevented them
from fishing for turtles as well as from using fishing nets without specialized
turtle-exclusion devices, as well as the government for a general lack of
concern for their situation.
Indeed
even my presence in the small fishing village of Portéte, just north of Límon,
was met with mixed reactions. After talking with a small group of fishermen one afternoon
about the state of fish populations in the area and their thoughts about the
exploration, one man remarked to me:
Why
would you want to come here and hang out with us poor people? This is our life
and you are just coming here for a little experience-you’ll write about us in
your little notebook and then you’ll go back to your rich university to your
professors who don’t care at all about us.
How do you think you can relate to us? (E. Walton, personal
communication, March 13, 2001)
Comments
such as this certainly made me question the relevancy of my research and my
purpose for being there.
Fishermen who are especially attached to their trade have
latched on to the idea that their recent lack of profit is due to the petroleum
exploration: “I’ve been fishing here for eighteen years, and I just want to
continue to practice my trade. The
government doesn’t care about us, they made the deal with the oil company for
their own benefit, not to help us here in Portéte or in Límon” (A. Sanchez,
Personal Communication March 13, 2001). While
opposition leaders from Límon aggressively promote this sentiment, handing out
propaganda of drawings of fishing boats floating in a sea of oil (see Appendix,
Figure 1), some environmental lawyers in San Jose are worried that they are
sending the fishermen mixed messages. A representative from CEDERENA told me that, because of the
causation uncertainties mentioned earlier, it would be very difficult to bring
the fishermen to court to attempt to win them compensation. “We don’t want
to promise them something we can’t deliver” (A. Campos, personal
communication, April 5, 2001). Thus,
he said, it may be better to simply attempt to keep the fishermen organized in
the political fight against the exploration, rather than embroil them in the
legal struggle.
Other
fisherman however, are not sympathetic to the opposition, and instead welcome
Harken’s presence as source for potential employment.
“Fishing here is no way to live” one man told me, “you never know
when you’ll get paid, but the company, they take care of you-give you check
every month and a pension too.” (J. Mora, personal communication, March 17,
2001). When I asked the man whether he was concerned that the oil
exploration might hurt the livelihoods of his peers in Portéte, he told me that
the oil company “wouldn’t hurt anything” and continued on to explain to me
how good the banana workers have it working on the Chiquita (formally known as
United Fruit Company) plantations. This
goes to show that when it comes to political issues, people will often believe
what they want to, regardless of all factual evidence.
In this case it seems that beliefs stem from economic situation, and for
many fishermen in Portéte right now hope is all they have.
The arrival of Harken Energy in Límon for them represents a new
opportunity.
Despite
this focus on legal action, perceptions of the prospects for victory on this
front are decidedly mixed among the environmental law community.
While some show a marked optimism, “Well, we won once didn’t we?”
(J. Hampton, personal communication, April 7, 2001), others, such Alvaro Campos
from CEDERENA feel that the political pressure mounted against them is too
great, and that the legal campaign is simply a way to delay the process.
The ultimate goal, for them is to change the laws, and thus the political
conditions that allow the adoption of legislation such as the Hydrocarbons Law
in the first place (A. Campos, personal communication April 5, 2001).
This
viewpoint, coming from CEDERENA, is particularly interesting considering that
Campos referred to the Natural Resources Defense Council as “a little bit
radical,” and said CEDEENA was more interested in legal and technical
arguments than political activism (personal communication February 26, 2001).
Although there is a consensus within the opposition campaign that the
current legal campaign cannot stand on its own to prevent exploration in Límon,
supplemental strategies vary among different segments and individuals.
Some like the president of the Development Association (Asociación de
Desarrollo) in Cahuita, believe that legal action is still the answer, but that
more funds must be raised in order to boost the resources of the legal campaign.
The idea that justice can be bought is certainly not a new one in Costa
Rica nor in the United States-the legal model on which the Costa Rican system is
based. While raising funds is seen as necessary for whatever type of
strategy the opposition campaign chooses to adopt, many feel that a more
directly political strategy is necessary for them to reach their goals.
Environmental
“Activists”
While it is always difficult to distinguish the various parts of the
environmental movement, one distinction that may be useful in this case is the
difference between those that consider themselves environmental professionals
(e.g. lawyers) and those who might be referred to as environmental activists.
Certainly these categories are artificial and there is a great deal of
overlap between them, though the differences in philosophy and tactics between
the group discussed above and the organizations that are the focus of this
section are substantial. Environmental activists in this case, generally refers to the
international Oilwatch network and its subsidiary student organization at the
University of Costa Rica known as Fecou, both of which have played an important
part in the opposition campaign. Although
one could certainly place the southern Caribbean coalition known as Adela in
this category, because of its local focus (and also philosophical differences)
it will be treated in the proximate section.
The structure and history of Oilwatch in Costa Rica deserves special
attention as it demonstrates many of the differences between the organization
and the environmental law entities described earlier, as well as foreign
organizations with international components such as the NRDC.
According to a document on its website, Oilwatch is an international
network which:
…looks to increase
environmental consciousness on a global scale, exposing the impacts of oil
activity on tropical forests and on the local populations, establishing as well,
links to the destruction of biodiversity, with climate change, with the
violation of human rights and with the role of the Multi-Lateral Bank of Credit
(What is Oilwatch? p. 1).
The goals of the
network are thus extremely ambitious; focusing on local campaigns such as the
one in Límon in order to demonstrate larger relationships between energy
production, environmental degradation and human rights abuses.
Certainly this ideological, big-picture approach is reflected in their
literature as well as in my conversations with network representatives-
“Petroleum isn’t the only thing we have on our minds” (L. Guevara,
personal communication, April 4, 2001).
The
Costa Rican branch of the network was conceived of in 1996 and officially
created in 1999, directly in response to the current exploration situation.
It was formed primarily by a group of environmental activists formally in
connection with a Friends of the Earth affiliated group known as ECO.
The young activists of ECO spent the early 1990’s embroiled in a
campaign against deforestation caused by the Stone Paper Container Corporation
on the Osa peninsula in southern Costa Rica.
Although according to Lizbeth Guevara, ECO was successful in its fight,
four members of their organization mysteriously died while supporting their
cause. She chose not to elaborate
on this subject but did add that it was a watershed event, and that ECO
disbanded soon afterwards in 1997, after which several of the members, including
herself began putting together the plans for Oilwatch Costa Rica.
Although the Oilwatch network is very decentralized, it does have a small
part-time secretariat in Quito, Ecuador. According
to website literature, Oilwatch has fifteen member organizations around the
world, primarily in Africa and Latin America, as well as other affiliated
members which give the network connections in over 50 countries of people
affected or threatened by petroleum activities (What is Oilwatch? 2000).
In addition to a share of the international network’s limited funds,
the Costa Rican branch is receiving contributions from a Mexico based
organization called EWOS, which funds numerous environmental organizations in
Central America. All in all
however, the branch is not receiving as many funds as other organizations in the
network due to the number of groups involved in the campaign in Límon, as well
as the well-developed nature of the Costa Rican environmental movement in
general.
Although Oilwatch Costa Rica is an inherently transitory organization
(the organizers plan to form a different organization once this issue is
resolved), its members ideally wish to change the way that Ticos conceptualize
environmental problems in order to build a popular movement to restructure the
political climate in the country (L. Guevara, personal communication, April 4,
2001). For Guevara and other activists in Oilwatch, the current oil
exploration is just one fight in the larger war for the environmental or
“green” movement. Certainly
this conceptualization is very different from the work-within-the-system focus
of the environmental law organizations, or as we will see later, the
here-and-now mindset of local activists in Límon.
Although I originally sensed a level of tension among these
philosophically and practically different segments of the opposition campaign:
“We’re not interested in lawyers or legal strategy here” (ibid), “we
don’t always agree with their tactics, and there are differences in
philosophy” (S. Jiménez, personal communication, April 3, 2001), I was
assured many times that my perceptions were incorrect “There is no tension,
because we all play our roles” (A. Campos, personal communication, April 5,
2001).
Although their vision, knowledge and dedication, especially among the
young student leaders, impressed me very much, as I found myself speaking to
Guevara, as well as the student leader Rolando Balbosa (Rolando B.) several
times in a dimly lit greenish loft, Anarchy flag and loud punk music in the
background, I couldn’t help but ask myself how the average Costa Rican relates
to these groups on the more radical end of the environmental movement.
Certainly the problem of getting a message across to a mainstream, often
ill-informed populous, is a formidable task for any political organization,
though the image of familiarly or legitimacy often goes a long way.
Certainly this is something that may take time and effort from this wing
of the movement.
Local
Community Leaders
Drawing heavily on the influences of the previous two groups as well as
high emotion and motivation, local community leaders from Límon Centro and the
southern Caribbean provide another major, if not the most crucial force in the
opposition campaign. The
individuals active in the campaign on a local level are a fairly diverse
collection, though generally speaking fall somewhere in between the
environmental lawyers and San Jose-based activists in philosophy, although this
is somewhat of a misnomer considering that some of them are lawyers or
environmental activists, or both. Many
however, though they may certainly consider themselves environmentalists, are
involved in the tourism industry, and in addition to their business they are
active in local development organizations or industry boards (Camerás de
Turismo). Individual worldviews and
political ideologies may differ or be more or less well developed among various
individuals, but the common thread certainly is that all of these people are
driven to action by the belief that petroleum exploration, for any of several
reasons represents an immediate threat to their local community.
Thus it is here that economic, socio-cultural and environmental interests
converge.
This convergence is perhaps best explained through local residents’
narratives involving the concept of livelihood.
Certainly petroleum exploration has the potential to damage the tourism
industry on which communities on the southern Caribbean depend, however for many
the economic aspect is simply one part of a larger vision of their community and
the values that they see and wish to see in it.
This idea is especially strong among the foreign activists living in town
such as Cahuita, Puerto Viejo and Manzanillo on the coast.
Tired of the formality and the grueling pace of life in European and
North American cities, many came to Caribbean Costa Rica in search of a new
beginning. They see the area as a
multicultural paradise, where people from different racial and ethnic
backgrounds live in harmony with each other and the natural environment.
Oil exploration consequently is viewed as a threat to their way of life,
not just to their businesses: “It’s a very strong coalition because we know
what we believe in. This is our
home, our livelihood, our environment, the Earth-it’s the whole world
actually” (E. Shultz, personal communication March 4, 2001); “…if there
was a spill, well of course that would destroy all our livelihoods down here”
(K. Lomax, personal communication, March 16, 2001).
Native Límonenses in the area, although certainly sharing these same
values to some degree, tend to focus more on the economic side of the issue.
In my interviews with them and in their public comments they focused more
on the threat the exploration poses to the tourism industry and what they see as
the lack of economic benefit to the area from the project.
“Tourism is the only development solution for the area” (C. Evens,
public meeting at the Municipality of Talamanca 3/12). “The oil is a threat to
the tourist economy of this area, and the environment too-if the corals are
damaged, then that would be very bad for Cahuita” (J. Romero, personal
communication, March 9, 2001) Certainly for these people, the environment and
the economy-for their community as well as their individual quality of life-are
inextricably intertwined.
Another extremely important point is the perception of this situation as
a racial, or environmental justice issue. Several
Afro-Caribbean community leaders in the area hold that the current oil
exploration project represents another example of the white, Hispanic government
imposing policy on area’s black population without their consent and against
their will. To them, it is another
incident in the long line of abuses touched on in Part II as well as the
continued silencing of the community, as witnessed by facts such as the lack of
education in schools about the history of the Afro-Caribbean community in Costa
Rica. The fact that letters written by Afro-Caribbean leaders to the national
government about the issue were rejected because of their alleged “strong
content,” certainly has provided more fuel to this perception.
Local
activists in the area are very proud of the strength and diversity of their
coalition: “It’s a very large coalition, it’s not just a few people
pulling the strings” (E. Shultz, personal communication, March 4, 2001).
While this comment seems to largely hold true, a more in-depth
exploration reveals that there is a small group of individuals that hold
prominent positions in a number of key organizations in the Límon area.
All in all, my investigation revealed approximately 20 key individuals in
the opposition campaign (although including the support staffs of certain
organizations, the number is somewhat larger), and of those 8-10 appear to be
especially important.
These numbers, placed alongside the fact that, excluding fishermen and
indigenous representatives, the opposition campaign is composed of a population
that is more or less economically well off (especially when compared to others
in their communities in Límon), demonstrate the idea that that in the world
today it is a privilege to be able to fight for the environment.
Although environmentalists rightly argue that advocating for the
environment ultimately means advocating for the basic needs of all life on the
planet including and especially humans, the fact remains that most people cannot
sacrifice time out of providing for their day-to-day necessities for
environmental activism. This of
course is especially true in the developing world.
Certainly
this raises serious questions about representation and democracy in relation to
the environmental movement in general, but it is especially applicable to this
particular situation. Indeed one of
the main criticisms made by exploration supporters of the opposition campaign on
the Caribbean is that it is mostly made up of wealthy foreigners protecting
their own interests and attempting to speak for local people: “The people who
are against the exploration are mostly the Europeans around here. They figured that they would lose tourist business so they
decided to start the whole destruction theme” (H. Taylor, personal
communication, March 21, 2001). Do
local communities share the sentiments expressed by the previous quote (from a
Cahuitan man), or do they respect and admire the activists for trying to defend
their communities? While this study
cannot answer these questions completely, it can provide some important clues.
First
of all, it is important to note that although the perception that foreigners are
dominating the local opposition campaign does have some merit, the stereotype
doesn’t exactly hold. Out of the approximately 20 key individuals mentioned above,
only 6 are foreigners. Community
activists for their part claim that opposition among residents along the
southern Caribbean (specifically from Cahuita to Manzanillo) runs higher than
90%, though they admit that the communities in areas around Límon Centro are
much more divided. Although these
sentiments are shared by the vast majority of local opposition leaders, there
are several who show less faith in the public: “People here are very fickle,
you tell them one thing one day and they agree with you, then somebody else
tells them something different and they change their minds” (R. Abbey,
personal communication, February 17, 2001).
In
a study conducted by a group of Dutch researchers about the environmental values
of the residents of Cahuita, 209 local residents were asked two questions about
their views in regard to petroleum exploration on the Caribbean (see Appendix,
Figure 4). In response to the first
question, which asked whether the respondent agreed that “petroleum
exploration would be realized at the expense of the natural environment,” a
full 78% of the respondents were either in “agreement” or “total
agreement” (Schoemakers, et. al. 2001). The
second question asked whether respondents’ agreed that “petroleum
exploration would have a negative impact on the development of tourism in
Cahuita,” and it was met with a response of nearly 72% in agreement or total
agreement (ibid.). Although the
structure of the questions raises concerns of possible bias and the
investigators’ limited Spanish language skills are evident in the survey
wording (the above quotes are my translation), I believe that it is safe to say
that a solid majority of the residents of Cahuita oppose the current exploration
project. In addition, due to
similar demographic patterns and my own experiences living the in area, I think
it is reasonable to extrapolate these results to other towns along the southern
Caribbean including Puerto Viejo and Manzanillo-though certainly not to the
Puerto Límon area. Finally,
although this study does provide information about the opinion of these
communities in regard to the exploration, it does not provide information about
how well informed the population is about the issue-a hot topic of debate that
will be discussed later in this chapter.
While
the campaign activities in Límon Centro involved weekly meetings with fishermen
in a small village and a march on Labor Day (May 1), the campaign on the
southern Caribbean, in contrast, has had more of a constant high profile.
As one approaches Cahuita from the north, signs bearing the phrase “No
a la Petrolera” can be seen along the highway all the way to the end of the
paved road, south of Puerto Viejo in a village known as Punta Uva.
In addition, vivid color posters are present in many businesses; they
sport images of two hands-one holding a vibrant scene of wildlife, beaches and
surfers, the other showing the same scene in drab colors, dead animals and oil
filled water with wording that reads “Escojamos! Nuestros futuro está en
nuestros manos” (We choose! Our future is in our hands).
T-Shirts, hats and donation jars are also widespread.
These
images, part of an emotionally based “public education” campaign are one
strategy of the opposition campaign in the area.
Adela,
which is the primary organization to which most of the southern Caribbean
community activists belong, in conjunction with Oilwatch, is responsible for
much of this propaganda. Other
important local-level tactics conducted by community activists include teach-ins
often performed in conjunction with environmental lawyers or representatives
from Oilwatch, marches and other public events and meetings with local
officials. Aside from lobbying of
municipal politicians, these activities are aimed at “informing” the public
of the issue and building support for the campaign.
Another
interesting strategy, which is being carried out by a conservation group on the
southern Caribbean known as Corredor Biologico, is to integrate lessons about
the environmental consequences of the consumption of fossil fuels in general,
and the exploration of petroleum specifically, into their already existing
environmental education programs in local schools.
When I asked whether the organization might run into problems with the
national government over this curriculum, the director of the organization
dismissed my concern (M. Delgado, personal communication, March 8, 2001).
Perhaps this is demonstrative of the central government’s inability to
control policy implementation in the country in general, though in this case it
might not be a bad thing.
The emotional, environmentally-based and highly visible campaign on the
southern Caribbean, versus the more low profile, economic and social
justice-based work in Límon raises a number of important questions.
After a short amount of time in the field I became convinced that these
tactics represented a conscious, well thought out strategy to appeal to
divergent populations in these economically and culturally different
communities. The southern Caribbean
campaign, it seemed was directed at the plentiful population of tourists in the
area who are, if not truly environmentally conscious, at least are highly
susceptible to images of cute animals and beaches drowning in oil.
Logically, appealing to this population could hope to bring in money
(hence the donation boxes and campaign souvenirs) for the legal fight of other
facets of the campaign. This perception of mine was bolstered when I viewed a
recently created video about the situation at a fishermen’s meeting in March.
The film was replete with images of the area’s spectacular wildlife but
short on content about the impact (or lack thereof) of the exploration on the
local economy. As I expected, the video did not hold the fishermens’
attention, though it did seem remarkably similar to propaganda often created by
American environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club (or the NRDC) in
order to solicit contributions from upper-middle class liberal
environmentalists.
Although
my impressions were not totally incorrect, I later learned that the differing
elements in the campaign structure reflected more the identities and isolated
activities of individuals in each community than centralized planning and
coordination. In other words, the
diverse strategies stem more from disorganization than organization.
The video, for instance, was created by a Danish man paid by the
opposition campaign; he took video footage, conducted interviews and pieced the
film together in Guatemala with little input from local activists.
Though according to Jessica Hampton, the video has been well received
(personal communication, April 9, 2001); it is not part of a conscious plan to
solicit contributions from wealthy tourists or foreign environmentalists.
In addition, although Justicia was paid by the opposition campaign for
their work on the first case, most of the legal counsel has been pro
bono. Money collected on the
southern Caribbean from donations and souvenir sales is being funneled directly
to Adela to print more propaganda and conduct teach-ins-not to provide resources
for the legal defense.
Indigenous
Participation
The decision by Harken Energy to abandon exploration plans in indigenous
territories announced in March significantly changed the role of the native
inhabitants of Talamanca in the opposition campaign.
The fact that the situation changed very rapidly in this respect combined
with my difficulties contacting and arranging meetings with indigenous
representatives has made it difficult to generalize about their perceptions of
the issue as well as their overall participation in the opposition campaign. Despite these circumstances several important points can be
derived in this respect.
While the names of indigenous organizations and representatives, as well
as talk of their participation, always figured prominently in opposition
literature and public rhetoric, direct evidence of their participation was scant
from the beginning. Even before
Harken announcement was made, I never saw an indigenous representative at any
meeting or event I attended, and specific names of community representatives
mentioned in interviews I conducted with other opposition leaders were few and
far between. I was told however,
that because of the relative isolation of the reserves and lack of time,
indigenous leaders were often unable to attend meetings or public events
regarding the exploration. Also to
their credit, as mentioned earlier, indigenous groups were involved in the court
proceedings and did have an organized plan to boycott MINAE's planed public
consultations before Harken made their withdrawal announcement: “We were not
interested in being consulted” (M. Fernandez, personal communication, April
10, 2001). Recently, indigenous
representatives took part in the Labor Day march in Límon Centro as well.
I conducted three interviews with indigenous leaders during my
investigation, one in San Jose, and two in indigenous reserves. What was most
striking about the three interviews was the two very divergent perspectives on
the current state and future prospects for indigenous people in Costa Rica.
Although all three expressed determination to fight for control of their
local resources and for the preservation of their culture, Miguel Fernandez, a
representative from project Namasöl, was decidedly more optimistic about the
future of their people.
He
described project Namasöl as “…an international project of
cooperation…the first of its kind…95% of the people working on the project
are indigenous” (ibid). Although
I was seeking only a basic introduction to the purpose, structure and activities
of the organization, most of our interview was spent with Fernandez proudly
speaking of the achievements and future goals of the project.
Although he expressed continued indigenous support for the opposition
campaign, he remarked that “It’s a problem of time” and stressed to me the
fact that the indigenous communities of Talamanca and Chiripó are also
currently embroiled in a struggle against a proposed hydroelectric project in
the area that would allow Costa Rica to sell electricity to its Central American
neighbors. Putting the exploration
in context he remarked, “it’s not just about petroleum, it’s about energy,
hydroelectricity-it’s about everything” (ibid).
Sadly
enough, in contrast to the pride and optimism exhibited by Miguel Fernandez, María
Hernandez at the Keikoldi reserve and Jose Palma of the Social and Educational
Development and Rescue Project for Indigenous Reserves (Proyecto Rescate y
Desarrollo Social y Educativo para Los Pueblos Aborigenes) in San Jose showed a
marked pessimism about the exploration situation and a sense of hopelessness
about the future of their people in general.
“The government has always done whatever they wanted to the indigenous
people here, they may do something to pacify us now, but once the people forget,
they will be back–democracy in this country is only for the rich (M.
Hernandez, personal communication, February 17, 2001).
It is important to mention however that these latter two interviews were
conducted before Harken abandoned their plans in the on-shore blocks, whereas
the former, of course, was conducted afterward.
This fact however, does not change the sentiment a great deal.
The
Supporters
Although many arguments in support of the exploration project have
already been introduced, as well as some of the supporters, it is important to
review some of their arguments and delve deeper, as with other groups, into
their perceptions and motivations. As
mentioned earlier, the economy of Puerto Límon is primarily based around the
port and the refinery. Thus their
proximity to, or in some cases their employment in hydrocarbon-based activities
already makes many people in this area likely supporters of petroleum
exploration. These are also
strongly unionized industries, and union stances on various issues carry a great
deal of weight in the Puerto Límon area. According
to a representative from the group Límon en Lucha, a coalition of labor,
community and women’s organizations in the area, the central government and
Harken, since 1999 have been very active in promoting the exploration in Puerto
Límon, especially to the unions. “Their
false promises of jobs and other economic benefits has been very difficult for
many union members to ignore” (R. Martinez, personal communication, April 17,
2001). Considering the economic situation in the area currently,
this sentiment is not surprising.
Supporters of exploration, of course dispute many of the claims of the
opposition. In particular they
charge that the opposition is distorting the issue, that their emotionally based
appeals described earlier are meant to confuse the public about the difference
between exploration and exploitation: “There are a lot of people here
misinforming and trying to take advantage of the project” (T. Maxwell,
personal communication, March 6, 2001). One statistic often cited is the fact that only 2% of all oil
spilled in the world is caused from exploration activities (National Academy of
Sciences, 2001).
Similarly, they strongly disagree with the narrative of the greedy,
selfish foreign company and the shady government deal.
One long-time employee of the RECOPE refinery and resident of Cahuita
shared his perspective of the situation with me, and had many positive comments
to make about his employer and the energy companies he has worked with in the
past. “If I didn’t work for RECOPE, I don’t know what I would
be doing…maybe selling drugs like the others” (H. Taylor, personal
communication March 21, 2001).
Henry Lewis has been contracted out to work on exploration projects
twice-first for PetroCanada in the 1970’s and later to PEMEX during the
controversial inland project on Talamanca indigenous reserves.
He said that each time he was treated very well, paid fairly, and that
because they dedicated a good deal of time to training him new skills he is now
qualified to do many different jobs. All
in all he says “They were both great opportunities for me, I learned a lot”
(ibid).
In addition, according to Henry Lewis, the companies were very open about
their operations: “they didn’t hide nothing from nobody” (ibid), and in
regard to charges that the project was damaging to local communities he insists
“they never did any damage to no one.”
The land, he said, “was left better than they found it” and that
“the Indians got a lot of benefits” from the project including increased
transportation, employment and educational opportunities (ibid).
Interestingly enough
however, Taylor was very negative in his comments regarding the working
conditions in private companies in the area.
He stressed to me the advantages of working for a state-run enterprise
including the right to form unions, job security and the ability to accumulate a
record of service which allows employees vacation time and a pension when the
retire. With most large private
firms in the area he said “you are like a slave” and that all of the above
benefits are denied to workers (ibid). Certainly
this contrasts with his experiences working for private companies on government
contracts and makes one wonder which situation future local Harken Energy
workers might find themselves in.
Representatives from Harken in Límon and company associates insist that
the exploration project is an important development opportunity for the area and
that all parties involved have only local residents’ best interests involved.
Two such men are Óscar Castro, an engineer from Límon who serves as the
company’s local representative and Tex Maxwell, an American businessmen and
long time Límon resident who is also connected to the project.
My meeting with them at Maxwell’s oceanside home in Moín was certainly
one of my most memorable.
Several times they stressed to me that they became involved in the
project as “concerned citizens of Límon” (T. Maxwell, personal
communication, March 6, 2001) and Maxwell assured me of his commitment to the
environment by declaring that “I actually worked fighting fires, I actually
worked picking up pollution.” They were very happy that I came to them instead of to the
opposition campaign so that I could obtain “the correct information” though
several questions that I asked them provoked responses such as “Okay, you’re
not being very honest with us, you know more than you say you do” (Ó Castro,
personal communication, March 6, 2001). They
believe that foreign environmentalists are running the opposition campaign to
further their own interests, which in their eyes even include wild theories
including preventing all development in indigenous lands in order to promote the
production of drugs for sale in the area. The emotional tactics of the
opposition campaign mentioned earlier infuriate them.
When describing the importance of the project to the local economy, their
tone is one of desperation:
The unemployment rate
in Límon is very high; Talamanca is the poorest Cantón in all of Costa Rica.
Investors don’t want to invest here, because every investment is going
to cause problems. We have two
choices: to change the situation or to leave-we want to change the situation
because we want to stay. If
somebody would come here to tell me “don’t do that, do something else” ok,
we will do it, but nobody’s coming with options-there are no options…what
are the options for our kids? (Ó Castro, ibid).
Undoubtedly he is
right, Límon is struggling to find development options right now, and many of
the government downsizing projects carried out in the nation, such as the recent
plan to privatize the national electrical company, have been met with great
resistance in the area. Although
these two men are very passionate in their desire to see economic development in
Límon, the question that begs to be asked however is whether the petroleum
exploration will be a positive development for the area.
This topic will be the focus of the following section.
Weighing
the Arguments
With passions running high on both sides of the issue and little
objective information to go around, sorting through the arguments of various
parties has proven to be a daunting task. Throughout
my investigation, not surprisingly, I found myself falling back on my academic
background and my own values and political inclinations to judge the information
I was receiving. Up until now I
have tried to use informants’ own words to summarize viewpoints, providing
direct testimony and examples to illustrate the arguments and perceptions of the
various actors and organizations involved in the issue.
Although it is easy to become bogged down in scientific and technical
arguments about the likelihood of spills and environmental damage, the fact is
that there has not been enough scientific study in several areas to make
“objective” judgments about many of the specifics of this particular case.
As has been noted several times in various configurations throughout this
paper however, when dealing with environmental issues of this nature, it is the
larger picture that is important; one could deconstruct individual arguments and
analyze group strategies and shortcomings endlessly, but the important question
are “who benefits and for how long?” Thus
my aim is a utilitarian one; in other words I am interested in the costs and
benefits of petroleum exploration in Limon, to the local community and to the
nation both present and future, as well as the reverberations this situations
may have on similar cases throughout the world.
Looking at the situation on the macro level, one of the most important
arguments is one of sovereignty; who has the right to exploit resources in
developing countries such as Costa Rica and for what purpose?
As has previously been articulated, many exploration supporters charge
the opposition campaign of environmental imperialism.
Perhaps the best articulation of this comes from Tex Maxwell: “They
tell us we can’t look for oil here because there is some kind of outsider
environmentalists that came from these same oil producing First-World countries
and they tell us ‘no, you don’t have the right as us to develop’”
(personal communication, March 6, 2001). Tex
is right in that there are a number of foreign environmentalists in the
opposition campaign, and they do come from First-World countries that developed
largely with the help of petroleum. The
problem is however, that Tex is also a foreigner and more importantly, the
company he does business with, Harken Energy, is foreign as well.
Thus although exploration supporters argue that Costa Rica should be able
to exploit its own resources, in this case it is not Costa Rica that is
exploiting the resource. And one cannot deny that it is not Costa Rica that will be
deriving most of the benefits from the project. Harken Energy will extract the petroleum and will
consequently resell it to Costa Rica (or anyone else in the world) at market
price, thus the host country will not receive a bargain in this respect.
As for the approximately 5% royalties the Costa Rican government will
receive from eventual profits and the approximately 6% destined for social and
environmental projects in Límon, opposition skepticism that the money will ever
materialize, though it is sheer speculation at this point, certainly has a basis
in history. One has to look no father than the fact that Exxon (now Exxon-Mobil)
has yet to pay damages ordered after the 1989 spill in Prince William Sound in
Alaska, to find evidence of multinational energy companies ability to wiggle out
of their legal commitments. Although
I was assured by opposition lawyers that similar agreements to provide local
benefits have been signed around the world and ignored by multinational energy
companies, due to lack of time I was not able to obtain specific information
about other contracts.
As
for the job prospects and potential economic development possibilities created
by the project, the numbers are very murky, however one does not need to be
economist to understand that oil exploration and exploitation are very
mechanically rather than labor intensive processes.
According to an article in the Tico Times on May 4th, Óscar Castro, has
admitted in the past that only 60 jobs will be created during the exploration
stage, only 33% of which will filled by local workers.
The rest will be subcontracted out to international specialists.
During the production stage an additional 200 jobs will be created, but
only a small percentage will be given to local workers, mostly in positions of
kitchen or cleaning help (Rogers, May 4, 2001). Although Castro denied having said this in the article, it
matches roughly what he told me in our interview as well as the numbers I have
been given from several of other sources.
During my conversation with Castro and Maxwell they both stressed
indirect economic benefits from the project.
Among other things they emphasized transportation of materials to the
site and services for the workers including food supplies (indeed according to
sources, Maxwell’s wife owns a business that supplies catering services to
workers on ships in Puerto Límon). There
are no estimates at this time as to the overall impact on the local economy that
the project could have, but regardless, the question that needs to be asked is
whether this operation can really sustain the economy of the region and for how
long?
Looking
at the possible costs on other side of the coin, it is obviously Costa Rica, and
particularly the populations of Límon, who stand to incur any environmental
damage that the operation could possibly produce.
Certainly, when compared to other petroleum producing activities,
exploration is very safe, however exploration is expected in this case to
inevitably lead to exploitation, and clearly this is a far more risky
proposition. Exploration supporters
point out that the majority of oil spilled is caused from transportation
activities, thus if oil is exploited off the Caribbean coast and refined in
Costa Rica, then there will be no need for transportation and therefore much
less danger to the environment. This seemed like a very important argument to me
until I learned that that the refinery is currently not operational and will not
be for several years, if ever. If
the Costa Rican refinery is not capable of refining the oil domestically, then
certainly the above argument does not hold up.
Other
current projects by American transnational energy companies operating in Latin
America, according to research conducted by Oilwatch, also provide very damaging
evidence to counter Harken’s claims of environmental friendliness.
A Texaco operation that has been conducted in Ecuador for 28 years has
been the site of frequent accidents, spilling a total of 16.8 million gallons of
oil into Amazonian rainforests. Likewise,
Occidental Oil’s project in and around Lake Lipa has severely contaminated
local ecosystems as well as had negative socio-cultural effects on indigenous
populations in the region (2000). While
it is unfair to say that Harken’s operations in Costa Rica will inevitably
follow in the footsteps of their peers in the region, it is safe to say that
history is not on their side.
An interesting strategy, expressed to
me by a representative in the Municipality of Talamanca is to advocate a “wait
and see” approach: “I think we should just see what we have, how can we know
what we have if we don’t explore?” (G. Brown, personal communication April
19, 2001) Although this sounds like a reasonable middle ground, it is
problematic for several reasons. First
of all, once the government signs the contract, the necessary environmental
impact studies are created and procedures are laid out, Harken Energy has a
legal right to exploit the resource. Although
I am not a lawyer, it sees fairly safe to say that as long as Harken follows the
contract and the environmental and other safeguards laid down by MINAE, it would
be very difficult for Costa Rica to declare after the exploration period that
Harken cannot exploit the petroleum. Moreover,
this logic can be dangerous when considering that environmental damage can be
irreversible, as well as a threat to the local economies already in place,
whereas oil exploitation only represents a possible source of economic benefit.
Perhaps most significantly though, this exploration represents negligence
and a lack of forward thinking on the part of decision-makers within the Costa
Rican government. As noted by
Marvin Johnson, president of the development association of Puerto Viejo, “The
government should be writing laws for my grandchildren,” (personal
communication, February 16, 2001) however, by the time his grandchildren are old
enough to vote, global oil supplies will most likely be exhausted.
To base the future of economic development in a region on a resource that
is absolutely not sustainable and whose exploitation has the potential to
destroy the rest of the economic base in the area is reckless.
This is especially inexcusable for a developing nation who in the past
has had the vision to create (however imperfect) a national sustainable
development plan and agreements to sell carbon-sequestering bonds in order to
protect forests and combat global warming in the twenty-first century.
Costa Rica knows better; it should be acting for the long-term benefit of
its people and as the example of sustainable development it wants to be known
as-instead of for the short-term benefit of a multinational company and a few
powerful individuals.
Part V:
Political
Impacts and Consequences
Now
that a picture has been painted of the situation and the key players, their
relationships, beliefs and tactics, the investigation now turns to the overall
political salience and significance of the issue in terms of national politics
in Costa Rica. Although some might
see this as a mostly regional issue, as is the case with most policy in the
small country of Costa Rica, it is being controlled by national politics, which
of course also entails international influences.
Certainly these ideas have been running throughout this paper, however
this final chapter aims to focus them to assess the impacts and consequences of
this issue of petroleum exploration on the future environmental and energy
policies and politics of the nation.
Considering
the fact that these questions are most easily approached by examining the issue
in relation to the upcoming national election, and that in a democracy such as
Costa Rica’s elections are generally the primary modality through which
national agendas are set and accountability is manifested (or not), the analysis
of this chapter will revolve around aspects of electoral politics.
After a brief introduction to Costa Rican democratic structure and
political parties, the relationships of current local and national politicians
as well as aspirants for public office to this issue will be examined.
The discussion will then turn to the overall profile and salience of the
issue on the national level, and its likely future in the political arena.
Governmental
Structure
The
Costa Rican national governmental structure is based on the United States model,
with three interrelated but separate branches.
Although the unicameral legislature is more developed than many of its
Latin American counterparts, the executive branch still holds a disproportionate
share of the power (Lara, 1995). Both the president and the legislative representatives are
elected to four-year terms and cannot run for reelection, though they can serve
non-consecutive terms. Representatives
(Diputados) to the national legislature are elected by province.
Two vice-presidents and a host of cabinet ministers round out the
executive branch. Each ministry
coordinates the actions of all state entities within a given policy sector.
Some are reorganized every time a new administration takes office-the
Ministry of the Environment and Energy (MINAE), for example, was reorganized by
the Figueres administration (1994-1998) from its previous form as the Ministry
of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines. Currently the Second Vice-President,
Elizabeth Odio is also the Secretary of MINAE.
The judicial branch is headed by the Supreme Court (Corte Plena), whose
magistrates are appointed by the legislature to six-year terms. Since they have the possibility of unlimited consecutive
terms they generally serve for life once appointed.
Beyond the Corte Plena there are four Chambers of Justice, the fourth
being the Constitutional Chamber, created in 1989 to uphold the Public
Constitution. Since its inception
the Constitutional Chamber has declared many laws, codes and procedures
unconstitutional, making it the source of great controversy.
Certainly its actions in the current exploration case are no exception.
Another important institution relevant to this case is the office of the
People’s Defender (Defensoría de Los Habitantes), which collects the
complaints of citizens who have been wronged by public officials and ensures
government compliance with the Constitution and other legal agreements.
The position, which is similar to a European-style ombudsman, was created
in 1992 and is elected by the legislative assembly for a four-year term.
Although the People’s Defender cannot punish offenders, it can
advertise occurrences of wrongdoing to the media and advocate the dismissal of
officials. Interestingly enough,
perhaps its most famous case to date was brought against the National Institute
of Tourism for failing to abide by environmental protection laws and respect
coastal ecosystems in creating tourist developments on the Gulf of Papagayo (on
the Northern Pacific Coast) (Lara, 1995). As
this case demonstrates, perhaps petroleum exploration isn’t the only industry
in Límon whose future development threatens the environment (but that is a
subject for another paper).
On the regional and local levels, Costa Rica is divided into three
distinct tiers: provinces, cantónes and districts.
Although each of the seven provinces is headed by a governor, their role
is mostly symbolic. Most local
governing takes place at the cantonal level, where a popularly elected Municipal
Council, whose members in turn appoint a Municipal Executive (in 2002 the
Municipal Executive, or Alcaldesa, will be popularly elected as well), makes
decisions. In general however,
their powers are severely limited, as the growing number of state ministries and
institutes have absorbed many of their functions. Municipalities are often victims of authoritarianism on the
part of state-level authorities (Lara, 1995), and certainly this case is no
exception.
As mentioned in Part Three, local governments were never consulted before
the Costa Rican Executive branch struck the exploration deal.
As the Municipal Executive of Límon remarked to me: “We have only been
the receiver, we have received what all the world has planned and what all the
world has decided” (E. Gray-Taylor, personal communication, April 18, 2001).
Despite this frustration, the municipal government is attempting to keep
an open mind about the exploration project.
Staking out a middle ground between the two sides of the issue,
Gray-Taylor believes that although many local people may have been deluded by
Harken’s promises of jobs and infrastructure development in the Límon area,
she also feels that opposition leaders have been using scare tactics in order to
promote their agenda (ibid). Despite
the impact of these influences, the municipality is searching for ways to
accurately determine public opinion about the issue among the various sectors of
the community.
Although all municipal representatives that I spoke with are very proud
of their local governments and assured me that they have a large amount of
autonomy and decision-making powers, it is clear that they have little efficacy
in regard to this issue. The most
that the municipalities can do in fact, is to formally declare their opposition
to the project-which the Municipality of Talamanca did in 1999.
Harken Energy, for it is part, is attempting to gain favor among
municipal representatives through symbolic gestures such as helping to decorate
the Christmas tree in Puerto Límon last year and buying gifts for municipal
employees (ibid).
Electoral Politics
Since
1953, the year that José “Don Pepe” Figueres was formally elected president
after taking charge during the revolution of 1948 and drafting a new
constitution; elections have been characterized by clashes between his National
Liberation Party (PLN) and various opposition coalitions and parties.
In 1983 the opposition forces coalesced into a single movement known as
the Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC). Currently
The PUSC holds a majority in the national legislature as well as the Presidency
of Miguel Angel Rodriguez, though due to fear of corruption Costa Ricans
generally elect the opposite party into power every four years.
Although traditionally the PLN is a social democratic party and is
officially a member of the Socialist International, its ideals have been
gradually giving way since the early 1980’s in favor of neo-liberal economic
policies favored by the IMF, World Bank and USAID.
The PUSC, for its part, is generally more conservative than the PLN,
however despite its connections to right-wing groups in Costa Rica and the
United States, its platforms as of late have included promises to address
poverty and promote equal opportunity. The
shift of both parties to the ideological center has made them nearly
indistinguishable in many respects, “especially once the campaigning is over
and the elected party gets down to governing” (Lara, p. 13).
Politicians and
Petroleum
My experiences with public officials, candidates and campaign workers in
Límon indicate that even those active in electoral politics have trouble
defining the Parties. “PLN always
tries to help the disadvantaged, the PUSC always helps the upper class” (Araya
campaign representative, personal communication, April 18, 2001) and likewise
“The core of the PUSC is social justice” (Mendez-Mata campaign
representative, personal communication, March 22, 2001) were about as detailed
of responses as I received to my questions about party identity.
When asked to describe a single issue in which the parties diverged in
their stances, many members of the political class that I spoke with could not
do so and instead changed the subject or resorted to rhetoric like the above
quotes. While some candidates and
their staffs seemed more knowledgeable than others, I was generally stunned by
the lack of preparation and the superficiality of the campaigns I encountered-
though to their credit it is early in the campaign season.
As for the topic of petroleum exploration, not a single candidate nor
member of a campaign staff that I spoke with had substantive knowledge of the
issue. In addition, or possibly as
a result of this ignorance, I found a general reluctance to address the subject.
One candidate from the PLN, after telling me that she supported petroleum
exploration in Límon “because it will bring jobs to the area” added half
jokingly “…but don’t bother me with it now, maybe after I get elected it
will be something I will want to address” (E. Cruickshank, personal
communication, March 13, 2001). Other
campaigns told me that they did not have a stance on the issue or even that they
were not familiar with the situation. Though several expressed approval for the project, for
employment reasons, only one campaign took a strong stance against the
exploration: “Esmerelda is against the exploration because it will harm the
environment…there are a lot of important protected areas around here, and if
they become damaged it will hurt the tourist economy that is so important
here” (E. Britton campaign representative, personal communication April 18,
2001). Interestingly enough, this
comment came after insistence that the centerpiece of the campaign was a promise
to bring jobs to the area.
On
the national front, although not certainly a key election issue, most of the
major presidential candidates have made statements regarding the situation.
Indeed a key strategy for the opposition campaign is to make petroleum
exploration an election issue-to force the candidates to take a stance and
hopefully to persuade them to sign a pact to oppose it.
In this regard they have had some success; although I was not able to
obtain any public statements to confirm this, many opposition leaders assured me
privately and also have said publicly that several major presidential contenders
have come out in opposition to the exploration.
On the PUSC side, opposition leaders believe strongly that Abel Pacheco
opposes the project, though his opponent, Rodolfo Mendez-Mata, the former
Minister of Transportation is a strong supporter.
As for the PLN, Rolando Araya, who many believe to be the primary
favorite, has not taken a strong stance on the issue.
Though a representative from the Development Association of Cahuita
proudly displayed a photograph of himself with the candidate and assured me that
he opposes the exploration, other opposition leaders are less sure. The other two contenders, José Miguel Corrales and Antonio
Alvarez, according to sources, stand in support.
Although
this is all second-hand information and thus rather tenuous, these presidential
candidate positions match the positions held by their respected allies in
campaigns for the national legislature in Límon.
Esmerelda Britton, the candidate mentioned earlier who firmly opposes the
project is an acolyte of Abel Pacheco in the PUSC, whereas the Mendez connected
campaign I spoke with, in addition to a strong ally of his in the Municipality
of Talamanca (mentioned in Part IV) are both exploration supporters.
Likewise, the Araya connected campaign I visited had no position on the
issue and the Corrales-backing candidate stood in favor.
Unfortunately, I was not able to encounter a campaign connected with
Antonio Alvarez in the area.
Though
certainly not all, many members of the opposition campaign, for their part,
although they feel that the PLN is their more natural ally, are not satisfied
with the candidates of either major party.
Instead many are enthusiastic about the candidacy of Ottón Solís, a
former PLN member who has since formed his own party, the Citizen Action Party,
and is planning a bid for the presidency. Although
he does not have a realistic chance to win the election, they hope that his
focus on environmental issues such as the petroleum exploration will change the
terms of political debate.
Overall Saliency and
Future Prospects
As should be evident from the descriptions given above, the consensus is
that the controversy over petroleum exploration on the Caribbean is still a low
profile issue, despite its significance in relation to national energy policy,
economic development and environmental protection.
If the knowledge among the political class in Límon is low, the general
public, especially outside of the Límon area, undoubtedly knows very little if
anything about the issue: “We have tons of press coverage in the newspapers
but people just don’t read the newspapers very often” (J. Hampton, personal
communication April 9, 2001). Indeed,
even to say the issue has had “tons” of press coverage is probably an
overstatement. The recent May 1st
Labor day March mentioned earlier, for example, did receive large coverage in
the English language Tico Times, though it was ignored in the more
mainstream Spanish language papers La Nacion and La Republica.
The
absence of substantive political discourse and lack of general knowledge about
such a critical issue is particularly disturbing in a nation that prides itself
on its democratic tradition and environmental awareness.
Whether the populous chooses to oppose or support petroleum exploration
off of their shores, or any important political issue for that matter, an
engaged and informed Costa Rican citizenry is essential for the functioning of
true democracy. As evidenced by
historically high voter turnout and overall enthusiasm for candidates, parties
and elections, Costa Rica is certainly a country that enjoys politics.
As Silvia Lara points out however:
Although
deeply ingrained in Costa Rican culture, political democracy-characterized by
regular elections and a tradition of social compromise-bears a superficial
quality that threatens to undermine its stability.
Many Costa Ricans vote for calderonistas
or the figueristas not out of any
ideological conviction, but simply to uphold family tradition. Once the party flag-waving and actual voting are over, Costa
Rican citizens withdraw from the political arena, leaving professional
politicians to manage the affairs of the nation (Lara, p. 12).
Although
electioneering may be superficial, the fact, which has not been lost on the
opposition campaign, is that an election still offers the highest potential to
raise consciousness and built support for a particular policy agenda.
The ability of John McCain to force campaign finance reform onto the
national agenda, certainly an incredibly important, if not the most important
issue in the United States, despite his losing campaign for the Republican
nomination in 2000 is one recent example of this phenomenon.
Thus the push to create an election issue, especially in the province of
Límon, of petroleum exploration and energy policy is critical.
The problem is, however, that the opposition campaign will likely need
high profile candidates to address the issue in to order to gain public
attention. Due to its
controversial nature however, and potential for sending politicians down a
slippery slope that they to not want to travel down (addressing petroleum
exploration could likely lead to a debate about sustainable development, and
thus call into question the entire economic structure of the nation), candidates
are not likely to give it substantial attention unless forced to by the public. Opponents of the exploration project thus find themselves in
a difficult situation-in addition to their hopes for the upcoming election,
their ability to raise the political saliency of the issue may determine the
outcome of their legal campaign as well. If
indeed, as many say, the Constitutional Court is under great pressure from other
political influences, it is likely to bend in the direction that pushes it the
hardest. If they hope to keep the
nation’s shores free form the operations of an American transnational energy
company, environmentalists, community leaders and the tourism industry, among
others must thus find a way to substantially increase their political clout, and
fast.
In
addition to attempting to force petroleum onto the national electoral scene
there are several other strategies that the opposition campaign could possibly
adopt. One entails encouraging
elements in the current executive branch to push for a change in energy policy.
According to sources as well as my own observations, there seems to be
significant tensions between the various facets of MINAE.
Local branches focused on conservation in towns such as Cahuita and
Manzanillo have far different priorities than the national directors or the
Ministry of Hydrocarbons (indeed there is even an Escojamos poster hanging up in
the Manzanillo office), and thus are much less likely to be supportive of the
exploration. The problem is
however, that these local branches have very little power, and like the
municipalities, often have policies forced on them from above.
When I attempted to gain an interview with the director of the local
MINAE office in Cahuita, I was told several times that the office does not have
a position on the issue and it would be no use for me to talk to them.
They gave me the names of several opposition leaders in the town (whom I
had already talked to) and said that I should speak with them instead (personal
communication, March 18, 2001). Thus
because of risks to their employment and their lack of power, this course of
action would likely prove fruitless for local activists.
Another possible strategy would be for the opposition to use their U.S.
contacts to attempt to shed light on the activities of Harken Energy in Costa
Rica, hoping to galvanize public support in that country against the company’s
international operations. This type
of campaign however, judging by the lack of success American environmental
activists have had attempting to prevent damage to native communities from the
Occidental Oil operation in Columbia mentioned earlier (which interestingly
enough has weak connections to the family of America’s other recent
presidential hopeful, Al Gore), would almost certainly end in failure as well. Without a doubt, continuing the campaign to build local
grassroots support in Límon is a much better option. Given the history of opposition to externally imposed
projects in the area, it is certainly possible that a large groundswell of
active opposition could form, manifesting itself in some sort of direct action
in the province. Considering the
fact that the oil pipeline that supplies petroleum throughout the country begins
in Límon, the possibilities for drastic measures certainly also exist.
In a comment that took me by surprise coming from a representative of
what some feel is one of the more conservative environmental law organizations,
Alvero Campos of CEDERENA remarked to me: “People in Límon can paralyze this
country if they want to” (personal communication, April 5, 2001).
Let us hope that that the situation does not reach that point.
Conclusion:
Navigating the Slippery Slope
The situation in Límon is evolving rapidly and certainly the opposition
campaign will do all that it can to turn up the heat as the election draws
nearer. Whatever the outcome, the
eventual result should be highly significant for the future of petroleum
exploration in the world. While many of the national narratives of Costa Rica may not
survive scrutiny, and environmentalism in the country may be riddled with
contradiction, the fact is that the images that the name “Costa Rica”
conjures are very powerful for policy makers, business leaders and
environmentalists worldwide. Due to
its democratic history, educated population, small size, national and
international attention to protected areas, potential for “eco-tourism” and
other factors-despite the problems discussed throughout this paper-the potential
for sustainable development in Costa Rica is higher than in most other areas in
the world. Although Costa Rican
politicians may wish to avoid the “slippery slope” mentioned in Part Five,
the longer they fail to address long term energy-based environmental and
economic issues the more likely it will be that the resulting mudslide will send
them tumbling into messy results.
Any truly sustainable energy policy in Costa Rica will have to navigate
between the duel pressures of profit-hungry economic entities as well as the
everyday needs of a growing population with constant demands for a higher
standard of living. Even well intentioned programs often fall into traps of
imperialism or authoritarianism, neglecting local populations and creating
environmental justice concerns. Like
most environmental issues, but perhaps even more intensely, energy policy is an
extremely complex proposition because its effects are so widespread and its
management is so fundamental to the operation of modern society.
Although no policy can please everyone, it would serve the nation well
when adopting future plans to give particular attention to those communities
mentioned throughout this paper that traditionally have been ignored or
discriminated against, as well as to subsequent generations of Costa Rican
citizens.
The
current situation in Costa Rica comes at a discouraging time for advocates for
sustainable development worldwide, due in large part to the failure of the
United States to address global warming and other pressing environmental
concerns. In addition to the recent
announcement by newly-inaugurated president Bush that the U.S. will not follow
through on its commitments to lower carbon dioxide emissions as required by the
Kyoto Protocol, the administration’s task force on energy policy led by
Vice-President Dick Cheney (another former petroleum industry executive) is
likely to recommend boosting domestic petroleum exploration as part as an
overall strategy to increase energy supplies rather than promote conservation.
There have been some positive worldwide developments on this front,
however, such as the implementation of substantive sustainable development plans
in countries such as the Netherlands and New Zealand, as well as the growing
interest in alternative energy investment around the globe.
Despite these encouraging signs, the fact that the world’s only
superpower has shown a decided lack of interest in long-term solutions to energy
and environmental problems is certainly disturbing.
While
abandonment of petroleum exploration on the Caribbean coast of Costa Rica is not
likely to change U.S. or global energy policies, it may at the very least
provide hope to other local people struggling to protect their environments and
the long-term overall health of their communities.
Opposing petroleum exploration however, is not enough; as local community
leaders on the southern Caribbean well know, realistic, yet creative
alternatives must be developed to provide for the needs of a rapidly growing
human population in the twenty-first century.
Business leaders such as Óscar Castro, who claim that “there are no
options” for their communities, must be shown a new path.
This path must be laid through the changing of larger relationships
between the environment and economy, relationships that currently force places
like Límon into accepting destructive, unsustainable development projects.
These changes must recognize the interconnectedness of natural and human
systems; of the importance of local culture and the necessity of global
cooperation. Only when the energy
that powers civilization unites environmental and economic systems in a mutually
beneficial cycle will sustainable development ever truly be realized.
Acknowledgements
First
and foremost I would like to thank all of my informants in the Province of Límon
and in San José for taking time out of their busy schedules to put up with my
incessant phone calls, visits and questions-as well as with my Spanish language
limitations. Certainly without
their generosity and candidness this study would not have been possible.
I
also owe a great deal of gratitude to all of the students of the ACM for their
interest in and support of this project; their encouragement meant the world to
me. I especially want to thank my compañeras
in Cahuita Jessica Haugsland and Carolyn Gump for their assistance and
friendship during our time on the Caribbean.
Thanks
also go to all of the wonderful ACM staff, to my advisor Axia Ansorena, and to
my host families, both in San Jose and in Puerto Viejo.
The term “seismic” is derived from “seisim”-the Greek word for
Earthquake. Seismic testing is
a technique used to map rock layers and properties without having to drill a
well. Powerful sound sources
are set off by air guns and the ensuing echoes are measured to determine
rock structure and potential hazards (CEF Consultations Limited, 1998).
The number of key individuals was determined by investigation of the
leadership of all organizations active in the opposition campaign, through
questioning of sources, and by looking at attendance at meetings or
authorship of or mention in relevant documents.
As for the latter number, it indicates individuals who are present in
several different organizations or are particularly influential as
determined from the methods mentioned above.
The name Adela was chosen to represent a local indigenous woman struggling
to defend her culture and local environment against outside forces (Adela,
2000).
British
Petroleum, for example, is now the largest investor in solar power in the world.
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Ambiente y Energía (1999). Estudio Impacto Ambiental de Actividades Petroleras a Tortugas
Marineras. San Jose, Costa Rica: Editorial Provenir S.A.
Ministerio del
Ambiente y Energía employees. Personal Communication (translated from Spanish), March 19, 2001.
Molina, I. &
Palmer, S. (1998). The History of Costa Rica. San José, Costa Rica: Editorial de la Universidad de Costa Rica.
Mora, J. Portéte
Fisherman, Portéte, Costa Rica. Personal
Communication (translated from Spanish), March 17, 2001.
National Academy of
Science (2001). Oil in the Sea: Inputs, Facts and Effects. Washington D.C.: Ocean Studies Board
Oilwatch
International (2000). Deuda Ecológia y Petróleo. www.cosmovisiones.com/DeudaEcologica/a_oilwatch1.html
Oilwatch
International (2000). What is Oilwatch? www.oilwatch.org.ec/main.html
Ortiz, V. Centro de
Derecho y de Recursos Naturales (CEDERENA), San José, Costa Rica. Personal Communication,
February 7, 2001.
Palma, J. Proyecto
Rescate y Desarrollo Social y Educativo para Los Pueblos Aborigenes. San José, Costa Rica Personal Communication (translated from
Spanish), February 28, 2001.
Palmar, P. et. al.
(1991). Taking Care of Sibö´s Gifts: An Environmental Treatise from Costa Rica´s KéköLdi Indigenous
Reserve. San José: Editorama,
S.A.
Palmer, P. (1993). “What
Happen:” A Folk History of Costa Rica’s Talamanca Coast. San Jose: Publications in English S.A.
Proyecto Estado de la
Nación (2000). Estado de la Nación en Desarrollo Humano Sostenible. San José, Costa Rica: Editorama S.A.
Republica de Costa
Rica (1998). Constitución Política.
San José: Editorial Provenir S.A.
Rodriguez, J.,
Justicia para la Naturaleza, San José, Costa Rica.
Personal Communication, February 13, 2001.
Rogers, T. (2001, May
4). Labor Day Marches Target Oil Drilling. Tico Times. pp. 5
Romero, J. Asociación
de Desarrollo, Cahuita, Costa Rica. Personal Communication (translated from Spanish), March 19, 2001.
Sanchez, A. Portéte
Fisherman, Portéte Costa Rica. Personal
Communication (translated from Spanish), March 13, 2001.
Schoemakers, A. et
al. (2001). “Household Survey on
Environmental Values of Residents of Cahuita, Costa Rica.” Unfinished study (translated from
Spanish).
Schultz, E. Adela,
Puerto Viejo, Costa Rica. Personal
Communication (translated from Spanish), March 4, 2001.
Taylor, H. RECOPE,
Cahuita, Costa Rica. Personal Communication, March 21, 2001.
United Nations
Environment Programme (1992). Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. Geneva, Switzerland, United Nations Publications.
Walton, E. Portéte
Fisherman, Portéte, Costa Rica. Personal Communication (translated from Spanish), March 13, 2001.
Zeledón,
R. (1999). Codigo Ambiental. San José, Costa Rica: Editorial Porvenir.
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