

# Journal of Political Science



We are proud to present you the very first Journal of Political Science. One of the most unique and vital parts of the undergraduate experience is the ability to create relationships and form dialogues with professors, between departments, and with peers. The institution of this Journal intends to do just that. By creating a forum for student work, our goal is to foster intellectual exchange among the Political Science community (our faculty and students) at Macalester.

This first Journal received over twenty submissions from students, of which we have published seven. The seven papers presented here pay tribute to the quality of the work done by Macalester students under the guidance of our faculty. Next year we hope to build on this initial success by publishing a larger Journal and increasing the pool of submitted papers. The Journal has also been successful at attracting papers from across the curriculum and from a variety of students, each with his or her own academic interests. This makes the Journal accessible and relevant to many students and professors.

The completion of this Journal owes a lot to Michael Okrob '04 and Roxanne Fisher, Department Coordinator for Political Science. The Political Science Department, Associate Provost's Office and to the Office of the Dean of Academic Programs have been very generous in financing the printing and distribution of the Journal.

Needless to say, the authors of these papers are largely responsible for this accomplishment. Michael Barnes writes a short piece on the roles of readers and writers. Emily Hedin discusses the work of Rousseau focusing specifically on his conception of the citizen. Ellie Strand provides a critique of theories of global politics and postulates a postmodern approach. Greg Walz-Chojnacki discusses the limitations of the realist perspective on international security, and advocates an alternative. Julia Podevin discusses the use of child soldiers in Sierra Leone and responses to this challenge. Sarah Detzner investigates the impediments to economic development in Saudi Arabia and proposes a development agenda. Ted Roethke discusses manners in which Peru can use its agricultural sector to drive development. Finally, Neely Crane-Smith analyzes rape, sexual abuse and domestic violence in GLBT communities and possible steps to prevent them.

We hope you enjoy this first Journal of Political Science. Look forward to our next Journal to come out in the spring of next year. We ask that students keep in mind papers to submit next year. We also ask professors to encourage student submissions and identify student work that should be in the Journal.

Thank you, and if you have any questions about the Journal, the Political Science Department or the Political Science Honors Society, please feel free to contact us.

Fernando Furquim

Co-editors

Kara Bovee



## Table of Contents

Readers and Writers: The Cost of a Contractual Partnership <i>by Michael Barnes</i> .....	4
Rousseau’s Citizen: A Response To Modernization, Enlightenment, and Society <i>by Emily Hedin</i> .....	5
A Critical View of Theories: Advocating a Postmodern Approach To the Study of Global Politics <i>by Ellie Strand</i> .....	15
Revising Security: Contributions and Limitations of Non-Traditional Security Studies <i>by Greg Walz-Chojnacki</i> .....	23
The Use of Child Soldiers and the Special Court: Seeking Punity for Violations of Human Rights in Sierra Leone <i>by Julia Podevin</i> .....	28
Now or Never: The Impact of Saudi Arabian Culture on Economic Development <i>by Sarah Detzner</i> .....	44
Policy Recommendations for the Government of Peru To Develop the Agricultural Sector <i>by Ted Roethke</i> .....	56
Rape, Sexual Assault and Domestic Abuse in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered and Queer Communities: Problems and Primary Prevention <i>by Neely Crane-Smith</i> ..	74

## Readers and Writers: The Cost of a Contractual Partnership

Michael Barnes

An enlightened essay, and any work of merit, irrespective of the medium, captures in its 'frame' a snapshot of motion, and it is only because we engage this snapshot in reference to our continuous personal motion that the snapshot maintains a significance across barriers of space and time. Hard currency as a value holder requires the same interpersonal attachment to maintain the value initially ascribed. Hard currency therefore becomes a contradiction in terms, as the "hardness" of currency is dependent upon the fluid nature of its motion from person to person in business transactions.

Looking at an essay as a vehicle of exchange, any receptive reader attaching significance to this essay must first recognize that for every sentence imprinted on the page, and for every reference highlighted in notes and quotes and diagrams, there are countless more unspoken and unnoticed, by the reader and the writer. This point is not made to imply that writing involves inherent undercurrents of plagiarism, though from a narrow perspective that may seem the case. Instead, within the frame of the stated points, explored and expounded in sentences alongside catalogued references, lie unstated alternatives which are equally capable of 'making the case.' It is more from a condition of convenience that an essay draws its sources, than from a condition of value judgment. The reason that an essay cannot be 'wholly expansive' is that there is no limit to the amount of applicable information and material available, and so by the nature of an essay as a snapshot, a frame must be created, and the rest of reality cropped in this instant. But that which survives the cutting board and arrives in your hands, if absorbed attentively into your distinct cradle of thought and experience, can expand again, drawing on your understanding, and growing in ways the writer could not formerly predict.

It is therefore the responsibility of the reader to acknowledge the limitations of the essay and for the reader to expect no more significance in its role than that which they make allowance for. The writer must likewise resist the notion that an essay as a physical entity can transfer part and parcel value and meaning to another person. Instead, the writer must accept that the essay as an isolated object holds no meaning or value, just as hard currency, unused and idle, becomes in that period of time, devoid of value. The individual strength of an essay is an instrument of illusion, the 'power' of the essay being generated by the power of belief granted courtesy of the readership. A contractual partnership of this nature, once recognized, breeds responsive readers, and writers with a capacity for appropriate moderation.

## **Rousseau’s Citizen: A Response To Modernization, Enlightenment, and Society**

**Emily Hedin**

Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s eccentric and unconventional personality set him far apart from his contemporaries or predecessors in philosophy. Raised by a simple watchmaker, and later gravedigger, Rousseau’s unusual biography and informal education did not compete with the glossy resumes of philosophers such as Montesquieu or Voltaire. While the world was swept up in the forward movement of the Enlightenment, Rousseau preferred to bask in the memory of past times when people were simple, moral, and honest. While the French *philosophes* preached the marvels of modern advancement in the arts, technology, and the sciences, Rousseau looked with longing at the antique societies of Rome and Sparta.

A frequent complaint of Rousseau was the current state of citizenship; as he stated in his *First Discourse*, “We have Physicists, Geometricians, Chemists, Astronomers, Poets, Musicians, Painters: We no longer have citizens” (Neidleman, 1). Rousseau’s picture of an ideal citizen was a person who participated in voting, had an active relationship with the Sovereignty, and was “virtuous.” This depiction was undoubtedly colored by his history as an outsider of society. However, Rousseau also used his “ideal” citizen as a way to respond to other philosophers of the time, such as Voltaire, Diderot, Montesquieu, and Pascal, and to critique events in theater, music, science, and other “Enlightenment activities.”

This essay will first examine Rousseau’s theories on voting and will analyze the ways in which certain philosophers and biographical events shaped these theories. Next, this essay will examine Rousseau’s theory on the relationship between citizen and Sovereign. Rousseau’s concept of virtue will then be explored. Finally, the definition of citizenship, as outlined in *The Social Contract*, will be applied to other works of Rousseau in order to examine the roles that gender and emotion play in Rousseau’s citizenship.

### **Part I: Rousseau’s Theories on Voting**

One critical aspect of Rousseau’s citizen is his role in voting, for it is this act of civic duty that not only differentiates between a citizen and a subject but also defines the general will. N.J.H Dent describes Rousseau’s stance on citizenship, “as these persons contribute to the constitution or determinations of the sovereign they are Citizens of that state. As they are ruled by deliverances of the sovereign they are Subjects of that state” (p.171). Rousseau describes a subject as someone who is acted upon by an authority and accepts any judgment or law that is created from above. A citizen must play the part of a lawmaker as well as a law follower, and one of the ways he does so is by voting. As Timothy O’Hagan explains in his book, *Rousseau*, the philosopher expects his citizens to come to a consensus on the common interest through a process of majority voting. Rousseau sees this process as relatively easy; he believes that few people will hold extreme positions because few will have radical interests. A citizen who is truly concerned with the

general will and not his own private agenda will come to a decision that is similar to that of his peers. Voting is imperative for a citizen because it creates the general will of the Sovereignty, and it is this Sovereignty that creates and unites the citizens in the first place.

### **The Influence of Rousseau's Personal History on his Theories on Voting**

Throughout Rousseau's discussion of voting, the influence of his personal history on his writing becomes clear. The voting process as outlined in *The Social Contract* gives insight into the education of Rousseau. Rousseau was never formally educated, but he became very knowledgeable in several fields through instruction by Francoise-Louise de la Tour, Baronne de Warens and his involvement with the French *philosophes*. For example, Rousseau lays out mathematically how the prevailing opinion should be decided. Rousseau says, "take away from these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel one another, and the general will remains as the sum of the differences." The phrase "sum of the differences" comes from calculus, which fascinated the mathematician in Rousseau (O'Hagan, 116). His studies in math combined with his expertise in music theory and composition led him to create a mathematical metaphor to solidify his voting procedures.

Rousseau's experiences in the French bureaucracy also led him to place significance on the practice of each citizen voting for himself. Rousseau stresses the importance of excluding factions when voting. When men begin to meet and talk with each other, factions are created. While Rousseau despises factions he admits that the only way to control them is to let them proliferate so they will cancel each other out in an early Madisonian theory of pluralism (Trachtenberg, 60). Rousseau's work as the Secretary to the French Ambassador in Venice from 1734 to 1744 familiarized him with the consequences of factions and the inefficiency and corruption they can wreck on a political body. It was during his work within the French political system that he perfected his theory of voting as found in *The Social Contract* (Dent, 168).

### **The Influence of Other Philosophers on Rousseau's Theories on Voting**

Rousseau's emphasis on voting as a critical factor of citizenship was also a result of the influence of many philosophers. Rousseau was an ardent admirer of Montesquieu, a sentiment not shared by the avant-garde of the Enlightenment. Montesquieu's liberalism, which included his famous system of checks and balances, gained him the permanent disdain of men such as Voltaire who saw him as attempting to re-establish the noble system in France (Cranston, 4). Rousseau, however, agreed with Montesquieu's writings and gleaned from it his ideas on public participation, especially voting. "Rousseau admired Montesquieu above all as a social scientist, a pioneer in the field where he himself had worked as the author of the *Discourse on Inequality* and was to work again as the author of *The Social Contract*" (Cranston, 5).

Whereas Montesquieu had a positive impact on Rousseau, Voltaire, on the other hand, was a thorn in Rousseau's side throughout his life. Voltaire criticized Rousseau's theories and disparaged his "naïveté." As a result, Rousseau remained determined to counter Voltaire's pessimism and stood firmly behind his construction of the ideal state and the ideal citizen. After the *Discourse on Inequality* was published, Rousseau enjoyed the praise of his hometown of Geneva. Despite Rousseau's love for this town he refused to

return to it because it had become the residency of Voltaire. Voltaire wrote to Rousseau in response to the text, “one wants to walk on all fours after reading your book, but since I lost the habit more than sixty years ago, I fear I cannot recover it.” Rousseau responded with, “don’t attempt to go back to walking on all fours; no one would be less likely to succeed. You teach us too well how to stand on our own two feet to stop standing on yours.” Partially because of Voltaire, Rousseau remained in Paris where he would write *The Social Contract* in 1762 (Cranston, 8-10). Rousseau’s belief in the ability of men to come to rational consensus concerning their own good was an indirect response to Voltaire’s masterpiece, *Candide*, which criticized men for being irrational, naïve, and stupidly optimistic (Cranston, 10).

Like Montesquieu, the philosopher Diderot had a positive effect on Rousseau’s writing. Diderot’s fifth volume of his *Encyclopedie* included a substantial section on Rousseau’s philosophy. The volume contained an essay by Rousseau entitled *Political Economy*, in which Rousseau describes the state as a coalition of individuals who are united by their common interests. It was under the guidance of Diderot that Rousseau developed his philosophy that a citizen must be aware of the general will. This shared belief was the foundation for Rousseau’s deep appreciation for the process of majority voting, which he believed would create the general will (Cranston, 11).

## **Part II: Rousseau’s Theories on the Relationship of Citizen and Sovereign**

In addition to full and vigorous participation in voting, Rousseau’s ideal citizen has an active relationship with the Sovereign in which the individual will of the citizen is subordinated to the will of the Sovereign. Whereas voting constitutes a citizen’s public participation, it is also important that the citizen acquire a certain disposition in order to participate fully in the Sovereignty. Citizens acquire this attitude through prioritizing their common interests and harnessing their desires. N.J.H Dent concludes that Rousseau’s citizens are composed of different wills. It is important to have a private will; however, the ideal citizen must also have a certain will that connects him with the Sovereignty. Dent writes that there is the will “qua family man and the will qua farmer but it is necessary for each person to have a will qua citizen which creates the general will” (173). Dent’s analysis also shows that the “civic” will of any single member of the body politic can represent the will of all its members. Therefore, there is a set criteria which must be met in order to be a citizen. If two people are both claiming to be citizens but each has different opinions, one must be mistaken. In other words, it is imperative that the frame of mind for each ideal citizen be the same. A citizen’s relationship with the Sovereignty is one of total cohesiveness and alienation. Upon entering into the Social Contract, people give up all their rights. As Rousseau writes,

Since each man gives himself to all, he gives himself to no one; and since there is no associate over whom he does not gain the same rights as others gain over him, each man recovers the equivalent of everything he loses, and in the bargain he acquires the equivalent of everything he lost. (Rousseau, 61)

In his essay “What is the General Will?” Gopal Screenivansan concludes that a citizen’s role within the Sovereignty is to subordinate his personal interests to the common interests.<sup>1</sup> To be a citizen, a person must harness his passions in order to come into a community where everyone is equal and everyone considers the good of the whole to be good for the individual.

### **Rousseau’s Personal History and the Relationship between Citizen and Sovereign**

As Rousseau’s experiences in the French bureaucracy led him to place significance on voting, so did his experiences in Paris help foster his theory that one must subordinate one’s personal interests to a commitment to the Sovereign. Living in Paris, Rousseau began to believe that French society was controlled by those with special abilities and wealth. As a music composer, Rousseau was often discriminated against by others in the field due to his foreign heritage. As a member of the French bureaucracy, Rousseau came under attack by his superiors and those with more wealth. As a result, Rousseau took great steps in his work to emphasize the equality of every citizen within the Sovereignty. Rousseau scholar, Judith Skhlar, writes, “that indeed is why the cohesive community is very much the anti-capital. Its virtues arise mainly from the absence of those conditions, which created Paris and its counterparts all over Europe” (Skhlar, 175). Unlike the situation in France, Rousseau’s ideal community is composed of members who are on equal playing ground. Everyone has an equal voice in the common good and all are equally affected by the decisions of the general will.

Rousseau’s view of the equality of citizens of the Sovereignty was affected by his time in France when he worked as Secretary to the French Ambassador in Venice who treated him with little justice. One night, the Ambassador refused Rousseau a place at the dinner table with the Duke of Modena. The disagreement escalated and the Ambassador sent for a warrant for Rousseau’s arrest. When Rousseau returned to France to plead his case and demand his unpaid salary, he was refused based on the fact that he was not a French citizen. The idea of justice became an obsession for him from that point on and greatly influenced his beliefs about a citizen’s relationship with the government (De Beer, 27).

Although his experiences in Paris directly affected Rousseau’s idea of citizenship, there were, as well, earlier influences. Rome and Sparta stood as strong evidence of the validity of Rousseau’s concept of the ideal citizen and his interaction with the Sovereignty. Rousseau believed that the citizens of these ancient cities were the epitome of popular sovereignty and that their relationship with the state was ideal. As a child, Rousseau’s father read to him the classics of Plutarch. Rousseau boasted, “I was a Roman before I was twelve” (Cranston, *The Social Contract*, 10). Rousseau idealizations of the ancient societies were an obsession from a very early age.

In his view, ancient societies such as those of Sparta and Rome had been particularly adept at generalizing human will: Through their simplicity, their morality of common good, their civic religion, their moral use of fine

---

<sup>1</sup> However, Rousseau is somewhat unclear about the role individuality will play in the relationship between the Sovereign and the citizen. Screenivansan’s analysis shows that a citizen must not have any individuality for he needs to be treated equally by the Sovereignty (567). However, a citizen is also entrusted with making decisions for the good of all and must be able to think clearly and independently (572).

and military arts, and their lack of extreme individualism and private interest, the city-states of antiquity had been political societies in the proper sense. (Riley, 130)

### **Influence of Other Philosophers on the Relationship of Rousseau's Citizen to the Sovereign**

Despite Rousseau's disagreements with Voltaire, there are some similarities in their writing concerning the relationship of the individual with a commonwealth. Voltaire writes in his *Philosophical Letters* that the "law of reason" requires that all individuals, "not in a multitude together," must choose "what society they will join themselves to, what commonwealth they will put themselves under." There is an undeniable resemblance in his writing to Rousseau's discussion of people making the decision to leave the State of Nature and join a society that will create a more fulfilling life. For Rousseau, it is this critical move that turns people into citizens. They must be willing to sacrifice their current state for the improvement of themselves and everyone around them. Because of the intersection of the beliefs of Rousseau and Voltaire, critics believe that Rousseau may have been influenced by Voltaire during his early years in Paris (Ellenburg, 45).

As Montesquieu had a great impact on Rousseau's theories of voting, he also had an impact on Rousseau's theories on the ideal interaction between citizen and state. Rousseau strongly believed that the legislators or magistrates should be entities within the general will, not above or beyond it. Rousseau preached the philosophy that everyone should be a lawmaker and a law follower and that every citizen must share responsibility within the Sovereignty. Rousseau quoted Montesquieu when he wrote, "at the birth of societies the chiefs of the republics make the institutions, and later the institutions make the chiefs." As did Montesquieu, Rousseau grew to believe that public participation and acts of civic loyalty were necessary and that a citizen's relationship with the Sovereignty must be active. It is through the participation of citizens that the Sovereignty becomes self-perpetuating.

Montesquieu also influenced Rousseau's beliefs on equality. Skhlar describes Rousseau's position on equality,

It [*The Social Contract*] does not call upon the people, for all its sovereignty, to make new laws or to exercise government functions. It does mean that the *moi commun* is sustained, that each citizen, even the least important, is treated with the consideration due a 'sovereign,' and that the citizens, because they are equal and just, care for each other. (Skhlar, 181)

Montesquieu's influence is clearly illustrated in Rousseau's belief that all are equal in regard to the Sovereignty and that a citizen's role within the Sovereignty is not to make new laws but to cooperate with all other citizens to create a general will (Skhlar, 181).

### **Part III: The Virtue of Rousseau's Citizen**

The third important aspect of Rousseau's citizen is his virtue. N.J.H Dent believes Rousseau is most concerned with the morality of citizens. Rousseau values the virtue of a small, country farmer over that of a commercial merchant. He believes people who are simple and have uncomplicated needs and limited wants are the most virtuous. One critic wrote,

Above all, Rousseau wants to transform the citizens' passions, and especially their *amour proper*, into the virtue of *amour de la patrie*, a 'sweet and lively sentiment which joins the force of *amour proper* to all the beauty of virtue, and gives it an energy that, without disfiguring it, renders it the most heroic of all the passions.' (Abizadeh, 571)

Rousseau believes that virtue is important because it is this attribute that protects the general will from corruption.

### **Influence of Rousseau's Personal History on his Vision of Virtue**

Rousseau's life experiences had a profound influence on the development of his vision of virtue. The first of many critical events was his relationship with Therese Le Vasseur whom he met in Paris in 1745. Rousseau and Therese had several illegitimate children (Scholz, 18). Rousseau writes of Therese in his *Confessions*, "the first time I saw this girl appear at table I was struck by her modest behavior... I believed that I saw in her a girl with feelings, a simple girl without coquetry...and her heart was tender and virtuous" (*Confessions*, 309-310). To many, Therese was simply an example of the ill-groomed lower class. Rousseau saw her as the paradigm of simplicity that was untouched by the corruption of the upper class. Another event in the life of Rousseau that influenced the importance of virtue was a near death experience. Following the success of his *First Discourse*, Rousseau fell ill and the doctor reported that he only had six months to live. Upon hearing this, Rousseau vowed to live the remainder of his life according to the guidelines of the *First Discourse*. He committed himself to a life of simplicity and virtue (Scholz, 190).

A series of "reforms" that Rousseau underwent throughout his life cultivated his view of virtue and the desirable characteristics of a citizen of the Sovereignty. In 1754, Rousseau decided to rid himself of the societal corruption of France. To do so, he returned to his hometown of Geneva—a safe haven of simplicity. Rousseau's family had lived in Geneva for a hundred and fifty years under the influence of Calvinism and republican democracy. Here, they were completely sheltered from the corruption—as well as the growth of French literary brilliance—of the seventeenth century (De Beer, 42). From the standpoint of his Genevan heritage, the French had taken advantage of the Enlightenment and manipulated it into a movement of immorality. As a lower-middle class republican from Geneva, Rousseau was greatly disturbed by the decadence of the absolute monarchy and high society of Paris (De Beer, 42). The object of a great amount of Rousseau's disdain was French theater which he considered rude and distasteful. Like the swing of a pendulum, Rousseau moved from simplicity, to utter gluttony, and back to simplicity once again.

However, Geneva failed to live up to Rousseau's increasingly strict standards of virtue. Shortly after moving to Geneva, Rousseau came under attack not only by the Calvinist priests but also by Voltaire. Rousseau decided that the sands of corruption had finally blown over what he believed to be the only sanctuary of virtue left in the world. To escape society, Rousseau went into exile in 1756. He left Geneva and moved to a chateau near the forest of Montmorency. He claimed that by doing so he could best fulfill his duty as a Genevan citizen. While in exile he could warn against new and dangerous innovations. He also dreamed about talking with peasants and helping them see the danger of corrupting influences (Ellenburg, 314).

Yet even here Rousseau did not find rest. He came under increasing persecution which culminated in a warrant in Geneva for the burning of his book, *Emilie*, published in 1762. Rousseau finally found sanctuary with George Keith, the Governor of Neufchatel, Switzerland. With his new friend, Rousseau resumed his search for a virtuous life. "With a donkey carrying blankets for provisions, and his friends...Rousseau made one excursion after another to the different valleys, slopes and crests of the Jura...At home, Rousseau baked his own bread, a return to primitive conditions of life" (De Beer, 64).

Sir Gavin De Beer believes that Rousseau's definition of virtue was a result of his constant yet futile search for virtue. Rousseau talked a lot about man before society corrupted him. The "natural man" to Rousseau was virtuous. However, according to De Beer, Rousseau had no credentials whatsoever to talk about the natural man.

Nobody can construct a conjectural history of primitive man without knowledge of biology, anthropology and sociology; and Rousseau was ignorant in all of them...Rousseau became intoxicated by his own propaganda. Having to his own satisfaction shown that, before civilization ruined him, man was virtuous and free, he claimed this virtue for himself because he had cleansed himself from the vices of society by his 'reform,' and thereby regained natural 'goodness. (40)

According to De Beer, Rousseau's "reforms" made him unduly self-righteous, which convoluted his rational evaluation of virtue in society. The more Rousseau sought virtue and did not find it, the steeper and more unrealistic his claims of virtue became.

These drastic actions taken by Rousseau had a profound impact on his definition of virtue; however, this belief was also crafted by the influences of the French *philosophes*. Despite the fact that Rousseau went sharply against their grain, the group did not take serious action to discredit him until he decided to leave Paris. At this point he was deemed a "monster, a misanthrope, and an enemy of the human race" (Hulliang, 58).

### **Influence of Other Philosophers on Rousseau's Vision of Virtue**

Rousseau's philosophy of simplicity bears some resemblance to the philosophy of Pascal, who despite his religious revivalism had a dismal look at society. Whereas Pascal blames sin for man's corruption, Rousseau blames society. Like Pascal, Rousseau claims

that the desires and passions of people far outgrow man's ability to fulfill them. Rousseau therefore believes that a citizen must suppress or harness passions (Hulling, 57-70).<sup>2</sup>

As discussed earlier, Rousseau's vision of virtue stood in sharp contrast to Voltaire's. Voltaire hailed the discovery of a smallpox inoculation as the epitome of the Enlightenment as he did many technological and scientific developments. While Rousseau was advocating a return to the simpler life, Voltaire urged society onward, praising such advancements as the replacement of earthenware with porcelain. Much to Rousseau's disgust, Voltaire placed developments such as the windmill and modern fireplace above and beyond Greek inventions and developments in the arts and literature (Ellenburg, 84-86). Voltaire's criticism pushed Rousseau to become more radical.

Diderot, as well, sharply differed from his old friend on his views of simplicity. Diderot wrote an article that was included in his *Encyclopedia* that claimed that modern day genius was the key to liberating humanity from the chains of the past (Ellenburg, 85). Despite his adoration of Diderot, Rousseau could not accept this frame of mine. As described in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, "he [Rousseau] could never bring himself fully to accept the social and moral implication of French culture, even though he never ceased to admire French taste" (219).

Diderot, however, also had a positive influence on Rousseau's theory of virtue. Diderot rejected the virtues of modesty and chastity, which he believed applied only to the individual, and focused on virtues that are applicable to everyone. Rousseau takes from Diderot's philosophy a desire to make virtue applicable to all mankind. However, he retains his belief that modesty and simplicity are desired over technological and scientific advancement (De Beer, 30).

#### **Part IV: Issues of Gender and Emotion in Rousseau's Philosophy**

The focus of this paper has been the definition of "citizen" as discussed in *The Social Contract*. However, an analysis of the citizen in Rousseau's novels reveals additional information for a more complete examination of Rousseau's philosophy. It has been popularly interpreted that throughout *The Social Contract* the citizen is a man. However, when looking at the characters of *La Nouvelle Heloise*, the female is the more virtuous citizen. The men in Rousseau's novels all deny passion and exemplify exaggerated traits of masculinity, such as self-containment and detachment. They think only of themselves when voting in the general will and break all loyal ties to family and friends. The females, on the other hand, have a greater ability to hear different arguments and to increase their understanding of how to deal with the issues of a pluralistic democracy.

Examine, for a moment, the characters of Julie and Saint-Preux in Rousseau's novel *La Nouvelle Heloise*. Both characters have been corrupted by society and engage in an affair with one another. The story starts out sympathetic to their love but changes as they try to become revived model citizens. They break off the relationship and suppress passion in the favor of duty. Saint Preux has great difficulty in showing real emotion; he says he loves Julie, but these are empty words. Lori J. Marso writes, "In Both *Emile* and *La Nouvelle Heloise*, it is striking that Rousseau believes it of great importance that his male citizens be a family men, it is not imperative that they know how to love" (Marso, 5).

---

<sup>2</sup> Nannerl O. Keohane's argument in his book, [Philosophy and the State of France](#) is similar to Hulling's arguments.

By looking at the characters of Rousseau's novels, it can be extrapolated that the success of the general will requires citizens to forgo empathy, love, and passion for others. However, if Julie were to be portrayed as the model citizen rather than Saint Preux, the community would be more democratic and more willing to accept diversity. Marso writes that "Julie is the center of any community she encounters, while Saint Preux...remains unable to nurture any relationships" (Marso, 6). Saint-Preux as well as Wolmar, Julie's second husband, were meant to be the model citizens who successfully suppress loyalty to serve their duty in the community; however, such a detachment failed the community. "Although Rousseau finds emotions absolutely necessary to initiate and sustain sociability, his fear of divisive interests and erotic passion toward others ultimately undermines his commitment to democratic community" (8).

In theory, Rousseau's ideals of a citizen's sense of duty and their unwavering commitment to the general will may sound perfect. However, as Marso's study shows, these characteristics can have harmful side effects on a citizen's relationship with those around him. After examining the citizens in Rousseau's other works it becomes clear that important aspects of citizenship in *The Social Contract* that are often overlooked include gender inequality as well as a lack of empathy and other basic human emotions such as love.

## **Conclusion**

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was writing during a time of tremendous growth in technology, intellectual thought, and the arts that had not been witnessed since the Renaissance. The Enlightenment produced such great minds as Voltaire and Diderot who are remembered for their bold philosophies that pushed society to advance and improve. However, in the midst of this whirlwind of activity, Rousseau stood as a champion of virtue and simplicity. A philosopher from a simple background, he was able to create strong resistance to modernization that ran contrary to the grain of philosophical thought. Rousseau crafted his argument in his discussion of citizenship. Three important aspects of Rousseau's citizen are active voting, strong relationship with the Sovereign, and uncompromised virtue. Through these three aspects, Rousseau is seen as a man who is yearning for a return to simpler times. Further, an angry response to the modernization of society and the "modern" views of the philosophers of the Enlightenment are also seen. Studies of citizenship in Rousseau's novels, however, reveal certain inequalities concerning gender and lack of passionate emotion in a citizen. It is important to consider these critiques because while Rousseau may seem like a brave crusader on a mission to revive virtue, his theories are not without their flaws. An examination of Rousseau's life and his interactions with other philosophers reveals that his vision of the ideal citizen stemmed from his own dislike of the world in which he lived. For the most part, Rousseau's work was not well received and his words were buried in the onslaught of the Enlightenment. However, Rousseau's plea for sympathy resonates in the twenty first century as it did in the eighteenth century.

### Works Cited

- Abizadeh, Arash. "Banishing the Particular: Rousseau on Rhetoric, Patrie, and the Passions." Political Theory 29:4, (2001): 556-582.
- Cranston, Maurice. The Noble Savage. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- Cranston, Maurice. Introduction. The Social Contract. By Jean-Jacques Rousseau. London: Penguin Books, 1968.
- De Beer, Sir Gavin. Jean-Jacques Rousseau and His World. London: Thomas and Hudson Ltd, 1972.
- Dent, N.J.H. Rousseau. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1988.
- Ellenburg, Stephen. Rousseau's Political Philosophy: An Interpretation from Within. London: Cornell University Press, 1976.
- Hullig, Mark. "Rousseau, Voltaire, and the Revenge of Pascal." The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau. Ed. Patrick Riley. Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 2001. 57-77.
- Marso, Lori J. "The Stories of Citizens: Rousseau, Montesquieu and de Stael Challenge Enlightenment Reason." Polity 30:4, (1998): 435-257.
- Neidleman, Jason Andrew. The General Will is Citizenship. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001.
- O'Hagan, Timothy. Rousseau. New York: Routledge, 1999.
- Riley, Patrick. "Introduction: Life and Works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau." The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau. Ed. Patrick Riley. Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 2001, xi-1.
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract. Trans. Maurice Cranston. London: Penguin Books, 1968.
- Scholz, Sally. On Rousseau. Belmont: Wadsworth, 2001.
- Screenivasan, Gopal. "What is the General Will?" The Philosophical Review. 109:4 (2000): 545-581.
- Shklar, Judith. Men and Citizen: Rousseau's Social Theory. Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 1969.
- Trachtenberg, Zev M. Making Citizens: Rousseau's Political Theory of Culture. London: Routledge Inc., 1993.
- "Jean-Jacques Rousseau." The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1967.

**A Critical View of Theories:  
Advocating a Postmodern Approach to the Study of Global Politics**

**Ellie Strand  
International Politics  
March 13, 2004**

Isaiah Berlin, in his article “Realism and Politics,” discusses his views on the quest for a concrete, scientific way to approach the study of politics. This positivist strain of methodology does not, he asserts, fully explain interactions of a political nature among states, leaders, and populations. Human “progress” cannot be calculated and predicted in a scientific manner. Berlin cites examples of revolutionary leaders such as Lenin and Robespierre, gifted and experienced intellectuals, whose carefully planned projects for radical change did not achieve their intended results.<sup>3</sup> When speaking of revolutionary changes, Berlin observes: “These changes then tend to be retrospectively regarded as inevitable; it is less often remarked that they seldom, if ever, correspond to the intentions of their makers, or embody any considerable portion of their original beliefs”.<sup>4</sup> What is reality then, if it cannot be objectively isolated, tested and predicted by pre-determined formulas or through an infallible and total understanding of social condition and historical context? Can reality ever be viewed as empirically set apart from a biased observer?

Striving to understand the most essential nature of reality continues to be the purported aim of intellectuals studying and analyzing conflict in the world on global and domestic stages of human interaction. It is imperative to be aware that to use the terms “global” and “domestic” is to speak the language in which the dominant discourse about politics frames its arguments. Implicit in this discourse is a state-centric worldview, one that has often been taken for granted as the natural result of human desire for power and sovereignty when negotiating a condition of anarchy and subsequent needs for nations and boundaries. In this paper I will argue for the importance of theory generally in the task of confronting “reality,” whatever this elusive objective may be. I will then address the necessity of different theories of international relations being re-formulated in conversation with one another, each meeting different criteria by which theories should be evaluated. To expand this discussion of theory and its utility when facing complex current world affairs, I will analyze three major theoretical approaches in light of their ability to help explain and view critically the historic conflict between India and Pakistan over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The final focus will be on a critical post-modern view of the state of affairs as the most productive way to view the violent past of the conflict while envisioning hope for a more peaceful future.

The way we talk about our world has very real consequences. Theory may seem to be something very abstract, but, like rhetoric is not solely empty words; theory is not

---

<sup>3</sup> Isaiah Berlin, “Realism and Politics,” *The Power of Ideas*, Ed. Henry Hardy, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 138.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, 137.

merely an intellectual exercise elevated above the realities of our world. Schools of theory are not ever purely descriptive, explanatory or critical; they usually encompass various methodologies, evidence of their conversation with “reality.” Similarly, theory affects the ways in which we conceptualize, and it is, therefore, never completely out of sync with the way we act. Theories, depending on their location within a particular discipline, are mostly not expected or accepted to be all-inclusive and applied as such. Typically there are fundamental ontological and epistemological beliefs which are held to be relatively absolute within various schools of thought, but theories may vary considerably in the ways they expand on and develop such foundations. One might argue, for instance, that there is “a fundamental division within the discipline ‘between theories which seek to offer *explanatory* accounts of international relations, and those that see theory as *constitutive* of that reality’”.<sup>5</sup>

This fundamental division causes international relations theorists, whether they conceive of themselves as working in opposition to either side of this academic divide or not, to formulate comprehensive and yet disparate views about the nature of reality. Their divergent approaches cause academics to see theory as serving different purposes and, through their various understandings of the degree to which an objective reality can be apprehended, they claim their own role as theorist either as inevitably affecting their work or as effectively removed by their procedure. Both views are important because they try to work out their own limitations which are only adequately illuminated through conversation with other ways of addressing this problem of grasping the meanings and modes of action in the political world. All theories then do meet all valuable criteria by which theory can be evaluated. The value in discrepancy is clear when we realize that theoretical disagreement causes us to care more about participating in debate, similar to the way that conflict motivates us to study international relations.

When coming up with criteria by which theories can be constructively, or de-constructively, evaluated, I would first call one to consider “a theory’s *understanding* of an issue or process”.<sup>6</sup> This point about a theory’s “understanding” is symptomatic of a theory’s ability to be used as a tool by directing one’s attention to a salient attribute of a situation or as a more general template for global politics, in both ways providing an “intellectual order” to the workings of international relations.<sup>7</sup> Both these criteria seem to be logically connected and essential in order to have a theory that can be applied and debated. “Intellectual order” implies a high degree of clarity in argument which is absolutely necessary in order for a theory to be viewed as possessing the quality of “understanding” when faced with the contemporary unfolding of events. Through this understanding as a product of intellectual order, we then move to the theory’s ability to *explain* the state of affairs. However, though a deep understanding of the many facets and perspectives of an issue or process may lead to degrees of explanation, I will argue that academic theory can never be relied upon to lead to infallibly accurate predictions.

The scope of a theory is also important, and this is related to the depth and breadth of its logically ordered understanding of events and developments and capacity to explain

---

<sup>5</sup> Scott Burchill, “Introduction,” in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, eds., *Theories of International Relations*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 2.

<sup>6</sup> Scott Burchill, “Introduction,” in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, eds., *Theories of International Relations*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 24.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid*, 13.

them. Burchill also cites “the *scope* of the theory” as being an important criterion.<sup>8</sup> It is also important that a theory possess a kind of analytical mobility. We need to always remember that as human beings we have internalized cultural values while engaging in the most basic acts of living in the world. This means that we are inevitably conditioned and that the best way to counter our “natural” tendencies is to be self-critical enough in our analyses to maintain a high level of awareness of perspective. Finally, I would add to my set of criteria the ability to liberate those who have been oppressed by historically dominant interpretations of events and world affairs and whose views have been marginalized as a result of socially constructed barriers. Because theories can shape the lens through which we view the world, they can shape our actions. This point is relevant especially in today’s world characterized by the sweeping forces of globalization where human beings are increasingly finding ways to act outside of the state’s agenda and jurisdiction. People are increasingly able to make regional and global impact as individuals and transnational communities, and so a theory that frees the minds of people from the constraints of inscribed categories, such as gender roles or race for example, may serve a catalyst for action in hope of *achieving* a more humane and just world.

Instead of looking to transform the world, the realist school of thought tends to focus on dealing with the condition of the world’s “reality” by viewing it as an actual and natural plane of being that is both static and accessible to “objective” scrutiny. Neo-realists tend to explain conflicts as inevitable because states are rational actors arranged in an international model of anarchy and must vie for relative power. Neo-realists make assumptions about the self-interested nature of states’ “rational” actions without considering the possibilities for cooperation among states. According to neo-realists like Kenneth Waltz, states are actually constrained by “anarchic structure” which is the cause of today’s international system.<sup>9</sup> In this condition of anarchy, states are not only confined to acts of self-interest, but they are unable to envision the actual cumulative results of their choices, actions and policies.<sup>10</sup> Because “individual” states cannot foresee the global ramifications of their decisions to act or not to act, they often cannot achieve their purported intentions or are left with undesirable collateral damage. In Waltz’s words: “With each country constrained to take care of itself, no one can take care of the system”.<sup>11</sup> Waltz compares the “structure” of global politics to the economic market in the sense that the structure acts upon “units” or states like a force, compelling states to be concerned with their own interests, assuming that these interests are always quite plain and understanding them as actions with a highest good in mind.<sup>12</sup>

When applying the neo-realist perspective to the conflict between India and Pakistan, especially over the issue of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, this concern by states for relative power in an international structure of anarchy appears to be a salient factor at work. India and Pakistan have been harboring deep-seated hostilities over the issue of the state of Jammu and Kashmir since partition in 1947. This animosity can be explained from a neo-realist’s point of view by understanding that states as mistrusting and power-hungry

---

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 24.

<sup>9</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Anarchic Structure of World Politics,” *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 2003), 47.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 61.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 51.

actors concerned with obtaining a dominant position relative to other states within the world system through the means deemed necessary. The belief that this is the way states act naturally then, in self-interest as opposed to seeking cooperative solutions, causes each state to build up its defense capabilities in relation to a threat, readily perceived (or constructed) by an inevitable distrust.

India and Pakistan have gone to war three times, twice explicitly over the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. In May 1998, India began nuclear tests, and Pakistan followed suit the next month. This drastically changed the deadly nature of the conflict and drew concerned reactions from other nations. Developing nuclear capabilities caused the relative power and position of both nations in the world system to shift, and it was this struggle, it seems the neo-realists' would say, that resulted in the increased regard by other nations for the possible escalation of this ongoing clash. Waltz notes that: "The structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system's units".<sup>13</sup> While Pakistan cited a U.N. resolution for vote in a plebiscite, India looked to the terms of the Simla Agreement of 1972 that agreed upon bilateral action following the 1971 conflict over E. Pakistan and Bangladesh. Neo-realists would say that this bilateral agreement makes sense because states want to secure national interests and so would be skeptical of the power of international organizations like the U.N.

India and Pakistan came very close to war again in May 2002 over high tensions in the state of Jammu and Kashmir after a raid on an army camp in India-controlled territory occurred, which India blamed on Pakistan-backed militants.<sup>14</sup> There was an exchange of fire and "a million men" were lined up along a ceasefire line.<sup>15</sup> Since both India and Pakistan possess nuclear capabilities, the possibility of war between these two states becomes a prominent concern for the international community. Hope might be found from a neo-realist perspective, however, in the fact that states are considered to be rational actors who would not be keen on blowing each other to bits. This is where the concept of deterrence enters the picture.

The conflict did not escalate, fortunately, into a full-scale war. Animosity persisted between the two nations with terrorist attacks and other forms of violence, but the most recent climate has been one of hope in light of pending peace talks between the leaders of the two countries. Still, neo-realists would take a more pessimistic view of this development in the sense that they would probably see it through the lens of pure self-interest incidentally resulting in cooperation. Peace talks are in the economic interests, certainly, of both nations. "Major" states like the U.S. that have greater pull in the market can, by placing sanctions or other means of economic pressure, cause states to take certain political actions.<sup>16</sup> This is the game of power politics neo-realists see at play in the international system, with states arranging or trying to order hegemonic relations in order to survive.

From the perspective of difference feminism, however, this persistent discourse about power politics with regard to national interests is the product of the historically male-dominated character of global politics. Difference feminists challenge the neo-

---

<sup>13</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Anarchic Structure of World Politics," *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 2003), 55.

<sup>14</sup> Simon Jeffery and Mark Tran, "Kashmir," *The Guardian*, 21 May 2002.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Anarchic Structure of World Politics," *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 2003), 62.

realists for presenting a gender-biased view of international relations which they portray as the natural ordering and necessity of political interactions among states. According to this perspective, it would make for a better future in international relations to re-locate “female strategy” at the center of discourse.<sup>17</sup> Difference feminism emerged out of a critique of liberal feminism and is centered on the idea that there are intrinsic differences between men and women, stemming most essentially from biological characteristics. What women have to offer, then, is a refreshingly different outlook on the world and modes of conflict resolution. For example, what is meant by “female strategy,” as J. Ann Tickner terms it, is not always acting under the assumption that power is necessarily related to domination.<sup>18</sup> Power, as defined by feminist theorists for instance, may also be viewed as the potential to cooperate and act through coalitions or communities for the possibility of mutual benefit.<sup>19</sup> Appropriate modes of understanding and exercising power have tended to be dominated by “masculine” impulses toward conflict and autonomy. More respect, equality and political voice should be awarded women because difference in strategy is by no means synonymous with inferiority, a patriarchal relations work to convey.

This idea that there are different strategies for approaching conflict resolution is part of an underlying critique in difference feminism of the neo-realists’ positivism or the idea that there is a single reality as opposed to “multiple realities”.<sup>20</sup> Difference feminists stake their claims in the constitutive nature of theory and, in turn, want to locate the historical and social context and subsequent constructed assumptions of the authors of global political theory. Their dominant position as privileged men allows their voices to be heard above other, marginalized experiences and perspectives. Tickner’s main concern is not to completely deny the validity of “power-as-domination” discourse and recognizes that it is “a pervasive reality in international relations”.<sup>21</sup> Instead, she wants to highlight the fact that “there are also instances of cooperation in interstate relations, which tend to be obscured when power is seen solely as domination”.<sup>22</sup>

When looking at the conflict then between India and Pakistan over the state of Jammu and Kashmir, a difference feminist would note that the conflict reflects in many ways the effects of patriarchy on international relations theory which, in turn, affects the reality of policies and actions by states. Proposing the concept of multiple realities as the marginalized alternative to power politics as the objective reality, difference feminists would emphasize that the leaders are men who have high social standing and have been historically privileged. They would point to the lack of women as evidence of a narrow scope of understanding on the part of state leadership, for to not include women is to silence such an active percentage of the population also experiencing the violence and with equal capabilities but different perspectives to add. To absorb new “female” points of view into the peace resolution now being set in process between the two countries would

---

<sup>17</sup> J. Ann Tickner, “A Critique of Morgenthau’s Principles of Political Realism,” *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 2003), 22.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> J. Ann Tickner, “A Critique of Morgenthau’s Principles of Political Realism,” *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 2003), 22.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

result in a more balanced, multidimensional and comprehensive view of the conflict and potential for forming networks of cooperation. Difference feminists would also see weapons of mass destruction as a transnational problem and case where states need to work together to solve the security issue effectively. But though this difference feminist perspective seems to adapt the neo-realist view of global politics into one that is more grounded in the “reality” of a multiplicity of voices and experiences by including women, by talking about “female strategy” they re-inscribe females into gender categories and, subsequently, gender-biased political and social roles.

In light of what I view to be a retrogressive limitation of difference feminism, despite its positive improvements on neo-realism, postmodernism is the theoretical tool that I believe works best to most fruitfully understand and interpret international relations. The cultivation of an analytical mobility, referred to earlier as an essential component of constitutive theories, results in a self-reflective recognition of one’s context and the cultivation of a consciousness that encourages critical deconstruction of hegemonic perspectives and *categories* which have been socially constructed and often internalized. This internalization of prescribed socio-political, linguistic or gender categories limits theories such as neo-realism and difference feminism and makes these theories all the more difficult to render visible by deconstruction and to advocate in practice. This deconstruction of constraining assumptions, made chiefly by neo-realists but also on the part of difference feminists in relation to gender categories, illuminates the relationship between power and knowledge essential to the postmodern perspective.

Postmodernism wants to bring to the forefront of discussion about global politics the relationship between power and knowledge and, as a result of this concern, new ways of thinking about sovereignty and the state. Regarding power and knowledge: “Rather than treat the production of knowledge as simply as cognitive matter, postmodernism treats it as a normative and political matter”.<sup>23</sup> It is imperative to talk about the way knowledge based in socially constructed meanings affects the way we conceive of identities. We must then ask what is meant by “state” in the neo-realist structure of international relations. From the neo-realist perspective, the concept of the state seems natural and static. A postmodern critique would not immediately discard the concept of states acting in self-interest and with violent potential in an anarchic condition because the purpose of postmodern thought is not to attempt to uncover a definite solution or concrete conclusion.<sup>24</sup> Instead, as a constitutive theory of global politics, postmodernism views reality as consisting of “competing perspectives” and looks at the process by which various narratives are reified.<sup>25</sup>

A postmodern critique might then involve a “double reading” of the sovereign state paradigm, for example.<sup>26</sup> The dominant interpretation’s argument would be considered first, which I believe is absolutely critical to the process of deconstruction.<sup>27</sup> This way the result of the deconstruction is not necessarily a new and equally exclusive theory but rather is one that meets my criterion of wider, more inclusive scope. After reading and under-

---

<sup>23</sup> Richard Devetak, “Postmodernism,” in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, eds., *Theories of International Relations*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 182.

<sup>24</sup> Richard Devetak, “Postmodernism,” in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, eds., *Theories of International Relations*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 188.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*, 184.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*, 187.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*.

standing the way the privileged argument is constructed, the task then at hand is one of applying pressure to points of instability within the argument, “internal tensions” such as the ambiguity regarding what is meant by the “state”.<sup>28</sup> This is particularly important to note when looking at the conflict between India and Pakistan which has been previously examined from two other distinct theoretical perspectives. Because postmodern scholars would see a variety of narratives interacting, there would certainly be questions as to *who*, as opposed to what positional entity, is meant by the term “sovereign state.” There are the Kashmiri Muslims, for example, many of whom consider their identity to be unique from either Pakistan or India. The ceasefire line clearly divides but does not define and is not stable, just as the constructed identities borders separate are not.

The borders between India and Pakistan were just as much formed by violence, when one looks at the historical context of the struggle over Jammu and Kashmir, as they are maintained by violence today. Postmodernists would assert that borders are formed and maintained by violence but also paradoxically viewed as a means of protection from violence.<sup>29</sup> Terrorism is generally considered a form of illegitimate violence, and this complicates the situation. Neither Pakistan nor India will take responsibility for terrorism since part of a government’s right to authority is the assumption that they will only perpetrate *legitimate* acts of violence. I suppose that a neo-realist would draw a parallel between legitimacy and rationality, but I would say that in the same way that there is no clear conception of what is meant by state’s interests, there is also no single, universal rationale.

It is clear that what is in the interest of India and Pakistan now in the midst of their preliminary peace talks is an end to the violence that has plagued their relations since partition. What is not entirely apparent is what agendas are being carried to these negotiations and what the end result will be. The historical context of this post-colonial rivalry will be brought to the table, along with national security concerns and pressures from other states to confront terrorism. There are important points in the neo-realist perspective, especially with regard to concerns by states about relative power. But when we look here, to this “power-as-dominance” model, it is important to bring in the multiplicity of agendas within states and to not view states and boundaries as static ideas. There are socially constructed identities and historically constructed rivalries at stake here, which have meaning to many people today and, consequently, the power to shape the future in detrimental and violent ways if not viewed critically.

This is where I locate the liberating power of postmodern theory in conversation with other theoretical approaches. There is no certain answer or “best” way to work toward peace, but awareness is the first step in the direction of understanding and working toward long-term solutions. Perhaps the occupation of analyzing politics is, after all, something like the art of practicing politics. Both require sensitivity and find reality in the moments of engagement rather than hyper-abstraction. The argument posited by Isaiah Berlin against our ability to objectively scrutinize and predict reality can be useful to recall here. He suggests that ideas are important but that there is some special sense of the moment that causes leaders to act successfully and achieve great ends.<sup>30</sup> He notes, “. . . there

---

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, 188.

<sup>29</sup> Richard Devetak, “Postmodernism,” in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, eds., *Theories of International Relations*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 191.

<sup>30</sup> Isaiah Berlin, “Realism and Politics,” *The Power of Ideas*, Ed. Henry Hardy, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 140.

are regions where gardeners achieve conspicuously more spectacular results than botanists; and to distinguish these areas from one another is one of the first symptoms of a sense of reality".<sup>31</sup> It seems to me that postmodernism is the best theory because it can be a tool to create awareness without insisting upon a definite theoretical conclusion which could not serve the purpose of predicting events and would possibly distort reality. Postmodernism is a theory of awareness which can successfully be translated into educated practice and positive change.

### Bibliography

- Berlin, Isaiah. "Realism and Politics." *The Power of Ideas*. Ed. Henry Hardy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Burchill, Scott. "Introduction," in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, eds., *Theories of International Relations*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
- Devetak, Richard. "Postmodernism." *Theories of International Relations*. Ed. Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
- Jeffery, Simon and Mark Tran. "Kashmir." *The Guardian*. 21 May 2002.
- Tickner, J. Ann. "A Critique of Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism." *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*. New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 2003.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. "The Anarchic Structure of World Politics." *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*. New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 2003.

---

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

## **Revising Security: Contributions and Limitations of Non-Traditional Security Studies**

**Greg Walz-Chojnacki**

In the face of the rapid expansion of the security studies field since the end of the Cold War, scholars and policymakers must discriminate between widely varying and contradictory perspectives in order to develop an understanding of security studies that benefits from the diversity of viewpoints without losing relevance or cohesiveness. This essay examines a variety of schools of thought on the topic of security studies and evaluates the most useful contributions based on two central criteria: ability to reshape conceptions of the study of security, or how scholars perceive the conceptual layout of the field; and capacity to influence practical policy making. By virtue of their potentially conflictive nature, these two criteria acknowledge the necessity of balancing depth of critique with the feasibility of alternatives offered. Because, problematic as it may be, the state government remains the most common actor in the field of security, useful critiques of mainstream security policy and scholarship must offer applicable insights to the policymaking community.

This essay analyzes some of the recent developments of the field in three sections. First, I examine epistemological critiques of traditional, “realist” framework and present some of the ways in which this critique has practically influenced conceptions of the state as the agent of security. Next I discuss the central arguments in the debate over the appropriate referent of security, a question many schools seek to answer. Finally, I use Ole Waever’s conception of “securitization” to analyze scholars’ attempts to characterize a wide range of policy areas as “security issues”. Through these sections, I argue that many of the critiques of mainstream security theory contribute best to the field as useful theoretical points of reference by which to evaluate government policies rather than as central paradigms by which to reorder the discipline.

### **Epistemological Critiques**

The epistemological critiques generated by post-structural and feminist scholars represent the most incisive and radical challenges to the realist conception of security, because they undermine the fundamental positivist assumptions from which realism derives its privileged place in the security debate. By contesting realism’s implicit assertion that the states-in-anarchy game-board of traditional security is what actually exists, rather than a constituted conception of the significant actors and relationships in international security, these critics open the field to a broad range of alternate ideas of how the field of security is constituted. The analytical techniques of feminist and critical studies scholars exemplify this perspective on the mainstream discipline.

Feminist writers expose the gendered nature of central concepts in realist thought in order to undermine its privileged place in the discipline and to promote alternate visions of security. J. Ann Tickner’s critique of Rousseau’s myth of the stag hunt as a model for the

anarchic nature of international relations illustrates this technique. She notes that this “foundational myth” ignores “the deeper social relations in which the activities of the hunters are embedded” and argues that the gender bias of such explanatory devices as this one “extends into international-relations theory” (Tickner 52). Exposing the gendered nature of the realist discourse undermines the claim to universality associated with the realist school’s self-perception as an objective science of international relations. This approach also reveals the problematic nature of the concept of anarchy upon which so many of the “rules” of realist politics rest.

Critical security studies scholars such as Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams historicize the concept of states as unitary, rational actors in order to show how this concept has evolved by analogy to a historically rooted concept of the individual as a “wholly self-contained, instrumentally rational subject” (Krause and Williams 40). This characterization of the concept of the unitary state actor exemplifies these scholars’ critique of realism. They describe the realist conception of its project as “the search for timeless, objective, causal laws that govern human phenomena” and derives its authority in the discipline through Enlightenment-rooted, “highly contestable view” that scientific procedures render universal conclusions about the object of study (Krause and Williams 37). Krause and Williams’ deconstruction of the rational, unitary state clears the path for alternate conceptions of the state that take into account the plurality of agendas within one government.

Realist writers commonly discount epistemological critiques as esoteric, “self-indulgent” scholarship that is “divorced from the real world” (Walt 223). Even more sympathetic scholars often argue that the epistemological disagreement between realists and post-structural and feminist scholars precludes these latter scholars from contributing to the mainstream security debate. On the contrary, both of these critiques have the capacity to enrich security policy debate by offering new perspectives from which to evaluate the successes and failures of current and potential policies. Considering governments (and states in general) as potentially fractious entities helps to explain the role of domestic policy in determining foreign policy, and it is sensitive to the changes in state priorities that often occur when administrations change. Further, this approach allows for a more nuanced conception of the mounting internal tensions that eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The feminist critique of the “state of nature” condition in which states find themselves points toward increased prospects for cooperation, rather than the antagonistic state relations that an anarchy-based international system engenders. Alexander Wendt’s socially constructive theory of international relations parallels the feminist critique in that it asserts the possibility of greater cooperation.<sup>32</sup> This similarity shows how the policies or postures that critics of realism advocate may converge despite their distinct theoretical origins. While traditional security scholars will not soon accept the epistemological critiques of feminist and post-structural scholars, these schools may still influence the policy world by offering new arguments for previously unaccepted policies, such as increased cooperation between states.

---

<sup>32</sup> In his article, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” Alexander Wendt argues that realists mistakenly treat their principle of self-help as “something separate from the practices by which it is produced and sustained,” (Wendt 79). In other words, they assume this principle as a simple “rule” that comes with the game of international relations, rather than a code of conduct that states create over time through foreign policy.

### **Shifting the Referent**

As mentioned above, the debate over the appropriate referent of security remains one of the most prominent discussions in the security field. One of the reasons why this issue allows for such widespread discussion is that it does not explicitly challenge the epistemological assumptions of realism; rather, it challenges realism's ontological foundation. As Krause and Williams argue, the idea of the state as referent derives from its status as the guarantor of rights and safety to the individual, the peacemaker in the Hobbesian "war of all against all" (Krause and Williams 40). It follows from this status that protecting the sovereignty of the state protects the individuals within the state from the internal anarchy that would reign in the absence of government. Thus securing the state equals securing the individual, according to realists. Various schools have proposed society and the individual as alternatives to the state as the object to be secured in international security policy.

Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen school assert that society represents the appropriate referent of security rather than the state (Smith 85). This conception stems from the observation of struggles between state and social identity in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. It is a more precise instrument with which to study intra-state conflicts, which often stem from the presence of multiple distinct ethnic groups in one state. In these situations, looking at the state as the object to be secured makes little sense, since the institutions of the state constitute the cause of the society's insecurity. Critical security scholar Steve Smith's observation about societal security highlights an indispensable contribution of the Copenhagen school to the discipline: "whereas state security focuses on sovereignty as the core value, societal security focused instead on identity" (Smith 84). Seeking to secure identity opens a wide range of alternatives other than military power to achieve the goal of security; this framework also provides a tool with which to analyze the role of unsecured social identities in violent intra-state conflict. Still, scholars ought not to consider society as the primary referent in all cases; clearly interstate conflict, such as that between the United States and Iraq, necessitates analysis of the security of states. Further, in countries that have homogeneous populations, or whose institutions balance power well between distinct ethnic groups, speaking of the state as the referent does not sacrifice too much accuracy.

Critics from diverse perspectives have argued for a shift from the state to the individual as the referent of security; this essay focuses on the contributions of the "human security" school and feminist scholarship to this vision of security. This concept is based on the idea that traditional security measures fail to account for many threats to individuals' security. Scholars in this field define the principle in a variety of ways, but the United Nations Development Program structures the human security agenda around "the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who [seek] security in their daily lives" (Paris 89). Feminist scholarship uses the example of the growing number of civilian casualties in armed conflict to illustrate how securing a state can often make its citizens less secure (Tickner 49). By using a "bottom-up" approach, feminist scholars such as Tickner seek "a better understanding of the interrelationship between all forms of violence and the extent to which unjust social relations, including gender hierarchies, contribute to insecurity" (Tickner 49). An important facet of this movement, noted by Ole Waever, is the shift

from the term “security” as applied to the state, a highly codified and loaded concept, to the concept of individual security, which contrasts the former term with the everyday sense of the word “security” in order to undermine the effectiveness of state security measures (Waever 48-50).

The individual as referent represents a useful concept in evaluating the success of traditional security policy. By exposing the potential contradiction between a nation’s “security” and the wellbeing of the citizens, this term forces scholars to think more broadly about the effects of the traditional instruments of security policy, namely military force and, more recently, economic sanctions. The traditional, state-centered notion of security characterizes “threats” as phenomena that have the capacity to disable the sovereignty of the state. With this understanding, the sacrifice of individuals in order to save the whole from the horrors of the Hobbesian state of nature makes sense; however, if one views state actions in the framework of providing security to its citizens (as this traditional model supposes the state does), the importance of a broader assessment of the “microlevel” effects of security policy becomes clear (Tickner 48).

### **New Visions for Security and Waever’s ‘Securitization’**

The human security and feminist schools both see broadening the agenda of security policy as a natural corollary to the individual-as-referent argument. If the goal of policy is to secure the individual, what aspects of individual life should security policy affect? Although there is not much consensus on a definite list of issues, many feminists and human security advocates support the inclusion of economic, environmental, and human rights-based notions of security (Paris 90). Each of these categories allows a wide range of interpretation, and they cover many phenomena as unrelated to traditional security as job discrimination and manufacturing practices that lead to pollution.

Ole Waever makes an insightful critique of the expanded security agenda when he advocates an understanding of “security” as a speech-act with definite historically-rooted connotations, rather than as a goal to be achieved by certain policies (Waever 48, 49). He argues that by trying to (re)define security as the goal of policies, and by further expanding the definition of what this desired end-state would be, scholars fail to interact meaningfully with the mainstream security community, whose history cannot be extricated from the term “security.” Waever proposes that by examining the code of thought and policy surrounding issues that have been classified as “security issues,” scholars gain a better understanding of the effect of trying to put non-traditional measures on the agenda. The “logic of war” that securitizing invokes does not address all issues with equal efficacy; rather, the protocol of response to “security threats” sometimes exacerbates problems rather than solving them (Waever 75). Waever’s argument makes a strong case for the restriction of the security debate to traditional affairs. It dismantles the more common conception of security as a speech act, the idea that “addressing an issue in security terms...evokes an image of threat-defense, allocating to the state an important role in addressing it” (Waever 47).

It follows from Waever’s position that scholars should conceive of the interrelation between traditional and non-traditional security issues as a relationship between distinct fields rather than trying to expand the discipline to accommodate new “threats”. Specifically, the best way to assimilate the concepts of the broader agenda and alternate referents of security is to use them as tools of reference, rather than as central paradigms in the

field. By using these concepts to judge the outcomes of policies generated according to the more traditional protocol of security studies, scholars can both take mainstream security on its own terms and offer insightful, useful analyses of policy alternatives. Further, by avoiding the securitization of non-traditional issues that logically flows from individual-referent frameworks, this approach reserves the response protocol of the “security” speech act for the issues that it addresses best.

### Bibliography

- Krause, Keith and Michael C. Williams. “From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies.”
- Paris, Roland. “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” *International Security* 26, 2 (2001): 87-102.
- Smith, Steve. “The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the last Twenty Years.” *Contemporary Security Policy* 20, 3 (1999): 72-101.
- Tickner, J. Ann. *Gendering World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
- Waever, Ole. “Securitization and Desecuritization.” *On Security*. Ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz. New York, Columbia University Press, 1995. 46-86.
- Walt, Stephen. “The Renaissance of Security Studies.” *International Studies Quarterly* 35, 2 (1991). 211-239.

## **The Use of Child Soldiers and the Special Court: Seeking Punity for Violations of Human Rights in Sierra Leone**

**Julia Podevin  
Macalester College  
December 2003**

Children are recruited into armed forces in about 87 countries worldwide. It is estimated that over 300,000 children are fighting with government groups and many more are recruited by non-governmental or oppositionist forces. While this problem is of global spread, it is most acute in developing countries of Africa.<sup>33</sup>

### **1) Introduction**

The contemporary history of Sierra Leone is scarred by a decade-long civil war notorious for its level of atrocity and brutality, including widespread human rights violations and abuse of civilians. The civil war broke out in 1991, when the rebel group Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Foday Sankoh launched a campaign to overthrow the repressive and corrupt one-party rule. This offensive turned into a decade long civil war over the control of the country's resources, especially its diamond mines. The war was characterized by large-scale human rights abuses including killings, amputations, rapes, abductions, and forced labor and conscriptions. The Sierra Leonean war is frequently referred to as one of Africa's most brutal wars and has a devastating record of tens of thousands civilians killed and up to one quarter of its population displaced. Although the RUF was known to be ruthless and committed the majority of the crimes, the government's armed forces<sup>34</sup> and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)<sup>35</sup> also committed many abuses of human rights. Forced recruitment and use of child soldiers can be attributed to all sides of this conflict. Among the many human rights violations perpetrated in Sierra Leone, this paper will focus on the issue of child soldiers. This issue is of great concern to the international community as it constitutes a grave breach of human rights and is key to human security and stability. As highlighted by the Government of Canada, "Children are our future – safe children means a secure future."<sup>36</sup> Protecting children in times of war should thus be a priority.

This paper will first give an overview of the use of child soldiers in Sierra Leone, by drawing on human rights reports. Secondly, it will discuss the definitions and legal foundations surrounding the issue. It will then proceed to analyze the weaknesses and

---

<sup>33</sup> "Key Findings of the Global Report on Child Soldiers 2001." Human Rights Watch: <http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/cs-report2001.htm>. Retrieved April 6, 2003.

<sup>34</sup> Government forces are composed of a loose alliance of the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) and the Sierra Leone Army (SLA).

<sup>35</sup> AFRC are SLA officers who organized a military coup in 1997 and joined forces with the RUF. Part of them later re-joined the SLA.

<sup>36</sup> "Children and Armed Conflict." Government of Canada: <http://www.waraffectedchildren.gc.ca/menu-en.asp>. Retrieved November 26, 2003.

shortcomings of the relevant rights. Subsequently the paper will report the role played by human rights organizations and other states in addressing and responding to the use of child soldiers in Sierra Leone. Several types of action are needed to address the use of child soldiers: demobilization, disarmament, reintegration in society and prevention of future recruitments. This paper will look more closely at the attempts to hold those involved in the use of child soldiers accountable, and thus prevent impunity for this violation of human rights law. This paper will thus focus on the establishment of a Hybrid Court in Sierra Leone in the aftermath of the war. Finally, the paper will conclude with an assessment of the progress made in terms of resolving the situation and child soldiers problem in Sierra Leone.

## 2) Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone

“Sierra Leone has one of the worst child soldiers problems anywhere in the world. Some 5000 child combatants serve among government and opposition forces, and a further 5,000 are estimated to have been recruited for labour among armed groups.”<sup>37</sup>

‘Children face some of the gravest abuses in this war at the hands of the RUF,’ said Takirambudde [executive director of the Africa Division of Human Rights Watch]. ‘The RUF specifically targets children for recruitment as child soldiers, forced labor, and sexual exploitation.’<sup>38</sup>

Over the war years, children have been frequently abducted and conscripted into fighting groups. Following the attacks of January 1999 alone, more than 3000 children were registered as missing.<sup>39</sup> Children are often recruited by force and used in armed combat. Children are extremely attractive to fighting units. As some commanders have noted, child soldiers are desirable because they are “more obedient, do not question orders and are easier to manipulate than adult soldiers”<sup>40</sup>. The physical vulnerability of children makes them more responsive to threats and commands so they can be easily intimidated. Moreover, fear and indoctrination are powerful tools on children, as they are easily impressionable and can thus be lured into fighting. As Eileen O’Connor (CNN News) suggests, children might be more aggressive, and willing to kill perhaps because of their innocence. They are less aware of issues, and easily manipulated.<sup>41</sup> Children can be influenced easily and might thus take arms and enter conflict without questioning the reasons behind it. “Effectively, they are slaves enlisted in wars they often know little about.”<sup>42</sup> The proliferation

---

<sup>37</sup> “Child Soldiers: Action: Sierra Leone.” Human Rights Watch:

[http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/action/sierra\\_leone.htm](http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/action/sierra_leone.htm). Retrieved December 1, 2003.

<sup>38</sup> “Sierra Leone Rebels Forcefully Recruit Child Soldiers.” May 31, 2000. Human Rights Watch:

<http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/05/s10531.htm> Retrieved November 26, 2003.

<sup>39</sup> “Sierra Leone: Human Rights Developments.” Human Rights Watch: [www.hrw.org/wr2k/Africa-09.htm](http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Africa-09.htm). Retrieved November 26, 2003.

<sup>40</sup> Machel Grac’a. “Impact of Armed Conflict on Children.” United Nations report: 1996, p11. Available at: [gopher://gopher.un.org/00/ga/docs/51/plenary/A51-306.EN](http://gopher.un.org/00/ga/docs/51/plenary/A51-306.EN)

<sup>41</sup> “Child Soldiers: Invisible Combatants.” Prod. Gene LaRocque; Dir. Mark Sugg. Center for Defense Information, 1997.

<sup>42</sup> “The Child Soldier.” *Al-Ahram Weekly*. February 28 – March 6, 2002. Issue No. 575, p4.

<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/575/in102.htm>. Retrieved April 9, 2003.

of cheap and easy-to-use light weapons further increases their efficiency as combatants and thereby contribute to their appeal as soldiers.

Children can be made to believe almost anything and are less fearful of death. As one rebel leader explained, “children make the best soldiers because they are brave and fearless. They think it is a game.”<sup>43</sup> Forces who use child soldiers often abuse this innocence and naivety, making children believe they are invulnerable to bullets, or giving them talismans and playing on superstitions to give them a sense of protection. Reporting the situation of child soldiers in Sierra Leone, a journalist records some of the ways in which children’s confidence is abused:

Some, for instance, are told that certain woolen tassels and bits of broken mirror will give them immunity to bullets. One 13-year-old claimed to enter battle equipped with nothing more than an animal horn wrapped in blue wool: this he explained was a “controller”, with which he could steer the enemy’s bullets. Others, known as the “born naked”, dance nude into battle to intimidate the enemy. Such children believe that their friends who were killed had lost their immunity by touching women, swearing or stealing.<sup>44</sup>

In addition, drugs and alcohol are commonly used to induce the fearlessness and ruthlessness of child soldiers, “many of the children with the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) were abducted, and sometimes given cocaine or marijuana to make them fearless in battle.”<sup>45</sup> As Sayo, a 14 year-old ex-AFRC soldier said as he was describing how his skin was cut and cocaine was rubbed in the wounds, “when I go to the battle fields, I smoke enough. That’s why I become unafraid of everything. When you refuse to take drugs, it’s called technical sabotage and you are killed.”<sup>46</sup>

Furthermore, children do not require pay, and are a good alternative to adult soldiers especially in developing countries where a majority of the population tends to be younger. The use of child soldiers also proves to be an efficient technique to inflict terror: as a former rebel of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone said, “when the rebels want to spread terror nothing is more effective than the execution of a village chief by a small boy.”<sup>47</sup> Children can also undertake many functions this includes traditional supporting roles such as cooking, carrying loads, looting, reporting, or spying, but increasingly children are being deliberately conscripted for active fighting roles.

In addition, rebels who abducted children in Sierra Leone often forced children to commit atrocities against their own families or villages in order to break any bonds between children and their communities, and guarantee that they will remain loyal to the rebel groups.<sup>48</sup> The progressive involvement of youth in acts of extreme violence desensitizes them to suffering. In a number of cases, young people have been deliberately exposed to horrific scenes. Such experiences make children more likely to commit violent acts themselves and may contribute to a break with society. Such disruption and abuse of child-

---

<sup>43</sup> Barnes, Edward. “The Kalashnikov Kids: the Russians are coming...and boy are they cute. Inside the children’s brigade.” *Life* July 1, 1999. 22:8. p3

<sup>44</sup> “Under-age Killers.” *The Economist* December 12, 1998: p46.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> “Sierra Leone” Child Soldiers Coalition: [www.child-soldiers.org](http://www.child-soldiers.org). Retrieved November 26, 2003.

<sup>47</sup> Machel, Grac’a. Op. Cit. p13.

<sup>48</sup> “Kalashnikov Kids.” *The Economist* July 8, 1999.

hood have profound negative implications on the child's development and on the future of societies. The forcing of atrocities also makes the process of post-war reinsertion of child soldiers into communities difficult and problematic, as these children will often feel guilt, or will be rejected by their former communities.

### 3) Relevant legal standards

“War violates every right of a child – the right to life, the right to be with family and community, the right to health, the right to the development of the personality and the right to be nurtured and protected.”<sup>49</sup> The use of children as soldiers in war exposes them to many additional risks and further violates their rights.

The Convention on the Right of the Child (CRC), adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1989 is the only treaty dealing exclusively with children's rights. It has been an essential step in promoting awareness and protection of children's rights. It defines a child as any person under the age of eighteen but makes an exception in its article regarding recruitment of children in armed forces bringing the age down to fifteen:

Article 38, 2. State Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities. 3. State Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces. [...] <sup>50</sup>

This article reinforces the similar obligations stated in the additional protocols to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to the protection of victims of international (Protocol I) and non-international (Protocol II) armed conflict, established in 1977.

There has been considerable pressure by states and NGOs to strengthen the Convention's article concerning child soldiers to increase the age to eighteen as is with all other rights considered in the document. This led up to the draft of an optional protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict approved by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and adopted by the General Assembly in 2000. As of December 2003, it has 115 signatories and 63 parties; Sierra Leone signed on September 8, 2000 and ratified it on May 15, 2002.<sup>51</sup> The protocol is innovative in that it urges both state and non-state actors to not recruit or use children under eighteen in conflict. However, it makes a distinction between compulsory recruitment and voluntary enrolment for which it allows lower age limits.

In addition to international human rights law and international humanitarian law, there are also international criminal and international labor laws addressing the issue of child soldiering. In 1998, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court declared the recruitment of children less than fifteen years of age into national armed forces or armed groups for participation in conflicts a war crime.<sup>52</sup> Child soldiering is also condemned un-

---

<sup>49</sup> Machel, Grac'a. Op. Cit. p10.

<sup>50</sup> Convention on the Rights of the Child. Steiner, Henry J. and Alston, Philip. International Human Rights in Context. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. pp1410-1419.

<sup>51</sup> <http://www.unicef.org/crc/opcac-tableweb.htm>. Retrieved on December 4, 2003.

<sup>52</sup> Sierra Leone signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on October 17, 1998 and ratified it on September 15, 2000. <http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp> Retrieved December 7, 2003.

der the International Labor Organization (ILO) Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention (C182), adopted in 1999. This convention “commits each state which ratifies it to take immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour as a matter of urgency.”<sup>53</sup> It defines children as anyone under the age of eighteen years and was thus the first international treaty to set eighteen as the minimum age for child soldiering; it also does not distinguish between the types of groups recruiting children. In addition, it does not distinguish between different functions a child might perform in the military, condemning the use of child soldiers for both direct and indirect roles in combat.<sup>54</sup>

The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child is to date, the only regional treaty addressing the issue of child soldiers. Adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1990, this treaty came into force in November 1999. Sierra Leone has signed in April 1992 but has not ratified the Charter yet.<sup>55</sup> It specifies that no child should be subject to direct participation in hostilities, and defines “child” as anyone below eighteen years of age. The Maputo Declaration on the Use of Children as Soldiers is also a significant step forward. Adopted in April 1999 after a conference addressing the problem of child soldiers in Africa held in Maputo, Mozambique, this declaration states that “the use of any child under eighteen years of age by any armed force or armed group is wholly unacceptable, even where that child claims or is claimed to be a volunteer.”<sup>56</sup> This conference was organized jointly by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers,<sup>57</sup> and Save the Children (an NGO), and brought together African governments, non-governmental organizations, and representatives of the U.N. and the Red Cross to seek an end to the use of children as soldiers. It served as a model for subsequent international conferences increasing awareness on the issue of children and war.

In addition to these legal documents are a multitude of U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on the theme of child soldiers. The UNSC resisted for many years the inclusion of human rights issues on its agenda and thus did not discuss the issue of child soldiers before 1998. In August 1999 however, it adopted its first resolution on the topic<sup>58</sup> expressing grave concern regarding the impact of armed conflict on children and urging all states and parts of the U.N. to intensify efforts to end the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict. This again is a positive step towards the eradication of child soldiers and is seen as a successful response to the pressures and efforts of the international community to promote the issue.

---

<sup>53</sup> “International Legal Standards Governing Child Soldiers.” Human Rights Watch:

<http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/int-law.htm>. Retrieved April 6, 2003.

<sup>54</sup> At the International Labor Conference of 2002, the government of Sierra Leone reported that the Convention had been ratified in the country, however instruments have not been received yet, and thus it appears as if the Convention has not been ratified. <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipecc/ratification/map/index.htm> Retrieved December 4, 2003

<sup>55</sup> <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/afchildratifications.html> Retrieved December 5, 2003

<sup>56</sup> Kalis, Martin A. “Child Soldiers in Africa: Solutions to a Complex Dilemma.” *Africa Journal in Conflict Resolution*. No. 1/2002, p6.

<sup>57</sup> The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers was launched in 1998 by six leading non-governmental organizations (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Save the Children-Sweden for the International Save the Children Alliance, Jesuite Refugee Service, the Quaker United Nations Office-Geneva, and International Federation Terre des Hommes). It has played an important role in increasing awareness and promoting the campaign to ban the use of children under eighteen years of age in armed conflict.

<sup>58</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 1261 (1999) on Children and Armed Conflict (25 August 1999). Steiner, Henry J. and Alston, Philip. Op. Cit.: pp536-537.

#### 4) Problems with these rights

Several difficulties arise, challenging the legitimacy of the rights put in place to protect children against military recruitment. The first debate has to do with the definition of a child as a person less than eighteen years of age. This definition contributes to an understanding of children as vulnerable and dependent individuals, in the process of developing themselves. Childhood and children's responsibilities can, however, depend on cultural and social environments. In poor families or under-developed regions, for example, children are often expected to take up responsibilities at a much younger age than is expected from children in developed countries. Furthermore, taking arms in a conflict can mean joining a group with status and can be seen as part of a ritual of initiation into society:

In Sierra Leone it is often difficult to distinguish between recruitment into armed conflict versus the initiation process young boys undergo to mark entry as an adult into societies of traditional hunters. For example, some parents may not try to prevent the recruitment of their children by the CDF due to the traditional status associated with membership in groups such as the kamajors, which are an important element of the CDF.<sup>59</sup>

International laws, while a crucial measure to prevent future recruitments of children and to protect them, are often ineffective in times of social turmoil. Wars uproot social norms and laws are often inapplicable in such contexts.

International humanitarian law is far from being able to enforce human rights in times of war. [...] In such chaotic conditions, it becomes extremely difficult to enforce international humanitarian laws, especially if these come only from above and are not understood at the local level.<sup>60</sup>

A further difficulty comes from the terms used by the law. They are often vague and unclearly defined. For instance: in the CRC and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, the article concerning child soldiering states: "State Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities."<sup>61</sup> The terms "feasible" and "direct part" are open to many interpretations. The feasibility aspect weakens the claim because many other rights use the wording 'in all circumstances'. The "direct part" poses the problems of children who are recruited by armed forces for supportive roles, which traditionally include activities such as spying, reporting, delivering messages or cooking. Although these roles may seem less harmful, these children are often subject to the same harsh treatment and pressures as children actively involved in the fighting. ILO C182 does not distinguish between active fighting roles and supporting roles, condemning the use of any children in armed conflict.

---

<sup>59</sup> "Sierra Leone" The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers: [www.child-soldiers.org](http://www.child-soldiers.org). Retrieved November 26, 2003.

<sup>60</sup> Honwana, Alcinda. "Children of War: Understanding War and War Cleansing in Mozambique and Angola." *Civilians in War* (123-142). Ed. Chesterman Simon. Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2001. p135.

<sup>61</sup> Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 38-2. Steiner, Henry J. and Alston, Philip. Op. Cit. p1417. Additional Protocol I to Geneva Conventions art 77-2. <http://www.barnsdle.demon.co.uk/bosnia/GenevaAp1.html#p4>

Furthermore some of the laws distinguish between voluntary and forced recruitment. For example the CRC allows voluntary recruitment of children between fifteen and eighteen years of age. Under situations of war, however, the distinction between forced and voluntary recruitment becomes blurred: children are highly vulnerable and enrolling as soldiers might be their best alternative given the breakdown of society and lack of social infrastructures such as schools. Economic pressures, lack of other alternatives, need for security, and peer pressure might all be factors pushing children to enroll. The additional protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict also makes the distinction between voluntary and forced recruitment but acknowledges though, in article 3, that “States Parties shall raise in years the minimum age for the voluntary recruitment of persons into their national armed forces”, and further recognizes that persons under the age of 18 years are “entitled to special protection.”<sup>62</sup> It also outlines a series of safeguards to ensure that minors who enroll voluntarily do so on a genuine basis.

#### **4) Addressing the issue: role of NGOs and states**

##### **4.1- Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration**

There are several ways in which the issue of child soldiers needs to be addressed. It is imperative that measures be taken to demobilize current child soldiers and prevent future recruitment of children. In Sierra Leone, an important disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process has been initiated following the Lomé peace agreements. UNICEF has played a key role in assisting the United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in assuring that the special needs of child soldiers be considered within the DDR program: through programs such as special training sessions of peacekeeping troops to deal with children. This process was harmed by a lack of funding and slow deployment of UNAMSIL troops following the Lomé agreements. Rebel troops slowly turned over child soldiers, but many were rerecruited in the resumption of attacks in 2000. However, the DDR process resumed in May 2001 and it is estimated that more than 2,600 abducted children were released by the RUF. International aid groups note that the large disproportion in the gender of those released serves as an indication that many girls who were abducted may still be kept as sex slaves.<sup>63</sup> In a July 2003 press release, the UNICEF Representative to Sierra Leone calls attention to the shortfall in funding for the DDR programs. Drawing attention to the successes to date of the two year-long child soldier reintegration program: “Around 98% of former child fighters and separated children have returned to their communities. [...] And thousands of young minds once engaged by fighting, have been re-engaged by training programmes that promise a future.” Despite this progress, UNICEF estimates that \$1.4 million would be needed immediately and \$2.5 million in the near future to complete the critical programs.<sup>64</sup>

##### **4.2- Restructuring police forces, the army and the judiciary**

---

<sup>62</sup> “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.” UNICEF: <http://www.unicef.org/crc/annex1.htm>. Retrieved April 24, 2003.

<sup>63</sup> “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001: Sierra Leone.” March 2002 United States Embassy in Stockholm: [http://www.usis.usemb.se/human/2001/africa/sierra\\_leone.html](http://www.usis.usemb.se/human/2001/africa/sierra_leone.html). Retrieved December 6, 2003.

<sup>64</sup> “Peace process falters for child soldiers of Sierra Leone” July 22, 2003. UNICEF: [http://www.unicef.org/media/media\\_12200.html](http://www.unicef.org/media/media_12200.html)

Another important part of addressing the issue is restructuring the Army, the Police and the Judiciary system. The U.K. has made significant contributions to Sierra Leone on this angle. It implemented a Law Development Project in 1998, which aims to restore and strengthen the legal system, and update the legal code. It has also been active in the restructuring of the army and police, since 1999 the British-led International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) has restructured and retrained the army now called the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) with successful results as few reports of human rights violations have been received. The Commonwealth secretariat, which is largely funded by the U.K., has also contributed since 1998 to the restructuring and retraining of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP). U.S. policies towards Sierra Leone have partly concentrated on supporting the U.K.'s actions.<sup>65</sup>

### **4.3- Creating accountability and ending impunity**

While such responses are fundamental to ending the use of child soldiers, I would like to focus on the actions taken to end impunity for the use of child soldiers. "Ensuring accountability for the horrific atrocities and other abuses that marked the ten-year war is of paramount importance if Sierra Leoneans are to have a future based on respect for human rights and the rule of law."<sup>66</sup> Indeed, a culture of impunity in the region has often been cited among the issues that gave rise to the war and its dramatic level of human rights abuses. When the war was finally declared over in January 2002 and when the president and new parliament were formally elected and took place in the government, efforts to establish the rule of law and seek accountability for past abuses were set among top priorities and as fundamental for lasting peace and stability in the country. The establishment of two new institutions: the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) with help from the international community are key in the process to end impunity and reach accountability.

### **The Role of the United Nations**

The year 1999 saw a resurgence in rebel attacks on the government. Rebels began an offensive to retake the capital Freetown. The U.N. observer mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) personnel were evacuated, but ECOMOG, a Nigerian-led regional peace-keeping force who had already been involved in reinstating the president in 1998, managed after several weeks to drive the rebels out. Following these rebel attacks, the U.N. Special Representative Mr. Okelo, in consultation with West African states, initiated a series of diplomatic efforts aimed at opening up dialogue with the rebels. Negotiations between the Government and the rebels led to the Lomé Peace Agreement on July 7, 1999. This agreement provided for the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), it also provided amnesty to all combatants and assigned government posts to rebel commanders.<sup>67</sup> As a result, Foday Sankoh, the leader of the RUF was made vice president as well as chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Recon-

---

<sup>65</sup> The U.S. and the U.K. have been the largest providers of humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone. ("Sierra Leone Human Rights Development" Op. Cit.)

<sup>66</sup> "The Jury is Still Out: A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper on Sierra Leone." July 11, 2002. p2. Available at <http://hrw.org/backgrounders/africa/sl-bck0711.pdf>

<sup>67</sup> It also included a disarmament program and an expansion of the UN role.

struction and Development. “That was a lot of words to say that he was now the diamond czar of Sierra Leone.”<sup>68</sup> This agreement was thus seen as highly problematic by the international community as it gave power to those most responsible for grave human rights abuses, and reinforced the cycle of impunity seen as a source for the abuses committed in the conflict.

Despite its critical role in facilitating this agreement, the U.N. did not support the blanket amnesty. On July 7, 1999 Mr. Okelo attached a hand-written disclaimer to the accord which said: “The United Nations interprets the amnesty and pardon in article nine of this agreement shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.”<sup>69</sup> This disclaimer is consistent with international law, which does not accept amnesties for these crimes. “Indeed, international law provides that a state has a duty to prosecute the perpetrators of serious violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law.”<sup>70</sup>

On October 22, 1999, the Security Council authorized the establishment of the U.N. mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) a new and larger mission, which replaced the observer mission, to supervise the peace agreement. Sam Bokari, one rebel leader declared they are not welcome, and attacks on ECOMOG troops and U.N. forces shortly followed. Through subsequent UNSC resolutions, the UNAMSIL mandate was revised to include additional tasks and the military personnel for the mission was expanded to eventually 17,500 military personnel in March 2001. UNAMSIL thus became the most important U.N. mission to date. Its mandate falls under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; its tasks include providing security, ensuring free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance, assist in the DDR program, and “coordinate and assist the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities.”<sup>71</sup> The mandate authorizes use of force but essentially holds to a classical peacekeeping rather than peace-enforcing role.

The U.N. played a key role in the establishment of the Special Court, and thus in attempting to curb the cycle of impunity. The Special Court was established as a result of an agreement between the U.N. and the Sierra Leone government. It is an international body that is independent of any government or organization and its staff includes both Sierra Leoneans and internationals. The UNSC adopted resolution 1315 in 2000 recognizing the need for a credible system of justice and accountability for the crimes committed in Sierra Leone in response to the requests from the Government of Sierra Leone for U.N. assistance to establish a court. The resolution outlines the subject matter jurisdiction of the court to include crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, as well as crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean law committed within the territory of Sierra Leone. The recruitment and use of children as soldiers thus falls under its jurisdiction. It further recommends that the court should prosecute only those who bear the greatest responsibility for such crimes.<sup>72</sup> The court is held in Sierra

---

<sup>68</sup> “The Terror of Sierra Leone” *Vanity Fair* August 2000: p117.

<sup>69</sup> “The Sierra Leone Amnesty under International law.” August 3, 1999. Human Rights Watch: <http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/sierra/int-law2.htm>. Retrieved December 1, 2003.

<sup>70</sup> “The Sierra Leone Amnesty under International law.” August 3, 1999. Human Rights Watch: <http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/sierra/int-law2.htm>. Retrieved December 1, 2003.

<sup>71</sup> “Sierra Leone –UNAMSIL- Mandate.” UN: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/mandate.html> Retrieved November 30, 2003.

<sup>72</sup> Resolution 1315 (2000) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4186<sup>th</sup> meeting, on August 14, 2000. Available at: <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/605/32/PDF/N0060532.pdf?OpenElement>

Leone and will try those who bear greatest responsibility for crimes committed in the country during the civil war and after November 30<sup>th</sup> 1996 (when the government and the RUF signed the Abidjan Peace Agreement).

### **The Role of the Sierra Leonean government**

The government of Sierra Leone has made repeated commitments to raise the legal age of military recruitment to eighteen years of age, and to demobilize child combatants. Despite these promises, recruitment and use of child soldiers has been underway even after the Lomé Peace Agreements, which made important provisions for the demobilization of child soldiers. The government has taken important steps however, such as the signature of the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict on September 8, 2000, which it has ratified on May 16, 2002.

The government of Sierra Leone has also taken important steps in the quest for justice and accountability in the aftermath of the war. It is playing a central role in the Special Court, which it has initiated through direct requests for U.N. assistance. The government has pledged to provide amnesty for child soldiers, and the Statute of the Special Court does not include jurisdiction over children under the age of fifteen at the time they committed their crimes.<sup>73</sup> The TRC is deemed to be better suited for addressing cases involving children.

### **Other states' role: the U.S.**

The court is funded directly by donations of U.N. members, rather than from the general U.N. budget. The U.S. is the Court's main provider of funds. It has actively supported the court, through monetary donations and also through personnel: the chief prosecutor (David Crane) and his chief investigator (Alan White) are American. However, the staff of the court is of international composition, with half of the members being African, and over a third from Sierra Leone.

As the subject matter jurisdiction of the court includes a variety of crimes – (1) war crimes such as murder, rape and mutilation committed by armed groups against civilians, (2) crimes against humanity, which include acts of murder, rape and torture when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian populations, (3) other serious violations of international humanitarian law such as attacks on U.N. personnel and recruitment of child soldiers fall in this category, and finally (4) certain crimes under Sierra Leone law, which include the abuse of girls and wanton destruction of property – it is difficult to distinguish what states contributing to the special court have done to address the issue of child soldiers specifically. However, by supporting the Special court in substantial ways, the U.S. is contributing to end impunity for grave abuses of human rights in Sierra Leone, and thereby the use of child soldiers is also condemned. The U.S. has also been a key supporter of humanitarian organizations in Sierra Leone. It has provided funds, includ-

---

<sup>73</sup> Even though the fact that children between the age of fifteen and eighteen could be prosecuted by the Court is problematic, it is highly unlikely as the Court's mandate focuses on the main leaders and those most responsible for crimes during the war.

ing \$900,000 through its Office of Transition Initiatives for programs to aid war-affected children and the reintegration of former combatants.<sup>74</sup>

Furthermore, the U.S. has proven its concern regarding the issue of child soldiers in other parts of the world with, for example, letters from congresspeople to Colin Powell urging to take specific steps to help end the use of children in war in Burma, Colombia, and Northern Uganda,<sup>75</sup> statements from U.S. congress condemning the use of child soldiers,<sup>76</sup> and with the US campaign to stop the use of child soldiers, which promotes awareness on the issue.<sup>77</sup> Despite these steps though, the U.S. has not yet ratified, although it has signed, the U.N. global ban on child soldiers as put forth by the Additional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict.

### **Other states: Canada**

The government of Canada makes the issue of children in armed conflict a human security priority. There have been many Canadian policies and projects promoting the global ban on the use of child soldiers. Regarding Sierra Leone specifically, Canada implemented a Human Security Project in 2001 on 'Protecting Children, Promoting Truth and Reconciliation in Sierra Leone', which established recommendations for policies and procedures for addressing and involving children in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone. This project was done in cooperation with UNICEF, the National Forum for human Rights and UNAMSIL/Human Rights.

### **NGOs addressing the issue**

Many NGOs and human rights organizations address the issue of child soldiers and its global scale and impact. Such organizations have had a fundamental role in raising awareness on the issue, developing international standards, and promoting a global ban on the use of child soldiers. Most NGOs concerned with human rights work on condemning the use of child soldiers, promoting awareness on the issue, and on programs to demobilize and reintegrate child soldiers in society. Such processes are crucial to the development of former child soldiers and have often been neglected, as Grac'a Machel emphasized in her 1996 report on the impact of war on children, "no peace treaty to date has formally recognized the existence of child combatants. (...) Official acknowledgement of children's part in a war is a vital step."<sup>78</sup>

In Sierra Leone, many NGOs, international and local, have helped the DDR process, including UNICEF and iEARN Sierra Leone.<sup>79</sup> In addition, there have also been part-

---

<sup>74</sup> "Sowing Terror: Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra Leone." July 1998. Human Rights Watch: <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/sierra/> Retrieved December 1, 2003. p6.

<sup>75</sup> "U.S. congresspeople write letter to Colin Powell about child soldiers." May 1, 2003. [http://www.maryknoll.org/GLOBAL/ALERTS/powell\\_ltr.htm](http://www.maryknoll.org/GLOBAL/ALERTS/powell_ltr.htm) Retrieved December 6, 2003.

<sup>76</sup> "Stop the Use of Child Soldiers: U.S. Congress Condemns the Use of Child Soldiers." Human Rights Watch: <http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/congress.htm> Retrieved December 5, 2003.

<sup>77</sup> "US Campaign to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers." <http://www.us-childsoldiers.org/thep.html> Retrieved December 6, 2003.

<sup>78</sup> Machel, Grac'a. Op. Cit. p14.

<sup>79</sup> iEARN Sierra Leone's mission is the rehabilitation of youth who have endured hardship from war and war's effects. It is a member of the International Education and Resource Network (iEARN), a non-profit global network that enables young people to use the Internet and other new technologies to engage in collaborative educational projects. It was founded in Freetown, in 1999. <http://www.iearnsierraleone.org/>

nerships between human rights organizations and in some cases governments, to protect children in the course of the quest for justice and accountability in 2001, as seen with the Canadian and UNICEF project to create standards providing protection and special care for children in the TRC process.

### **Progress of the Special Court**

The Special Court relies on outside funding. In May 2003, a letter was addressed to Kofi Annan already demanding more funds, as the court had only received a part of the sums pledged, and these pledges fell short of the budget.<sup>80</sup> The letter outlined the successes achieved so far as shown by the indictments. The number of indictments has since grown and as of November 2003 it includes thirteen persons from all three of the country's former warring factions. Of those, two are deceased, ten are in custody, and two are not in custody. The court has asked for cooperation from other states in arresting those indicted, in particular Charles Taylor, who as President of Liberia, supported the RUF during the war, and is indicted on 17 accounts of crimes. The UNSC has also called upon states to cooperate fully with the Special Court. Any country to which Taylor seeks refuge has a duty to ensure that he be tried for his crimes under the Geneva Conventions, which classify war crimes as "crimes so serious that states have an obligation either to try these crimes themselves or to hand over suspects to a competent tribunal."<sup>81</sup> The chief prosecutor has declared any nation legally bound to arrest Taylor, but the Special Court President has requested an expansion of the mandate of the Court to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which would give it the power to enforce its arrest warrants.

As of December 2003, the outcome of the court is uncertain. Two of the most important charged individuals: Foday Sankoh and Sam Bokarie are deceased and the charges against them have thus been dropped. One's status (Johnny Paul Koroma, the leader of the AFRC) is still uncertain; he may be dead or hiding to escape justice. Another main figure - Charles Taylor -- is still fleeing. Statements of defense are already expected from Mr. Taylor drawing on sovereign immunity and extra-territoriality. Such statements are also expected from the other accused, especially on charges regarding the constitutionality of the court or the amnesty granted by the Lomé peace agreements. A recent press release on the Special Court's website indicated that the Appeals Chamber of the Court turned down three defense motions as part of a fast-track process; these motions include extra-territoriality, sovereign immunity and whether the accused are covered by the Lomé peace accord amnesty.<sup>82</sup>

### **5) Conclusion**

The Sierra Leonean war is over, and much progress has been made on the human rights situation. Efforts to end impunity in the country have been initiated, but the outcomes are still uncertain. The Court still has much to prove. The hybrid composition of this

---

<sup>80</sup> "Letter to Kofi Annan on Financial Contributions to the Sierra Leone Special Court." May 21, 2003. Human Rights Watch: <http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/05/s10521031tr.htm> Retrieved November 26, 2003.

<sup>81</sup> "Charles Taylor: International Support for Sierra Leone Special Court." August 8, 2003. Critical Lawyers Committee for Human Rights: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/sierra/2003...>

<sup>82</sup> "The Court Rules Trials Should Be Held Without Undue Delay." November 5, 2003. Sierra Leone Special Court: <http://www.sc-sl.org> Retrieved December 7, 2003.

court has advantages over the fully international tribunals as used for Rwanda and Yugoslavia; it is less costly and can proceed faster, its mandate is limited to three years. However, there are many limitations as well. Concerns have been brought up regarding the transparency of the court's actions, as the court is located within Sierra Leone, some security concerns emerge. Also the death of two high profile indictees as well as Taylor's success so far to escape arrest warrants challenge the credibility of the Court. The reliance on donor countries for funds also may prove to be problematic. In addition, there are worries that the U.S., being the main donor, is trying to use the Court to promote its own policy interests.<sup>83</sup> A further problem is the fact that crimes committed before 1996 are not considered by the Court. The TRC however, considers the whole period of the war in its attempt to establish a historical rapport of the events. It will in this way fill in the gaps not covered by the Court, but cannot prosecute those heard.

It is still too early to draw conclusions because the court is still evolving. On December 4, 2003 the international law enforcement agency INTERPOL issued a "Red Notice" to seek the arrest of former Liberian President Charles Taylor, with a view to transfer him to the Special Court.<sup>84</sup> Furthermore, many hearings were scheduled last week, from Tuesday December 2 to Friday December 5, 2003, on which day the indictments against Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie were withdrawn.<sup>85</sup> Prosecutions are thus unfolding as we speak, and it is essential to keep an eye on the evolution of this court. This court will serve as an example in many ways, as it is the first hybrid tribunal put into place; it could also be a model for the region, bringing an end to the ongoing cycle of impunity which has contributed to the instability in the region. It is fundamental to maintain efforts to bring to justice those responsible for Sierra Leone's crimes, as it could be vital to promote future stability in the region.

---

<sup>83</sup> Allegations have been made of links between Al Qaeda and Sierra Leone's rebels in the sale of diamonds. In addition, as the U.S. opposed to the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), its support of hybrid courts can be seen as an attempt to weaken the ICC.

<sup>84</sup> "Red Notice Issued for Charles Taylor." December 4, 2003. Sierra Leone Special Court: <http://www.sc-sl.org>. Retrieved December 7, 2003.

<sup>85</sup> "Court Schedule" Special Court for Sierra Leone: <http://www.sc-sl.org/courtschedule.html> Retrieved December 7, 2003.

## Bibliography

### Articles:

Barnes, Edward. "The Kalashnikov Kids: the Russians are coming...and boy are they cute. Inside the children's brigade." Life July 1, 1999. 22:8.

Kalis, Martin A. "Child Soldiers in Africa: Solutions to a Complex Dilemma." Africa Journal in Conflict Resolution. No. 1/2002.

"Kalashnikov Kids." The Economist July 8, 1999.

"The Child Soldier." Al-Ahram Weekly. February 28 – March 6, 2002. Issue No. 575. <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/575/in102.htm>. Retrieved April 9, 2003.

"The Terror of Sierra Leone." Vanity Fair. August 2000: pp 110-173.

"Under-age Killers." The Economist December 12, 1998: p46.

### Books:

Honwana, Alcinda. "Children of War: Understanding War and War Cleansing in Mozambique and Angola." Civilians in War, (chapter 6: 123-142). Ed. Chesterman, Simon. Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2001.

Steiner, Henry J. and Alston, Philip. International Human Rights in Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, 2000.

### Internet Sources:

#### Canadian Government:

"Children and Armed Conflict." Government of Canada: <http://www.waraffectedchildren.gc.ca/menu-en.asp>. Retrieved November 26, 2003

#### Human Rights Watch:

"Child Soldiers: Action: Sierra Leone." Human Rights Watch: [http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/action/sierra\\_leone.htm](http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/action/sierra_leone.htm). Retrieved December 1, 2003.

"International Legal Standards Governing Child Soldiers." Human Rights Watch: <http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/int-law.htm>. Retrieved April 6, 2003.

"Key Findings of The Global Report on Child Soldiers 2001." Human Rights Watch: <http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/cs-report2001.htm>. Retrieved April 6, 2003.

"Letter to Kofi Annan on Financial Contributions to the Sierra Leone Special Court." May 21, 2003. <http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/05/s10521031tr.htm> Retrieved November 26, 2003.

"Sierra Leone: Human Rights Developments." Human Rights Watch: [www.hrw.org/wr2k/Africa-09.htm](http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Africa-09.htm). Retrieved November 26, 2003.

“Sierra Leone Rebels Forcefully Recruit Child Soldiers.” May 31, 2000. Human Rights Watch: <http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/05/s10531.htm>. Retrieved November 26, 2003.

“Sowing Terror: Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra Leone.” July 1998. Human Rights Watch: <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/sierra/> Retrieved December 1, 2003. p6.

“Stop the Use of Child Soldiers: U.S. Congress Condemns the Use of Child Soldiers.” Human Rights Watch: <http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/congress.htm>. Retrieved December 5, 2003.

“The Jury is Still Out: A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper on Sierra Leone.” July 11, 2002. Available at <http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/sl-bck0711.pdf>

“The Sierra Leone Amnesty under International law.” August 3, 1999. Human Rights Watch: <http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/sierra/int-law2.htm>. Retrieved December 1, 2003.

#### Special Court for Sierra Leone:

“Court Schedule” Special Court for Sierra Leone: <http://www.sc-sl.org/courtschedule.html>. Retrieved December 7, 2003.

“Red Notice Issued for Charles Taylor.” December 4, 2003. Sierra Leone Special Court: <http://www.sc-sl.org>. Retrieved December 7, 2003.

“The Court Rules Trials Should Be Held Without Undue Delay.” November 5, 2003. Sierra Leone Special Court: <http://www.sc-sl.org>. Retrieved December 7, 2003

#### The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers:

“Origins and Membership.” The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers: [http://www.childsoldiers.org/cs/childsoldiers.nsf/displaysmessage/About\\_The\\_CSC](http://www.childsoldiers.org/cs/childsoldiers.nsf/displaysmessage/About_The_CSC). Retrieved April 2003.

“Sierra Leone” The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers: [www.child-soldiers.org](http://www.child-soldiers.org). Retrieved November 26, 2003.

#### United Nations:

“Sierra Leone –UNAMSIL- Mandate.” U.N.: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/mandate.html>. Retrieved November 30, 2003.

“UNSC Resolution 1315.” August 14, 2000. U.N.: <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/605/32/PDF/N0060532.pdf?OpenElement>

#### UNICEF:

“Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.” UNICEF: <http://www.unicef.org/crc/annex1.htm>. Retrieved April 24, 2003.

“Peace process falters for child soldiers of Sierra Leone” July 22, 2003. UNICEF: [http://www.unicef.org/media/media\\_12200.html](http://www.unicef.org/media/media_12200.html).

**Other:**

- “Additional Protocol I, added to the Geneva Conventions.” Available at:  
<http://www.barnsdlе.demon.co.uk/bosnia/GenevaAp1.html#p4>. Article 77.
- “Charles Taylor: International Support for Sierra Leone Special Court.” August 8, 2003. Critical Lawyers Committee for Human Rights:  
<http://ww.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/sierra/2003...>
- “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001: Sierra Leone.” March 2002. United States Embassy in Stockholm:  
[http://www.usis.usemb.se/human/2001/africa/sierra\\_leone.html](http://www.usis.usemb.se/human/2001/africa/sierra_leone.html). Retrieved December 6, 2003.
- “US Campaign to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers.” <http://www.us-childrensoldiers.org/thep.html>  
Retrieved December 6, 2003.
- “U.S. congresspeople write letter to Colin Powell about child soldiers.” May 1, 2003. Available at: [http://www.maryknoll.org/GLOBAL/ALERTS/powell\\_lettr.htm](http://www.maryknoll.org/GLOBAL/ALERTS/powell_lettr.htm) Retrieved December 6, 2003.

**Report:**

- Machel Grac’a. “Impact of Armed Conflict on Children.” United Nations report: 1996.  
Available at: <gopher://gopher.un.org/00/ga/docs/51/plenary/A51-306.EN>.

**Video:**

- “Child Soldiers: Invisible Combatants.” Prod. Gene LaRocque; Dir. Mark Sugg. Center for Defense Information, 1997.

**Now or Never:  
The Impact of Saudi Arabian Culture on Economic Development**

**Sarah Detzner  
Development Politics  
Dec. 15, 2003**

As all those of you concerned with Middle Eastern development will be aware, Saudi Arabia has always been acknowledged as a special case among economically developing nations. In the early years of its existence the state operated at a traditional subsistence level. Despite this poverty, Saudis maintained a great deal of pride in never having been colonized, possessing the two most holy sites in Islam, Mecca and Medina, and especially in being, in their eyes, the only Muslims to practice Islam in its purest, truest form, according to the teachings of Al-Wahhab.

After World War II, when many other poor nations started receiving development aid from the West, the Saudis discovered the full potential of their oil resources. The vast amount of wealth this brought into the country allowed the Saudis to skip many steps that are often seen as essential for development, such as compiling a uniform legal code for business, privatizing industries, or creating an accountable political system. Profits were so immense that a great deal of waste could be absorbed. But in recent years, when oil prices dropped, the nation has been plagued by deficits, lackluster foreign investment, and unemployment. The state no longer has the money to mask problems with its economic structure. But why did Saudi Arabia need this mask? Why couldn't a country with such a huge capital jump-start, whose government has been committed to development and gradual independence from oil since 1970 succeed in the task of building a modern, sustainable economy? In this paper, I postulate that major factors, which create some problems and worsen preexisting ones, are present Saudi cultural attitudes and behaviors.

Culture has been defined as the learned patterns of thought and behavior characteristic of a population or society at a particular time and place. (<http://www1.sru.edu>) The present Saudi culture, which encompasses bureaucratic and political culture, is clearly a result of the Saudis adjusting to previous circumstances where these patterns of behavior were adaptive. Some of these shaping factors stretch back to the traditional tribal way of life, and some of them emerged in the welfare state of the past generation.

But the pressures that might have led to a culture adapted to a modern economy were held at bay by oil wealth. This wealth is no longer the sure thing that it once was. Should it continue to be unreliable, if the Saudis wish to stop the decline of their standard of living, they are going to have to make a conscious effort to modify those aspects of their culture that block economic success. I aim to identify these aspects and suggest policies to ameliorate the problems. I will do this primarily by discussing the affect of culture on the economic problems of human resources, good governance, and the existing social contract. However, first I will give a brief historical overview to explain how Saudi Arabia arrived at its present unique situation.

## **I. History**

### **Early History**

Before the rise of Islam, Saudi Arabia, an area with very little arable land<sup>86</sup>, was occupied primarily by nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples. Ancient Arabia profited from its position as a trade route from Egypt to the civilizations of Iraq, and its few cities were mostly trading centers. One of these, Mecca, was an ancient place of pilgrimage and the birthplace of Islam. It has been suggested that Mecca's position as a trading city where ideas were exchanged led to the culture of its Hijaz region becoming relatively open and cosmopolitan. Central Arabia, or the Nejd, on the other hand, was largely ignored and isolated, as it was easily to by-pass by sea. The differences between the two regions have led to culture clashes in modern Saudi Arabia, the consequences of which I will later discuss.

During the centuries of rule by the Caliphs and their Turkish and Mongol successors, much of Arabia remained unchanged. Mecca and Medina retained their religious importance and were home to an important scholarly community, but outside of the cities of the Hijaz tribal life continued virtually unaltered.

### **The 1st Saudi State**

In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the pressures of the changing Islamic world finally penetrated to the interior, and a powerful new religious and political movement emerged from the Nejd region under the guidance of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud.

Al-Wahhab was a fundamentalist imam who had traveled in the Islamic world and been horrified by what he saw as a softening of key Islamic principles and general moral decay. While preaching, he searched for a leader to help him establish his version of an appropriate Muslim state, and found one in ibn Saud, chieftain of the settlement of Dariyah in the Nejd. As the partner of al-Wahhab, ibn Saud gained for his family, the Al Saud, the religious authority to govern as long as it was done according to Wahhabi (the term for the followers of al-Wahhab) teachings. This partnership is still cited as the source of authority for the Saudi royal family in the modern state and is one reason Wahhabi beliefs are the official doctrine and basis for law in Saudi Arabia (Metz 15).

By 1765, when ibn-Saud died, they had established authority over the entire Nejd region. However, the Ottoman Empire saw the new state as a threat to its authority and destroyed it. Even so, the region was not viewed as important enough to incorporate into the Empire and, once the threat was gone, it was left to the various tribes to struggle for control.

### **The Creation of the Modern State**

---

<sup>86</sup> Modern land use in Saudi Arabia(CIA World Fact Book)  
(Updated Aug. 1, 2003).  
Arable land: 1.72%(of country's total area)  
Permanent crops: 0.06%  
Other: 98.22% (1998 est.)

In 1905 the young Abd al Aziz, the Al Saud leader of the time, reconquered the Nejd, followed by surrounding areas and the Hijaz in 1924. One of his main tactics was to focus the religious fervor of the Nejd tribesmen who had remained faithful to Wahhabi ideals and, when united by a central authority, militantly enforced these ideals upon all Muslims within reach. At the same time, al Aziz had to convince the British that he was moderate enough to be allowed to take over Arabia without interference (Metz 25). This harnessing the power of native fanaticism while cooperating with the West was a tricky ideological balancing act, and one which the Al Saud have perpetuated to the present day in dealings with the West and their own people. The new state of Saudi Arabia (officially founded Sep. 23, 1932) was initially very poor, depending largely on pilgrimage revenue.

Then, in the 1930's, oil was discovered. While al-Aziz lived, the revenue this created was used to some extent for the country's benefit but also absorbed by Aramco, the conglomerate of then-American firms that extracted and refined it. Al-Aziz treated the country's revenue in the patriarchal tribal manner, meaning that all state revenue was automatically his, but also that he was culturally obligated to give most of it back in the form of gifts to subjects, ensuring redistribution (Mackey 4). Other than the position of the King, Saudi society did not have large class gaps.

Al-Aziz's reign was one of consolidation. Initially, the country he created had many cultural divisions, with Arabians wearing the dress and practicing the customs of their own regions.<sup>87</sup> When he took power, their main loyalty was to family, clan, or tribe. The new ruler slowly phased in policies of cultural uniformity and was successful in creating a sense of loyalty to the broader state and a Saudi identity. He was succeeded initially by an incompetent son, who was deposed in favor of another son, Faisal.<sup>88</sup>

Faisal's reign was one of modernization and reinvestment of oil revenues toward growth and education.<sup>89</sup> Because of his reputation for piety, Faisal was able to introduce technology without antagonizing much of the religious establishment, which the state tried, with mixed success, to co-opt by making them dependent on government largesse (Metz 36).

Under Faisal, the average citizen's loyalty to the state was strengthened. This was partly accomplished by the generous education subsidies and social welfare benefits made available by the huge profits from the early '70s oil boom. Standard of living increased dramatically. Faisal aimed to sustain this prosperity by establishing a central planning committee in 1970 to develop infrastructure and education according to a five year plan. During this period, the population began increasing as infant and child mortality rates dramatically decreased but religion and tradition (not to mention family interests, which I will later discuss) demanded that women continue their historical rate of child-bearing (Yamani 8).

---

<sup>87</sup> Though Saudi Arabia is now broken into 13 amirates, or provinces, the four main cultural regions are the Hijaz (West), the Nejd (Central), Ahsa (East), and Asir (South).

<sup>88</sup> While Saudi Arabia is officially a monarchy, in practice it is something more like an oligarchy. Kingship is not passed father-to-son but rather which ever of Abdul-Aziz's sons the family decides (through consensus) is most fit to rule. The King then appointed must maintain general support of the Al-Saud in order to be effective.

<sup>89</sup> In a typical compromise, education for women was approved but placed under control of religious authorities.

**Recent History (1975-present)**

Khalid, the next brother to succeed to the Saudi throne, continued many of the policies of Faisal. In 1982, Khalid died and was replaced by his younger brother Fahd (the current monarch), also a reformer, who particularly tried to encourage using the country's oil advantage to establish domestic industries, as well as training Saudis to replace the foreign workers who, because of expertise or low cost, made up much of the work force. These attempts were only mildly successful and are still government goals.

In 1986, there was a world wide oil price crash, with serious economic consequences for Saudi Arabia, which has struggled to maintain its standard of living and deal with growing unemployment ever since, assuming debt for the past sixteen years to do so. Disputes between conservative and liberal cultural factions have also become more pronounced, though ultimate political authority continues to rest solely with the royal family. The de facto head of state since the early '90s has been Crown Prince Abdullah, as King Fahd's health is very poor, but the future succession remains an issue, since Prince Abdullah is in his late 70's.

There have been six five-year economic development plans since King Faisal began them. It is somewhat difficult to gauge their success individually, since many sources agree that the statistics provided by the Saudi government are grossly optimistic and not to be trusted. Unlike many governments that prominently display their problems in the search for aid, the Saudis are mortified at being seen as less than rich and successful by what they perceive to be lesser states.<sup>90</sup>

**II. Human Resources: Education and the Mudir Syndrome**

It has long been acknowledged that one of the most important factors in a nation's economy is the productivity of its workers. This section will discuss how several factors of productivity, such as education and efficient use of human resources, stand at present in the Saudi state.

One of the major problems with developing an internal economy in Saudi Arabia is that large amounts of the wages paid to workers automatically leave the country. This is because two-thirds of the workforce consists of foreign guest workers who hold 90% of jobs in the private sector and remit much of their pay to their home countries (Baer).

This seems a particularly surprising phenomenon given that 30% of Saudi men and 95% of women are unemployed, and the burgeoning youth population means that this number is likely to grow (Rouleau). It is even more surprising that the Saudis, who are famously anti-foreigner of any kind and strongly discourage immigration, would permit a situation where, at any given time, a quarter of the people in the country are non-Saudi (Baer).

These imported foreigners come in two different types, and each fulfill a different gap in Saudi capability. The vast majority of foreign workers are very poor imports from third world countries brought in to do the Saudi state's manual labor, a need which cannot be fulfilled from domestic sources because of what Champion has called "mudir," or "director" syndrome, meaning that a Saudi considers it dishonorable to accept any job not

---

<sup>90</sup> "This haughty attitude toward foreigners stems from the Saudi belief that they are chosen by God, and that others, even their co-religionists, are inferior." (Abir)

containing “authority, status, and respect”.<sup>91</sup> Jobs that involve manual labor of almost any kind are not acceptable. This bias is often attributed to long-standing Bedouin contempt for settled, farming peoples who performed manual labor.

Research suggests that this prejudice is openly held by 90% of the Sunni Saudi population. It is even extended to the point that a skilled engineer suffers social consequences because of the “manual” nature of his work (Abir). Less economic pressure than one might expect is brought to bear on those who refuse to take such jobs, since many essential services are provided by the generous welfare state, protecting the unemployed from many consequences of poverty.<sup>92</sup> Additionally, a Saudi’s honor reflects upon his or her extended family, so that it may be more practical for such a family to support an unemployed member than to let that member take a socially unacceptable job.

It is even less easy to understand why, after thirty years of attempting to train their own professionals; the Saudis are still compelled to import much of their white-collar non-governmental workforce from the West while domestic unemployment soars. However, one likely culprit is the way in which their culture views the functions of the educational system.

As a move to placate the religious leaders, for some time the educational system has been entrusted to strict Wahhabis, who emphasize religion as the most important and worthy study one can undertake. The system of studying the Quran under religious leaders is the traditional way that educated people were trained before the creation of the state. As a result of continuing this system in the modern world, however, today two thirds of the Ph.D.s awarded in Saudi Arabia are in Islamic Studies, rather than in desperately needed technical fields (Baer). Even those Saudis who do graduate with technical degrees “end up more qualified to analyze holy texts than to work as engineers, architects, computer specialists, or managers”(Rouleau).<sup>93</sup>

Before the economic slump, this problem did not fully manifest itself, since every educated Saudi could reasonably expect to get a job in the government bureaucracy. Today, however, once a student has graduated, he<sup>94</sup> has to contend with the fact that far fewer government jobs are available. For private firms, foreigners are usually 4-5 times cheaper

---

<sup>91</sup> “The trait is widely acknowledged and is recognized as an obstacle to progress in reducing unemployment and improving the kingdom’s long-term economic prospects”(Champion)

<sup>92</sup> “Saudi Arabia operates the world's most advanced welfare state, a kind of anti-Marxian non-workers' paradise. Saudis get free health care and interest-free home and business loans. College education is free within the kingdom and heavily subsidized for those who study abroad. In one of the world's driest spots water is almost free. Electricity, domestic air travel, gasoline, and telephone service are available at far below cost. Many of the kingdom's best and brightest—the most well-educated and, in theory, the best prepared for the work world—have little motivation to do any work at all.”(Baer)

“Over 70 percent of the curriculum in the four “secular” universities involves religious studies and Arab and Islamic history, whereas only about 25 percent is devoted to other general subjects”(Rouleau)

<sup>94</sup> Generally, a job seeker is a he. In Saudi Arabia, women are educated at the expense of the state. However, their knowledge and training is often wasted because they are not allowed to work except with a male guardian’s permission, and then only in medicine or teaching in an all-female setting. This culturally born restriction is economically inefficient, since it halves the Saudi labor pool and leaves training underutilized.

to hire, considered more competent<sup>95</sup>, and possess fewer inconvenient legal protections, all of which make them very attractive hires (Rouleau).

### **Solutions**

- Change tax and tariff laws
  
- Conditional Government contracts
  
- Welfare-to-work
  
- Selectively free education

While fixing any one sector will not solve the problem, there are several options for the Saudi government to attempt if it hopes to deal with this situation. For domestic companies that do not compete internationally to any great extent, tax and tariff law needs to be changed so that it is more expensive to import a foreign worker than employ a Saudi. Given the proportion of foreign workers involved, such a policy would need to be implemented slowly, so as not to immediately raise labor costs dramatically.

Also on a national level, the government should begin a policy of awarding contracts, foreign and domestic, at least partially on the basis of the percentage of a country's workforce that is Saudi. Since a lot of the major building projects in the nation are funded by the government, this should create a strong incentive for companies to hire more Saudis.

Incentive structures also need to affect the general population. The Saudi government should consider implementing a welfare-to-work policy, wherein citizens who refuse to accept jobs containing manual labor when offered may have their government benefits revoked, the act of which would also save money.

In much the same vein, the state should begin to offer the majority of state higher education funds only to those who intend to train in a field needed in Saudi Arabia, and only to for programs approved for sufficient useful content.<sup>96</sup> This may eventually lead to increased social mobility, since the rich will be able to afford to continue to get useless degrees, while the poorer will be learning useful and profitable skills.

Lastly, the Al-Saud should consider appeals, directed through leading clergy, that would link taking a job from a foreigner with patriotism and the defense of Islam. Hopefully, this would instill a measure of pride and social standing to those moving into jobs that would once have been shunned.

There are a number of obstacles to be considered. Tariffs will, from a free trade perspective, act to artificially raise the cost of labor in Saudi Arabia. There will likely be public outcry if benefits are cut or made conditional. The religious scholars will not look kindly on potential students' funding being cut. However, given the massive unemploy-

---

<sup>95</sup> This valuation may well have developed because Western professionals and firms, having been entrusted with developing the country for so long, actually have more relevant experience than their Saudi counterparts.

<sup>96</sup> Since women are excluded from most employment, it makes sense to exclude them from such restrictions as well.

ment that, tracing current population and trends, is only likely to increase, the Al-Saud can ill afford not to risk ameliorative measures.

### III. Good Governance: Wasta, Legality, and Royal Corruption

One of the most significant obstacles to growth in Saudi Arabia is what in development circles would be called Saudi civil society; the state of their legal system, other institutions, and amount of corruption in business and politics. Saudis are now trying to institute “good governance” reforms and privatization to facilitate foreign trade and to make it eligible to join the WTO, which it has been attempting to join for seven years (Champion). However, since these policies do not originate from within the society, they are difficult to implement and face cultural barriers.

For one thing, Saudis have never had a single unified legal code that is evenly applied or can be consulted. They claim to operate according to the Shar’ia, or body of Muslim law, but there is no lasting consensus on what constitutes the Shar’ia.<sup>97</sup> Since Islam has no official religious hierarchy, and allows room for theological disagreement, the pronouncements made by government-funded clerics, which determine Shar’ia, are not seen as intrinsically more valuable to follow than another cleric’s interpretation, leading to a lack of respect for established law.<sup>98</sup>

In any case, Shar’ia by alone is incomplete as a legal system since, among other things, it does not deal in detail with modern business and financial situations, except, under its Wahhabi interpretation, to prohibit Saudi banks from charging interest and local insurance companies from being established. As a result, Saudis keep their money abroad. American banks are estimated to hold almost a trillion dollars in Saudi wealth. The Saudi private sector is estimated to produce only a third of the country’s GDP (Rouleau).

A consequence of the lack of a uniform, enforceable legal code is what would be perceived in the West as widespread corruption and nepotism. However, in Saudi society the family is so central that it is considered dishonorable not to use any means at ones’ disposal, including, often, ones’ bureaucratic position, to get a relative a job, or make sure an unfavorable legal decision is reversed so as to protect their interests (Mackey). This extreme loyalty to family was an adaptive cultural trait in the harsh nomadic lifestyle most Saudis knew before modernization. It is also one reason why family size remains so large; when children grow up, they will all work together to protect the interests of the family. The more children, the more resources the family will later have to draw on (Yamani 36).

Foreigners lack these important connections, or “wasta”<sup>99</sup> and are disconnected from the myriad of family, tribal, and regional allegiances in the country. This means that it is extremely difficult for a foreign firm to predict what way any legal dispute will be decided, leading to an unstable and unattractive business environment. This is only exacerbated by the fact that, when facing financial crisis in the past, the government has re-

---

<sup>97</sup> There are, in fact, four different Islamic legal schools with different beliefs. Traditionally, in civil disputes people are permitted to choose which school of law will decide the case.

<sup>98</sup> The government, basing its legitimacy on being Islamic, dare not be seen as the creator rather than the servant of religious law. This lack of clear leadership can lead to chaos, as in the case of the Saudi vice-prevention police, who are volunteers that enforce whatever they see as morality on the community, rather than having to stick to a written body of laws. This is not, I stress, a problem inherent in Islam, but rather one that flows from basing law on nothing else.

<sup>99</sup> Which translates roughly as “influence”.

sponded by delaying or defaulting on money owed to foreign workers and firms making them disinclined to do business with the kingdom in future. For example, during the oil glut of the late 80's, many particularly vulnerable third world workers reported not receiving wages for over a year (Mackey 364).<sup>100</sup>

The unattractive business environment is only rendered more so by the fact that foreign firms are required to have Saudi business partners to operate inside the country. Foreign workers and business travelers need to have a Saudi sponsor. This leads to great potential for abuse of power, since, once in Saudi Arabia, foreigners cannot leave without the permission of their sponsor, permission which may be delayed or denied in retaliation if business goes badly.

Additionally, foreign firms have developed a preference for partners as close to the royal family as possible. These partners have the most influence, and make it more likely that bureaucratic and legal decisions will be favorable. As a result, many minor princes live off the money they receive by charging foreign companies a commission to use their *wasta* on the companies' behalf.

This royal *wasta* leads to purely internal corruption as well. "A prince might walk into a restaurant, see that it was doing well, and write out a check to buy the place, usually well below market price. There was nothing the owner could do. He knew that if he resisted, he'd end up in jail on trumped-up charges" (Baer). This kind of practice succeeds in "completely alienating Saudi Arabia's traditional merchant class and fledgling middle class" as well as stifling profitable, entrepreneurial tendencies by making the return not worth the risk of appropriation (Baer).

It also, in some cases, can exacerbate regional tensions, as many merchants are Hijazi, a traditional occupation thanks to the previously mentioned trade routes through Mecca and Medina in past centuries. The royal family is from the Nejd, and, generally, non-Nejdis do not have as much *wasta* as those tribally connected to the Al-Saud, except through marriages.

The culture of royal entitlement is even more pronounced at the top of the power structure. Since all oil revenue belongs to the royal family, a great deal of it is simply diverted into the pockets of senior princes before it is ever listed as state revenue (Baer). Even more of it is dispensed in the form of allowances to members of the royal family. Given that the royal family currently has about 30,000 members, a number expected to double in a few years, this is a considerable economic drain (Yamani 54). However, this problem is an extremely delicate one, as the Al-Saud maintain power through family unity and do not wish to risk dissent in their midst by cutting perks.

Politically speaking, there is yet another disincentive to free market reform because, should such be implemented, the government can no longer easily use economic policy for the traditional balancing strategies that help the Al-Saud remain credible. In 2002 the Saudi government banned about 200 firms from doing business in the country as punishment for handling Israeli exports, a move encouraged by religious leaders. Restricting market access in this way hinders fair competition, and, in the long run, hurts the Saudis' ability to use economic policy politically, as other countries detach pre-emptively. An example of this is the oft-stated American desire to be free of Saudi oil (IPR Strategic Business Information Database). Additionally, privatization places an unaccustomed bur-

---

<sup>100</sup> There is also reluctance to invest because of uncertainty about whether or not the Saudi government is stable and investments are likely to be protected in the next few years.

den on the middle class, which is, as described earlier, used to receiving most public services, including education and utilities, for free.

### **Solutions**

- Incentives to re-attract diverse kinds of foreign investment.
- Codify law
- Explore Islamic banking
- Anti-nepotism laws
- Impartial courts
- Limitation of royal wasta

Saudi Arabia has started work on some of these economic problems. Generous incentives are already being offered to draw foreign investment with some success. These incentives should be targeted to encourage diversification from the oil industry, making the Saudi economy more independent of oil prices.

To keep this new investment, Saudi Arabia needs to codify its law so that companies (and for that matter, citizens) can know what to expect and abuses are easier to detect by consulting the official, legal text. The state might also benefit if it were to adopt the strategy of other Islamic countries of getting around the ban on bank interest establishing Islamic banking, wherein interest is replaced by profit sharing and more evenly distributed risk. If the Saudis can manage to keep some of their immense capital at home, it will be available to invest locally and encourage growth.

The problem of wiping out nepotism and the use of wasta is a very difficult one, since this is the way business has been done for a very long time. It may be necessary to simply wait until other factors make nepotism seem less necessary. In the meantime, however, it can be discouraged somewhat through laws restricting close family members from working for one another in bureaucracy, which will at least prevent officials from hiring their own close connections, though not from trading favors.

Additionally, wasta and other bias must be removed from the court system. The foreign investment climate will not be good while investors fear having that their interests could automatically be subjugated to those of someone whose sponsor is better connected. Fixing the courts will take consistent pressure and monitoring, as well as the discipline to not overrule rulings by the upper levels of the royal family. As profitable as the sponsor system is for minor princes, it needs to be discontinued or modified in such a way that foreign workers and firms are not at the mercy of their Saudi sponsors.

While in theory the Al-Saud should set a good example, and forbear to use or be influenced by wasta, in practice, not only is it a part of traditional social interactions, but there are too many Saudi princes and princesses for the family to act as one. The problem of royal abuses would probably be considerable less acute if the royal house were not so large. Despite their traditional consensus decision making, somehow the more powerful

branches of the family are going to have to push through restrictions on royal status and royal perks. Otherwise the amount paid out in stipends and appropriated from firms and individuals will expand as quickly as the immense royal family expands, and become unsustainable.

#### **IV. The Saudi Social Contract and the Future**

One interesting feature of Saudi Arabia is that it possesses what is perhaps the purest, most direct social contract between a government and its citizens anywhere in the world. It is this contract that the Al-Saud perform to retain power. It evolved from traditional practices, but has some very modern applications and challenges ahead of it.

Throughout Al-Saud rule, from the days when Al-Aziz traveled around dispensing money to the tribesmen, keeping the nation's treasury in a giant chest, the Saudi rulers have maintained legitimacy by adopting the traditional roles of "patriarchs and patrons to their subjects—a respected role in Arabian tradition—basically purchasing a great deal of domestic sociopolitical stability"(Champion). To this day, the senior princes still hold audiences for the public at which they dispense money and other favors upon application (Mackey 147).

The Al-Saud managed to set up one of the most complete welfare states the world has ever seen, wherein there was "no link between effort and consumption" ("Contribution" 238). They had an allocative economy, an economy "that serves to allocate rents from oil, etc, rather than create wealth, which leads to a mentality that one should strive to secure a portion of the rents, rather than start a value creating enterprise"("Contribution" 238).

This has been possible because of the immense wealth they gained from oil, all of which is considered royal property. The problem, then, is that the government has failed to make its wealth dependent on anything but oil, for economic reasons discussed previously. Oil still accounts for approximately 90 percent of export earnings and 75 percent of budget revenues (Champion). However, this is extremely dangerous, because oil revenue is neither stable nor everlasting, as the Saudis first discovered in the 1986 price slump.

One of the major problems in working on Saudi development is that the future situation is so unpredictable, because of Saudi Arabian near-total reliance on such a changeable commodity. It is possible that Saudi Arabia's current economic woes will disappear if oil prices jump, and they will have "dodged the bullet" on reform slightly longer. It is also possible that they could be heavily reduced, even, in an extreme scenario, disappear altogether, if a preferable alternate source of energy were widely implemented. For the moment, however, it looks as if oil revenue will stay more or less at its present level.

Unfortunately, that level is not sufficient to maintain the Saudi people in the manner to which they became accustomed during the boom. Per capita income in Saudi Arabia fell from \$28,600 in 1981 to \$6,800 in 2001 (Baer). A rapidly growing population is "destabilizing because of the tremendous economic pressure it generates: it automatically decreases per capita wealth in the absence of extraordinarily high economic growth, and strains infrastructure and social services" (Champion).

Because of this, the terms of the social contract are breaking down. If the Al-Saud cannot provide generously, they can no longer expect absolute power, and the rate at which they are willing to adjust the society accordingly will determine their continued existence.

Already, there have been protests, nearly unprecedented in Saudi Arabia, calling for government reform and liberalization, as well as lessening the official role of Wahhabi doctrine. On the other side are the terrorists who have attacked Riyadh, among other targets. These fundamentalists see the Al-Saud as the pandering puppets of the West and believe that the Al-Saud has lost what religious legitimacy it ever had and should be overthrown (Hardy).

With their customary ability to adjust to the times, the Al-Saud have begun experimenting with changes to reestablish their delicate balance of secular/Western practices combined with traditional values and Wahhabism. In October 2003, the Saudi government announced that it would hold its first ever elections, for municipal councils, within the year. There are reports that this is to be the first in a three-year, three-stage plan of democratization. The second year city-wide elections will be held, and in the third 30% of the majlis al-shura, or consultative council, seats will become elective (Hardy). This is particularly significant, since it has also recently been announced that the council would soon have the power to propose legislation without consulting the King. He still, however, retains veto power on all laws ([www.BBC.com](http://www.BBC.com)). This is a seismic shift for a country that has never allowed any type of representative government.

The Al-Saud are defending their interests on the other side of the divide by undermining the credibility of their terrorists. For a long time, the terrorist call had been to remove American, "infidel" troops from the land of the holy cities, Saudi Arabia. When that removal was accomplished, and attacks continued, it became clear that the terrorist goal was more extreme than previously stated. There have been several hot-button issues such as Iraq that they can use to garner support among Saudis. However, a series of suicide bombings that killed Saudis and other Muslims as well as foreigners lost them a great deal of public support and allowed the government to begin its current crack-down without wide scale protest.

The solutions to this challenge cannot be simply listed. They are the accumulation of all the other solutions proposed. Essentially, if Saudi Arabia wishes to continue moving toward a healthy economy without violent revolution or overthrow of the monarchy, the Al-Saud must find a way to first get their own house in order. The strength of the family has always been its ability to close ranks in its own self-interest. Internally, they must determine how to curb royal privilege and settle the succession without triggering a fatal division between factions.

On a grander scale, this is also what must be done for Saudi Arabia as a whole. Especially because the reforms concern culture, few of the changes proposed in this paper will be favorably received or easy to implement. The Al-Saud will take a major risk in pushing them through, if it chooses to. However, it is a risk that has to be taken. Saudi Arabia is a country with the resources to support success, but because of its dependence on a volatile commodity it is also an economic time-bomb. If it is not diffused through economic reform, it will one day explode to reveal a land with far too many people desperately fighting for far too few resources to support them. At that point, the Saudis will no longer have the luxury of gradual, directed cultural change, but will have to adapt quickly to whatever the circumstances require of them.

### **Bibliography**

Abir, Mordechai. "Saudi Arabia, Stability, and International Islamic Terror." The Jerusalem Letter July 2002

Baer, Robert. "Fall of the House of Saud." The Atlantic Monthly. May 2003. V291 i4 pcover, 53-62.

Champion, Daryl. “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Elements of Instability Within Stability.” Middle East Review of International Affairs December 1999. Vol. 3 No.4.

Evans, Kathy. “Shifting sands at the House of Saud.” The Middle East February 1996. No. 253, p. 9.

Hardy, Roger. “Saudi Princes Grapple With Change.” BBC News Online. 11 June 2003. <<http://www.bbc.com>>

Hardy, Roger. “Saudi Elections ‘in three years’.” BBC News Online. 17 October 2003. <<http://www.bbc.com>>

Mackey, Sandra. The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom. New York: W.W. Norton, 2002.

Metz, Helen Chapin, Ed. Saudi Arabia: A country study. Washington D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1993.

Rouleau, Eric. “Trouble in the Kingdom” Foreign Affairs. July-August 2002. V81 i4 p75.

“Saudi Arabia Blacklists 200 Foreign Firms.” IPR Strategic Business Information Database. 8 August 2002. <<http://www1.sru.edu>>

Yamani, Mai. Changed IdentitiesL The challenge of the new generation in Saudi Arabia. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs; Washington, DC: Distributed by the Brookings Institution, 2000.

## **Policy Recommendations for the Government of Peru To Develop the Agricultural Sector**

**Developed by Ted Roethke  
Presented on Dec. 15<sup>th</sup>, 2003  
POLI 242: Development Politics  
With Advisement from Prof. David Blaney**

### **Executive Summary**

This report identifies two overarching goals. The first is to encourage increased domestic production of basic food crops to combat the expensive capital outflows that occur as a result of purchasing foodstuffs from abroad. The second is to increase agricultural exports in order to gain foreign capital inflows, and diversify exports to maintain the stability of those inflows. To accomplish these goals this report makes the meta-suggestion of increasing export-crop production in the coastal areas, which will bring increased foreign currency inflows, at the same time as shifting domestic food production to the Sierra and Selva. Three sections follow the introduction of goals and meta-suggestion. First, this report outlines suggestions for shifting domestic food production to the Sierra and Selva; second, this report outlines suggestions for increasing production for export along the coast. Both of these sections explicate the necessity of subsidies, marketing campaigns, research and extension services for meeting the overarching goals. The third section of this report deals specifically with fruit, and outlines some broad suggestions for increasing the export of fresh fruit—negotiating access to export markets, marketing fruits abroad and improvements to domestic infrastructure.

### **Section 1 – Overview of the Agricultural Sector**

The Peruvian agricultural sector has been in a constant state of decline for the past twenty years. Since the early 1980s Peru has been a net importer of agricultural products.<sup>101</sup> While it is difficult to establish causality, a commonly agreed upon explanation for the decline of agriculture has been government policies which subsidized food at the point of consumption rather than at the point of production. The massive waves of migration from rural areas to the urban centers, especially Lima, from the 1950s onward outpaced the ability of those centers to absorb the new immigrants.<sup>102</sup> Since the 1940s,<sup>103</sup> but especially from the 1970s on, in order to keep food prices low to stimulate industrial production and secure the

---

<sup>101</sup> Area Handbook Studies, p. 147

<sup>102</sup> The massive rural to urban migration has been linked to the rise of the importance of the informal sector (Sheahan, p. 100). At the same time, migration has been unable to lower the net number of Peruvians living in rural areas (Sheahan, p. 59).

<sup>103</sup> Stein, p. 27

support of the urban electorate, one government after the other enacted policies that favored the urban consumer over the rural producer. These policies shifted over time, but included artificially high exchange rates that decreased the prices of imports, price controls on basic foodstuffs and even outright subsidies for imported food.<sup>104</sup> Researchers and academics have been aware of the detrimental effects of these policies for the past forty years, but until today, have continued to watch the decline of the agricultural sector.<sup>105</sup> While these policies were enacted with the intention of nurturing import substitutionist industrialization, they have undoubtedly had negative rather than positive effects on the development of the Peruvian economy as a whole.<sup>106</sup>

Today the Peruvian agricultural sector has two distinct sides. Raw coffee, raw cane sugar, fresh asparagus, and fresh flowers are grown almost exclusively for the export market, while potatoes, corn, barley, cassava, Andean tubers, rice and fresh fruits and vegetables are grown almost exclusively for the domestic market. There is some overlap, as mangoes, bananas, onions, beans, grapes and fresh flowers, all grown for the domestic market, are also important exports. On the other side, Peru imports substantial amounts of cheap wheat, rice and feed corn, and has also become a net importer of cotton (which it also exports), processed sugar and vegetable oil. Finally, no summary of modern Peruvian agriculture is complete without a discussion of coca production; Peru produces coca for legal domestic consumption as well as for the legal export market.<sup>107</sup> Coca is also grown for clandestine export to cocaine refineries in Colombia. This report will only tangentially touch on matters related to coca production, as there are unfortunately few suggestions that can be made regarding this sector.<sup>108</sup> In summary, Peru remains a net importer of basic foodstuffs and, while maintaining a diverse domestic agricultural sector, continues to rely heavily on a handful of export crops for foreign capital inflows.

## **Section 2 – Overview of Suggestions for Change**

Two broad recommendations flow from this basic analysis. The first is to encourage increased domestic production of basic food crops to combat the expensive capital outflows that occur as a result of purchasing foodstuffs from abroad. The second is to increase agri-

---

<sup>104</sup> The reformist military regime (1968-1975) under General Velasco kept prices low using direct price controls, an overvalued currency (Thorp, p. 76, 81) and direct subsidies of imports (Stein, p. 27); the more conservative military regime that followed (1975-1979), as well as the conservative Baluande government (1980-1985) and the populist García government (1985-1990) continued these policies despite their political and ideological differences (Sheahan, p. 67, Area Handbook Studies, p. 147; Zimmerer, p. 78). The neo-liberal Fujimori government was also forced to keep down food prices, even as it eliminated price controls, by maintaining an overvalued currency which favored imports (Sheahan, p. 92).

<sup>105</sup> Stein, p. 1-55

<sup>106</sup> Cameron and North, p. 50-63

<sup>107</sup> The state owned company ENACO has a legal monopoly on the Peruvian coca market (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, p. 6) and buys about 3,000 tons of coca leaf per year for traditional uses and legal export to pharmaceutical companies and the Coca-Cola company (Chuavin, p. 1-3).

<sup>108</sup> Coca production generates important foreign currency inflows, while at the same time generating high social costs in the form of violence and increased corruption. Efforts to decrease coca production to the levels sustainable by the domestic legal market by introducing alternative crops have failed, due to the fact that the majority of Coca production takes place on land that is ill-suited for other crops. This analysis concludes that only a decrease in the demand for cocaine in countries of the developed north will dissuade Peruvian farmers from continuing coca production (Sheahan, p. 73-74).

cultural exports in to gain foreign capital inflows, and diversify exports to maintain the stability of those inflows. This remainder of this essay will be divided into four sections. The first section will briefly discuss the geographic constraints to Peruvian agriculture and the current division of agricultural production between the coastal, Sierra and Selva geographical regions. An understanding of these constraints and division is necessary in order to make recommendations for simultaneously increasing the production of basic food crops and agricultural export products. The second section will focus on redistributing agricultural production in order to meet those goals, and will suggest strategies for facilitating that redistribution. The third section will discuss broad strategies for diversifying export products. A final section will suggest specific strategies for increasing and diversifying production of fruits bound for the export market.

### **Section 3 – Geographical Constraints and the Division of Agricultural Production**

A key aspect to understanding Peruvian agriculture is the geographical constraints that Peru's topography places on agricultural production. Peru's deserts, mountains and jungle reduce the amount of arable land, so that in 1997 only 3.3% of the total land area was under cultivation.<sup>109</sup> The country of Peru is divided into three geographical areas: the coast, the Andean Sierra, and the Selva, which can be further subdivided into the high Selva (montaña, or cloud forest) and the low Selva (the Amazonian basin).<sup>110</sup> While Peru's twenty-four departments (excluding the special department of Callao) tend to overlap geographical areas, they can generally be divided into three groups. Coastal departments include Tumbes, Piura, Lambayeque, La Libertad, Ancash, Lima, Ica, Arequipa, Moquegua, and Tacna. Sierran departments include Cajamarca, Huanuco, Pasco, Junín, Huancavelica, Ayacucho, Apurímac, Cuzco, and Puno. Selva departments include Amazonas, Loreto, San Martín, Ucayali, and Madre de Dios.

Agriculture in the coastal region is devoted to a number of crops produced both for export and the domestic market. The main coastal crops are sugarcane, cotton, rice, corn (amarillo duro), asparagus and wheat. Minor and marginal crops are vegetables, marigolds, mangoes, olives and potatoes, corn (amiláceo), and barley. The main crops in the Sierra are potatoes, corn (amiláceo), coffee, barley and wheat. Minor and marginal crops are ulloco, quinoa, papaya and cocoa (not to be confused with coca). The main crops in the Selva are yucca, bananas, rice, coffee and coca. Minor and marginal crops include pineapples, papayas and cocoa. Data for the percentage of national production of these and other crops for each of the three regions are given in Table 1.<sup>111</sup> There is however, a substantial amount of overlap in crop production across the three regions. There are some crops which can only be grown in one region, such as sugar cane on the coast, but others which can be successfully grown in all three, such as corn and yucca. While an analysis is not presented here, it is clear that coastal agriculture provides higher yields (Kg/ha) for almost all crops which can be produced across regions. This is a combination of the modernized state of coastal agriculture and the favorable climate in the coast for some crops.

In terms of infrastructure, especially transportation, but also for food processing, the coastal region is more developed than either the Sierra or the Selva. There are two geo-

---

<sup>109</sup> Gale Group, p. 328

<sup>110</sup> Area Studies Handbook, p. 63

<sup>111</sup> See Appendix

graphical reasons for this. The first pertains to the physical terrain; the mountains of the Andes and the jungle of the Amazon are simply not conducive to transportation infrastructure. Two major highways exist linking the Sierra and the Selva with the coast and internally, however these roads are more expensive to maintain and harder to traverse than coastal roads. The second pertains to the human geography of Peru; the fact that Lima alone contains one third of the country's population, and that more major urban centers are located on the coast than in the Sierra or Selva, means that more money has been put into transportation and food processing infrastructure near those major urban areas.

Agriculture in the coastal region is by far more modernized, in terms of capital and labor inputs, than agriculture in either the Sierra or the Selva. Coastal agriculture today is a mix of large privately owned farms and large cooperatives left over from the agrarian reform of 1969. Both provide economies of scale, and use more labor saving technologies and less labor than agriculture in either the Sierra or Selva. While the agrarian reform of 1969 created peasant cooperatives in the Sierra, these were gradually converted into small holdings for individual families, either officially or unofficially. Some development experts have testified that only the reintroduction of economies of scale will increase the production of Andean agriculture,<sup>112</sup> whereas others contend that the conversion to small peasant holdings resulted in little or no change in production.<sup>113</sup> Irregardless of one's perspective on this, it is both politically and socially unfeasible to drive large numbers of Andean peasants off their land at the present moment. It has already been discussed how the capacity of Peru's urban areas to absorb rural migrants has been exceeded by the numbers of migrants. Instead, this report makes other suggestions for the development of Peruvian agriculture.

Because the coastal areas are more efficient, modernized, and integrated to the export infrastructure, the guiding principal of this report is a recommendation to increase export-crop production in the coastal areas, which will bring increased foreign currency inflows, at the same time as shifting domestic food production to the Sierra and Selva, in as much as those regions can handle the shift. The limiting factor is the amount of arable land, which requires decreasing the coastal land used for domestic food production, and shifting that production to the Sierra or Selva. Arable land in the Sierra and Selva is also in short supply, which demands a decrease in some areas of production and an increase in crop yields for other kinds of production. The details for these suggestions are discussed in the next two sections.

A caveat should be inserted here to say, however, that it is unlikely and probably unwise to change the agricultural production in the department of Lima. The capital needs to have a nearby food supply to make it less vulnerable to politicized strikes and transportation stoppages. More than one government in Latin America has been brought to its knees when opposition elements prevented food shipments to the capital city.<sup>114</sup>

---

<sup>112</sup> Stein, p. 45-46

<sup>113</sup> Sheahan, p. 67

<sup>114</sup> To demonstrate this point with an anecdote; in January of 2003, while traveling in Peru and Bolivia, a national strike (paro) was called in Bolivia with the aim of putting pressure on the government of now president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada. While at the Peru-Bolivia border crossing of Desaguadero, I witnessed Bolivian truck drivers refuse to deliver Peruvian food exports bound for La Paz. Bolivian government officials resorted to hiring men on bicycles to transport bags of potatoes to the Bolivian capital (see Figure 5.1 in appendix for a photographic illustration).

#### Section 4 – Decreasing Dependence on Food Imports

Farmers in the Sierra should switch from coffee production, Peru's second most important export, to food production or to the production of Andean fruits bound for the export market (discussed in the next section). Not only has the world market for coffee collapsed in recent years, but Peru's coffee crop has historically received lower prices on the world market and has only recently begun to recover from years of reputation for small bean size and poor quality control.<sup>115</sup> Coffee will remain an important export, however, the land gained from decreased coffee production can be used for food production or production of Andean fruits bound for the export market. In terms of foreign capital inflows, while it may seem counterintuitive to decrease production of this important crop, the loss of inflows will be offset in a macroeconomic sense by the increased export production in coastal areas. However, to induce Andean farmers to switch, compensation will have to remain the same or rise for food products.

It is probably not politically feasible for the government to allow overall food prices to rise significantly. However, they should be allowed to rise some. A small rise in food prices should be combined with direct subsidies targeted at certain kinds of food producers in the Sierra. Instead of providing subsidies at the point of consumption via an overvalued currency, as it did in the fiscal year of 2003 when the Peruvian Central Bank purchased over 600 million dollars in FY 2003 to keep the value of the currency up,<sup>116</sup> the government of Peru should spend less on propping up the currency, let the value of the currency fall a little, and instead use the money saved for four strategies designed to increase consumption of domestically produced food (simultaneously lowering its price for consumers and increasing profits for domestic farmers). This will cause inflation to rise slightly and make food imports more expensive, but will have the positive effect of making Peru's exports more competitive on the international market.

Most importantly, the government of Peru should give some direct subsidies to farmers in the Sierra and Selva. This must be done in order to persuade Andean farmers to switch from coffee (or coca<sup>117</sup>) to food production. Additionally, over the last twenty years, the amount of land in the Sierra under cultivation for food production has actually decreased slightly as prices for domestically produced food have dropped due to the government policies discussed above; the uncultivated land has been mostly used for cattle grazing.<sup>118</sup> Directed subsidies will increase incentives for making productive use of this land, leading to increased food production. These subsidies should be specific to the geographic region and the type of food produced. Although the coast has an overall advantage in terms of yields (Kg/ha), there are crops which the Sierra and the Selva produce already, in a profitable manner. This is outlined in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 below.



---

<sup>115</sup> Achermann, p. 13-15

<sup>116</sup> International Monetary Fund, p. 4

<sup>117</sup> Although it has already been mentioned that alternative crops are unlikely to catch on in coca producing areas in the face of high international demand for cocaine, there could be some farmers in some geographical areas that could be persuaded. This would be a good area for the Peruvian government to explore the idea of negotiating for international aid monies, principally from the United States, for the funding of subsidies incorporated into the national development plan.

<sup>118</sup> Mayer, p. 245-248



Thus, subsidies should be given to coffee or coca farmers in the Sierra who switch to cultivation of potatoes, barley, ulluco (an Andean tuber) and possible wheat,<sup>119</sup> and farmers in the Selva who increase production of corn (amarillo duro) and rice. At this point a new issue need to be addressed, that of Peruvian crops versus exotic crops. Peruvian crops are those which were produced in Peru before the conquest by the Spanish. Exotic crops are those which are not native to Peru. Over the last fifty years, Peruvians have become accustomed to a diet, a sizeable portion of which consists of non-native foods, some of which must be imported. Thus, white bread, rice, and noodles have replaced traditional Peruvian staples such as quinoa and ulluco. While Peru can produce rice and wheat, it cannot produce them as efficiently as foreign exporters. To reduce dependence on food imports requires the Peruvian citizenry, in part, to reduce their consumption of exotic crops to a level that can be supplied by the Peruvian agricultural sector. To facilitate this change, the government should favor producers of Peruvian crops with larger subsidies. It has been shown that Andean farmers will change their cultivation choices in response to economic incen-

<sup>119</sup> It is not clear how much success the Peruvian government might have with wheat subsidies, given the likely opposition to the idea from the United States. The United States provides subsidized wheat free of cost to the Peruvian government, provided the Peruvian government uses to proceeds from sale to finance anti-narcotic programs. A better strategy would be for Peru to reduce its consumption of wheat, thus avoiding a potential worsening of relations with the United States.

tives,<sup>120</sup> hence the government should give some direct subsidies to Andean farmers who increase their production of quinoa (a lentil like grain), ulluco and other non-exotic crops.

In effect, the Peruvian government will be providing subsidies to achieve two different goals, shifting food crop production away from the coast, and increasing production of non-exotic crops. For some crops, these two goals overlap. Ulluco is a non-exotic crop which is also produced on the coast. This production should be shifted to the Sierra. However, other non-exotic crops are already produced almost exclusively in the Sierra; quinoa is one of these crops. Nevertheless, subsidies for increased quinoa production in the Sierra should be higher than subsidies for increased wheat production in the Sierra. By giving larger subsidies to farmers who increase production of non-exotic crops, the potential contradiction of subsidizing wheat to the detriment of ulluco, quinoa, corn (amiláceo), potato and other non-exotic crop production. Figure 3.1 provides an advisory subsidy hierarchy.

	<b>Coast</b>	<b>Sierra</b>	<b>Selva</b>
<b>Higher Subsidies</b>	Fruits (for export) <sup>121</sup> Vegetables (for domestic consumption) <sup>21</sup>	Quinoa Ulluco Potatoes	
<b>Level of Subsidies</b>		Corn (amiláceo) Andean Fruits <sup>21</sup> Barley	Corn (armarillo duro)
<b>Lower Subsidies</b>		Wheat	Rice

Figure 2.1 Advisory Subsidy Hierarchy

The second strategy, which the Peruvian government should fund using monies diverted from currency support, builds on the theme of promoting the non-exotic foods by promoting the consumption of non-exotic foods by the Peruvian citizenry. The government should launch a media and educational campaign to encourage Peruvians to change their diets by eating less wheat and rice and eating more traditional foods, such as quinoa and ulluco. In the current context, quinoa and ulluco are not eaten by many Peruvians, especially those in urban centers, for a number of reasons, ranging from denigration of “Indian food”<sup>122</sup> to ignorance of preparation techniques. The campaign must be designed to reach the maximum number of people with the maximum persuasive effects. Presently there is one popular cooking show<sup>123</sup> that showcases traditional Peruvian foods. This example pro-

<sup>120</sup> Zimmerer, p. 79-80. Analyzing post reform farming patterns in the Paucartambo Valley, Zimmerer found that demand for beer from urban consumers transformed Andean agriculture dramatically: “the neighboring Urubamba Valley had witnessed more agricultural change during the mid-1960s due to demand from the Cuzco brewery than from any other driving force.”

<sup>121</sup> For a detailed discussion of this, see the following section, “Increasing and Diversifying Exports”

<sup>122</sup> Zimmerer, p. 102-103

<sup>123</sup> On this show, *La Cocina de Don Pedrito* (12:00pm-1:00pm, *Frecuencia Latina*), the host Don Pedrito showcases traditional coastal foods while entertaining viewers with lively showmanship, singing and danc-

vides a base on which the government can model its efforts; popular culture can be a vehicle with which to launch a persuasive media and educational campaign. The government should pay popular Peruvian celebrities (soap-opera stars, soccer players and talk show hosts) to be guests on cooking shows featuring traditional foods or to appear in public service announcements promoting traditional foods. The government should also introduce curriculum into the national school system designed to increase knowledge of traditional foods and non-exotic crops. The government campaign could also infuse these strategies (more the media campaign than the educational campaign) with appeals to nationalism and a pre-Colombian past.

Third, the government should increase for funding research on pre-Colombian agriculture and the exploration of ways in which pre-Colombian crops could be re-introduced for increased domestic production and consumption. Since the 1970s, Peruvian agriculture has seen a decline in the diversity of non-exotic crops planted, to the extent that some crop varieties have disappeared entirely.<sup>124</sup> The prestigious International Potato Center already draws researchers and funding from the international community,<sup>125</sup> developing high yielding varieties of traditional potatoes, however other non-exotic crops have not received this kind of attention. The Peruvian government should explore the possibility of drawing on international funding and support, from development agencies and foreign research universities, for further research on the re-introduction or improvement of other non-exotic crops. However, any international funding should be free of clauses that would give proprietary rights to newly developed crops, crop improvements or techniques to non-Peruvian actors. The creation of a well-funded and prestigious research center devoted to the improvement of quinoa and ulluco and the re-introduction of other non-exotic crops that are little known even in Peru itself (such as arracacha<sup>126</sup> or uncucha, non-exotic vegetables, or llocón and achira, non-exotic tubers<sup>127</sup>) would help solidify and symbolize the government's support for non-exotic crops (a move which could be incorporated into the government's media and educational campaign).

The fourth strategy that the Peruvian government should fund with monies diverted from currency support is to increase extension services to Peruvian farmers, with an emphasis on aiding farmers take advantage of the new subsidies and make the transition from coffee production to production of non-exotic crops or other food crops. These extension services will involve both increasing the number of agricultural specialists in the countryside—and their capacity and training, specialists dispatched to the Sierra or Selva should receive training related specifically to non-exotic crops and production geared toward the domestic market—and increasing capital investment in agriculture, both by improving infrastructure, such as irrigation networks, and by providing credit to producers.<sup>128</sup> This suggestion applies to both the goal of decreasing dependency on food imports by increasing

---

ing. Other shows could be created and funded on this model, but with an emphasis on traditional dishes from the Sierra or Selva.

<sup>124</sup> Zimmerer, p. 69-70

<sup>125</sup> Zimmerer, p. 231

<sup>126</sup> National Research Council, p. 47

<sup>127</sup> Meyer, p. 289

<sup>128</sup> Current Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo reinstated a national bank of agriculture, AgroBanco, in 2002, the first national agricultural bank in Peru since the collapse of the Banco de Agrío under former President Alan García. In 2003, Reuters reported that this bank had an operating budget of 43 millions US dollars. This report recommends increasing this operating budget.

food production in the Sierra and Selva *and* increasing coastal cultivation for exports. There will be the need for increased extension services in all three regions to smooth the transition, and there is also some room for the extension of arable land via irrigation and other capital inputs in all three areas (although land will remain the limiting factor on Peruvian agricultural output).<sup>129</sup>

### **Section 5 – Increasing and Diversifying Exports**

In addition to decreasing dependence on food imports, the government of Peru should take steps to encourage the diversification and expansion of agricultural exports. Currently, Peru's only major agricultural exports are fresh and processed asparagus and raw coffee. In 2002, Peru exported around 138 million dollars worth of asparagus products and 180 million dollars worth of raw coffee. In comparison, it exported only 27 million dollars of mangoes and 17 million dollars of sugar, the next most important exports.<sup>130</sup> Peru must diversify its agricultural exports in order to maintain stability of foreign currency inflows; as already discussed, the world coffee market has collapsed in recent years, additionally, in recent years the price of asparagus on the world market has decreased sharply due to a flood of cheap asparagus exports from China.<sup>131</sup> By exporting a larger portfolio of crops in smaller quantities, Peru can stabilize its export profits. This section of the report is divided into two subsections. The first briefly outlines the strategy the Peruvian government should take to encourage the diversification of agricultural products for export. The second examines more detailed strategies the Peruvian government should enact specific to the cultivation of fresh fruits for the export market.

The government should to encourage farmers and agro-business in coastal departments to decrease their production of potatoes, corn, wheat, barley and ulloco, all of which can be grown in the Sierra. This is part of the overarching agricultural strategy outlined on page seven. The farmers and agro-businesses in the coastal areas should also be encouraged to decrease sugar cane production, as the world market for sugar has been in decline for sometime. Sugar cane will remain an important export, but land freed up from decreased production of sugar and shifted production of foodstuffs should be used to diversify agricultural exports in order to maintain stability of foreign exchange inflows. This parallels the recommendation that Andean farmers be encouraged to decrease production of coffee (and coca).

The strategies the government should use to these ends are similar to the strategies previously suggested for the agricultural plan in the Sierra and Selva, namely, the use of targeted subsidies and extension services, including dispatching agricultural specialists, improving agricultural infrastructure and providing credit to producers. The government should give targeted subsidies to coastal producers who increase production of fresh fruit, fresh vegetables, herbs, flowers and other products for the export market. Agricultural specialists should be dispatched to the countryside to help producers take advantage of the new subsidies. These specialists should receive training specifically related to the production of crops for export and the navigation of regulations by importer countries. By en-

---

<sup>129</sup> Sheahan, p. 60

<sup>130</sup> Ministerio de Agricultura, Republica del Peru, *Idicadores Agroecónómicos*.

<sup>131</sup> United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Horticultural and Tropical Products Division. *World Asparagus Situation and Outlook*.

couraging increased production of fruits and vegetables for export, the Peruvian government should look to the example of Chile. In 2002, Chile's booming agricultural sector exported 849 million dollars worth of fresh fruits, fresh vegetables, processed fruits and vegetables and fruit and vegetable juices to the United States alone, of which 746 million was fresh fruit.<sup>132</sup> This compares to 139 million dollars worth of the same categories exported by Peru to the United States in 2002, the vast majority of which was asparagus, bananas and mangoes.

Although this report will not go into the details of vegetable, flower or herb production, development, and export, an increased variety of these products should be produced for export, although in less quantity than fruits. There are a number of reasons for this: Since fruit orchards take at least five, and sometimes more, years after the initial investment before they yield any fruit for export, vegetables and other products, which can be sown and produced quickly, will fill an important role in maintaining profits for farmers and agri-businesses in the interim. Second, vegetables and other products will provide the export platform diversity needed to maintain stable foreign currency inflows. Third, it is the opinion of this report that pre-Colombian Peruvian vegetables (such as arracacha or uncucha) will not be able to command the types of markets that pre-Colombian Peruvian fruits will. As many importer countries already maintain significant production of the vegetables their markets demand, the agricultural specialists dispatched by the government should help Peruvian producers coordinate their harvests of vegetables and other agricultural products to coincide with the off-season for importer countries (most importantly, the United States and the European Union). It may also be harder to petition developed countries to open their markets to imports of vegetables and other products, which they can produce domestically, than to Peruvian fruits which they may lack the capacity to produce in quantity. The next section details specific strategies for the government of Peru related to the increasing the export of these fresh fruits.

## **Section 6 – Increasing Exports of Fresh Fruits and Vegetables**

There are three critical areas for the Peruvian government that must be attended to in order to boost exports of fresh fruits: identifying and negotiating access to markets, stimulating and meeting demand and improving infrastructure. These three areas are discussed in turn in this section. This report then closes with a conclusion.

### *Section 6.1 – Identifying and Negotiating Access to Markets*

To increase the export of fresh fruits, it is critical for the government of Peru to research and identify possible markets for Peruvian agricultural products, and to distribute information about these markets to Peruvian farmers and exporters. The majority of these markets are going to be in the developed countries of the global north and non-tropical countries; i.e., the United States, Canada, European Union, Eastern Europe and Russia, Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and Australia. To gain access to those markets the government of Peru should negotiate bilateral trade agreements with the United States and the European Union to allow for more exports of fruits and vegetables. Recently, the government of Peru has been in bilateral negotiations with the United States, the European Union, Thailand and the

---

<sup>132</sup> United States Department of Agriculture, *BCIO Report*

Czech Republic.<sup>133</sup> When negotiating bilateral agreements, the Peruvian government should bear in mind Peru’s current trade relationship with the United States. Currently, Peru is allowed to export 43 fruits, vegetables and herbs to the United States.<sup>134</sup> In comparison, Chile has permission to export 65 fruits vegetables and herbs.

Additionally, Chile has permission, which Peru does not, to export several delicious fruits, including Cherimoya, Papaya, Loquat, Lucuma and Passion fruit. Peru should negotiate for permission to export more varieties of fruits. One strategy might be to use political capital accumulated via cooperation with the United States and the European Union on combating coca production to negotiate more favorable import permissions.

### *Section 6.2 – Stimulating and Meeting Demand*

Identifying markets will not be enough to encourage demand from first world countries. The Peruvian government should form a working group with farmers and trade associations to target certain countries for marketing campaigns designed to promote Peruvian products, particularly fruits. There are several fruits which are widely popular in Peru and throughout Latin America which are not as popular or even unknown other parts of the globe. These include Caitmito, Carambola, Cherimoya, Papaya, Lucuma, Passion fruit (otherwise known as Maracuja or Granadilla) and Tuna. In some cases these fruits might find a ready market with little trouble. Other fruits might require marketing or development in order to be successful. Included in Figure 4.1 is a short list of fruits that may be good candidates for export, some general information on the fruits and their production and some suggestions on how to market them abroad.

Figure 3.1 Candidate Fruits for Export

*Babaco*: Babaco is a five sided fruit that is juicy and has been described as “having overtones of strawberry, pineapple and papaya.”<sup>135</sup> Due to this unique flavoring, and the difficulty involved in eating babaco, this fruit should be marketed as a juice product or flavoring.

*Caimito*: Caimito, also known as abiu, is a fruit native to the Amazonian lowlands. It is usually eaten fresh or as a flavoring in ice cream.<sup>136</sup> Caimito could be marketed both for direct consumption and as a flavoring.

*Carambola*: Carambola is a star-shaped fruit that grows throughout Central and South America, the Carribean, Hawaii, southern China and Florida and California. Carambola trees do not grow well in areas with sustained hot winds and require constant irrigation and will grow well in coastal departments. Carambola is best eaten directly—“its flavor, depending on variety, can range from exotically sweet to refreshingly tart”<sup>137</sup>—and should be marketed as such.

---

<sup>133</sup> United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Press Office; EU Business; Agence France Presse, Czech News Agency.

<sup>134</sup> United States Department of Agriculture, *Regulating the Importation of Fresh Fruits and Vegetables*

<sup>135</sup> California Rare Fruit Growers, Inc.

<sup>136</sup> Morton, p. 406-408

<sup>137</sup> Meadows, p. 1-2

*Cherimoya*: Cherimoya is a large fruit that resembles a large, white, tropical raspberry.<sup>138</sup> Its thick skin makes it well suited to the necessities of transportation, and could arrive in distant markets relatively bruise free. Cherimoya should be marketed for direct consumption.

*Papaya*: Papaya is a world famous and delicious fruit. There is already a sizeable market for this fruit, which is dominated by Brazil and Chile. The Peruvian government should focus on breaking into this market via trade negotiations.

*Lucuma*: Lucuma is a sweet fruit native to the Andean valleys of Peru and Ecuador. In Peru it is hugely popular as a flavoring in ice cream, a trend which the Peruvian government should continue when marketing the Lucuma abroad. Other suggestions are flavorings for milk shakes, puddings, pies and cakes.<sup>139</sup> Lucuma grows best in cool sub-tropical regions, and orchards cultivated for export should be located near the major highways in order to bring the fruit quickly to the coast for export.

*Passion Fruit*: Passion Fruit, also known as maracuja and granadilla, already has significant popularity abroad as a flavor in blended juices (i.e. “Smoothies”). There already exists a large market for Passion fruit. The Peruvian government should focus on breaking into this market via trade negotiations.

*Tuna*: Tuna is a small, pleasant tasting fruit with many small seeds that grows naturally in Peru. International trade in Tuna, also known as cactus-pear is grown, is dominated by three countries, Chile, Mexico and Italy. The Peruvian government should break into the international market by attempting to develop varieties of Tuna with few or no seeds. The cultivation of Tuna is well suited to the coastal regions of Peru because it grows well in “marginal land in arid parts of the world.”<sup>140</sup>

### *Section 6.3 – Improving Infrastructure*

There are three important investments that the Peruvian government needs to make in infrastructure which would be vital to increase the production of fruit for export.. The first of these is investment in roads and the domestic trucking industry. Proper maintenance the three major highways, the Pan-American highway, the Central highway (Lima-Pucallpa) and the Marginal Jungle Highway (Cajamarca-Madre de Dios), and increasing pavement of secondary highways that connect with the three major ones, will increase the ease of food transportation throughout the country. The trucking industry will also need husbanding if it is to meet the challenge. Without such improvements Andean fruits such as Lucuma, which cannot be grown in the coastal regions, but which nevertheless have great potential as an export product, will rot before they can reach the import markets of other countries. Unfortunately, the trucking industry is highly politicized in Peru, often leading national labor strikes. It would be unwise to upset the delicate political balance by attempt-

<sup>138</sup> California Rare Fruit Growers, Inc.

<sup>139</sup> National Research Council, p. 262-265

<sup>140</sup> Tous and Ferguson

ing to solve the problem via the creation of a state owned trucking industry—instead the government Bank of Agriculture should give low interest loans directly to small farmers, who rarely own their own trucks,<sup>141</sup> in order to increase the balance of rolling stock ownership.

The second major investment is also related to transportation, specifically the transportation of export crops to import countries. Just as Andean farmers are at the mercy of the trucking industry to transport their goods to market, so is the entire Peruvian export platform at the mercy of air-cargo companies to transport their goods to the importer countries. In recent years, there has been a shortage of cargo space,<sup>142</sup> and valuable produce is left to rot in warehouses before it can reach the market. The Peruvian government should follow the lead of Colombia, where flower producers banded together to form their own air-cargo company, Aerofloral, and should do one of two things. At first, the government should encourage national and regional carriers, such as Lan Peru, to add cargo capacity to cope with the seasonal fluctuations of the fruit market. If that fails, the government would be open to creating a state-owned fruit and vegetable air-cargo company, modeled after Aerofloral in Colombia. This company would quite probably operate at a loss, which should be considered (within limits) an acceptable subsidy to the export economy. Additionally, the military already operates a passenger service to connect remote jungle hamlets with the rest of the nation. This carrier should be encouraged to carry small quantities of jungle produce, such as caimito, to the coast, from where larger carriers can transport it abroad.

The third kind of infrastructure which is especially vital to fruit production is irrigation. Fruit orchards require constant irrigation, and the massive infrastructural costs in this case should be born by the government, or in a public-private partnership with coastal farmers and agro-business. Large scale irrigation projects might be an area for which the Peruvian should explore the possibility of securing international funding from development donors such as the World Bank.

## Conclusion

This report has suggested steps that the Peruvian government can take to decrease dependence on food imports while boosting agricultural exports. This report has iterated the importance of subsidies, marketing campaigns, research and extension services to agriculture bound for both the domestic market and the export market, as well as the importance of negotiating access to export markets, marketing fruits abroad and improvements to domestic infrastructure for boosting the export of fresh fruit. The implementation of these suggestions requires a massive commitment on the part of the government, and therefore this report ends with a warning. These agricultural programs cannot successfully be implemented if corruption and patronage get in the way. The government of Peru, and specifically the Ministry of Agriculture, as well as the AgroBanco, the Central Bank, and the office of the President, must guard to their utmost, the integrity of the programs entrusted to them, should the government adopt the suggestions outlined in this report. To that end, this report makes one, final suggestion. The Peruvian government should commission a report on how bureaucratic changes could be implemented to reduce corruption and patronage in

---

<sup>141</sup> Zimmerer, p. 100

<sup>142</sup> Sobie, p. 1-4

the ministries mentioned above. When the suggestions of this yet to be written report are coupled with the suggestions of this finished report, the future of Peru's long neglected agricultural sector will shine like the jewel of Peru itself.

**Appendix**

Table 1: Division of Production for 25 Crops in Peru: 2002

	Coast	Sierra	Selva	National
	% national production	% national production	% national production	% national production
<i>Major Crops</i>				
Potatoes	25	73	2	100
Rice	65	7	28	100
Coffee	2	66	32	100
Sugar Cane	100	0	0	100
Bananas	16	27	57	100
Corn (amarillo duro) <sup>è</sup>	71	10	19	100
Yucca (cassava)	10	30	60	100
Cotton	95	.5	4.5	100
Corn (amiláceo) <sup>è</sup>	24	70	1	100
Asparagus	100	0	0	100
<i>Minor Crops</i>				
Wheat	50	49	1	100
Barley	30.5	69	.5	100
Cacao	1	76	23	100
Quinoa	3	96	1	100
Ulluco	18	80	2	100
Mangoes	93	1.5	5.5	100
<i>Marginal Crops</i>				
Papayas	.5	65	29.5	100
Onions	84	15.5	.5	100
Marigolds	100	0	0	100
Tomatoes	92	4.5	3.5	100
Oranges	26	64	10	100
Kiwi	67	33	0	100
Pineapples	16	55	29	100
Olives	100	0	0	100
Apples	98	1.8	.2	100

Source: Ministerio de Agricultura, Republica del Peru, *Informacion Agricola Mensual 2002-2003*

\* illustrate the inaccuracy of the land use efficiency calculations

<sup>è</sup> amarillo duro is used for animal feed, while amiláceo is cultivated for human consumption

### Bibliography

Achermann, Ulrich. "A Bitter Business." Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH, Online Publikationen. Accessed online at [[http://www.gtz.de/dokumente/AKZ/eng/AKZ\\_2001\\_PPP/peru.pdf](http://www.gtz.de/dokumente/AKZ/eng/AKZ_2001_PPP/peru.pdf)]

Ad Hoc Panel, Advisory Committee on Technology Innovation, Board on Science and Technology for International Development, National Research Council. *Lost Crops of the Incas, Little Known Plants of the Andes with Promise for World Cultivation*. National Academy Press, Washington D.C.: 1989.

Agence France Presse. "Thailand, Peru edge closer to free trade agreement." October 17, 2003.

California Rare Fruit Growers, Inc. Online Fruit Facts Index. Accessed online at [<http://www.crfg.org/pubs/ff/index.html>]

Cameron, Maxwell and Liisa North. "Development Paths at a Crossroads: Peru in Light of the East Asian Experience." *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 25, No. 5. Sep. 1998.

Chauvin, Lucien O. "Peru firm exports coca leaves" *Miami Herald*. Jul. 04, 2003. Accessed online at [<http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/6232078.htm>]

Czech News Agency (CTK). "Peru Interested in Czech Machines, Dairy Products." *CTK Business News Wire*. Feb. 5, 2002.

EU Business. "Germany Backs Peru on EU Free-Trade Pact." *EU Business* webpage. Accessed online at [<http://www.eubusiness.com/afp/031015141230.9vw5hzta>]

Gale Group. *Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations, 10<sup>th</sup> Edition*. Farmington Hills, MN: 2001.

International Monetary Fund. *Peru: Third Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement—Staff Report*. Oct. 2003. Accessed Online at [<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ser/2003/cro3355.pdf>]

Library of Congress, Federal Research Division. *Peru, A Country Study (Area Handbook Series)*. Bernan Press, Lenham: 1993.

Mayer, Enrique. *The Articulated Peasant, Household Economics in the Andes*. Westview Press, Cambridge, MA: 2002.

Meadows, Jean. "Carambola" *Sarasota Herald-Tribune*. Oct 29, 1998. Accessed online at [<http://www.sarasota.extension.ufl.edu/FCS/FlaFoodFare/Carambola.htm>]

Ministerio de Agricultura, Republica del Peru. Idicadores Agroeconómicos, Año 2001. Accessed online at [<http://www.portalagraio.gob.pe/belectronicos2002.shtml>]

Ministerio de Agricultura, Republica del Peru. Informacion Agricola Mensual 2002-2003. Accessed online at [[http://www.portalagrario.gob.pe/info\\_agri/infoagricola02.shtml](http://www.portalagrario.gob.pe/info_agri/infoagricola02.shtml)]

Morton, J. *Fruits of Warm Climates*. p. 406-408. Accessed online at [<http://www.hort.purdue.edu/newcrop/morton/abiu.html>]

Purdue University Center for New Crops and Plant Products. Online Crop Index. Accessed online at [[http://www.hort.purdue.edu/newcrop/Indices/index\\_ab.html](http://www.hort.purdue.edu/newcrop/Indices/index_ab.html)]

Reuters. "Peru to inject fresh cash into agricultural bank." November 21, 2003. Accessed online at [<http://www.marketnewzealand.co.nz/home/index/0,1455,SectionID%253D4558%2526ContentID%253D8435,00.html>]

Sheahan, John. *Searching for a Better Society, The Peruvian Economy from 1950*. The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, PA: 1999.

Sobie, Brendan. "Frutas Frescas, Demand for Fresh Produce Around the World is Growing Faster than the Cargo Space for South America's Exports." *Air Cargo World*, Online, Oct. 2000. Accessed online at [[http://www.aircargoworld.com/archives/reg3\\_oct00.htm](http://www.aircargoworld.com/archives/reg3_oct00.htm)]

Starn, Orin and others, ed. *The Peru Reader*. Duke University Press, Durham: 1995.

Stein, William. *Peruvian Contexts of Change*. Transaction Books, New Brunswick: 1985.

Thorp, Rosemary. *Economic Management and Economic Development in Peru and Colombia*. University of Pittsburg Press, Pittsburg: 1991.

Tous, Joan and Louise Ferguson. "Mediterranean Fruits." Accessed online at [<http://www.hort.purdue.edu/newcrop/proceedings1996/v3-416.html>]

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Peru Coca Survey for 2002. Released March 2003. Accessed online at [[http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/peru\\_coca-survey\\_2002.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/peru_coca-survey_2002.pdf)]

United States Department of Agriculture, *BCIO Report*. Accessed online at [<http://www.fas.usda.gov/scripts/bico/bico>]

United States Department of Agriculture, *Regulating the Importation of Fresh Fruits and Vegetables* [Manual]. Accessed online at [[http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ppq/manuals/pdf\\_files/20Fruits\\_and\\_Vegetables.pdf](http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ppq/manuals/pdf_files/20Fruits_and_Vegetables.pdf)]

United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Horticultural and Tropical Products Division. World Asparagus Situation and Outlook. Accessed online at [<http://www.fas.usda.gov/htp>]

United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Press Office. “U.S. and Peru Establish Consultative Committee on Agriculture.” Oct. 21, 2002. accessed online at [<http://www.fas.usda.gov/scriptsw/PressRelease>]

Zimmerer, Karl. *Changing Fortunes, Biodiversity and Peasant Livelihood in the Peruvian Andes*. University of California Press, Berkeley: 1996.

**Rape, Sexual Assault and Domestic Abuse in Lesbian,  
Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered and Queer Communities:  
Problems and Primary Prevention**

**Neely Crane-Smith  
Macalester College  
12/03/03**

**Introduction**

How do heterosexist and homophobic policies and social actions (heteronormativity) shape how rape, sexual assault, and domestic abuse occur in and affect the lives of lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and transgendered people? How are the effects of these social actions on survivors of rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse being addressed by primary prevention and support services being provided by and to LGBTQ people? In this paper I will demonstrate how heterosexism, homophobia and anti-LGBT policies and social actions fuel rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse in queer communities, and also prevent many LGBTQ survivors from receiving the help they need. I will also show how LGBTQ organizations are challenging heteronormativity through their services, education and primary prevention, and how they are affected by structural violence within their organizing.

**Important Terms**

It is necessary to clarify some of the terms this paper will use in order to avoid confusion. I use *heteronormativity* in the context of a process of marginalizing and oppressing communities based on the belief that heterosexuality is “normal” and “right”, the binary gender system is correct and all other sexualities or genders are invalid and deviant. Heteronormativity encapsulates homophobia, “negative feelings, attitudes, actions, or behaviors” against members of LGBTQ communities; heterosexism, which includes “systems and ways of thinking that reinforce a belief in the inherent superiority or ‘normalcy’ of heterosexuality” and heterosexual privilege. (OutFront, 1) Heteronormativity is not merely a sexual bias, however; by privileging white middle-class monogamous straight relationships heterosexist practices also privilege certain races and classes. Heteronormativity includes an entire societal trend towards the regulation of gender, sexuality, race and class which affects immigration, health care, education, the media and globalization.

I also use interchangeably LGBTQ and queer when speaking about lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender communities. While there are many gay men, lesbians, bisexuals and transgendered people who do not identify as *queer*, I interpret the term as not only carrying connotations of sexual identity, but also a political agenda, and as such it is useful to this paper.

## Background

Of all modern feminist causes, rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse have become poster children for violence against women perpetrated by men. “Feminist scholars who take this position believe that rape and the fear of rape enable men to assert their power over women and maintain the existing system of gender stratification.” (Baron and Strauss, 61) Organizations such as rape crisis centers and battered women’s shelters have enacted serious social changes in order to affect the problem of sexual violence; from ad campaigns to special examination units in hospitals, they have petitioned for people to open their eyes to the worldwide problem of rape. Rape is portrayed as “a function of such factors as the patriarchal domination of women and the prevalence of pornography.” (Baron and Strauss, 5) However, this explanation does not hold up when one considers the source of rape that occurs within the queer community, nor rape that occurs as a hate crime against “deviant” sexualities. In order to understand the difficulties encountered by the LGBTQ community in addressing rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse, one must understand the effects not only of male domination on the queer community, but the overwhelming effects of heterosexist and homophobic practices.

Unfortunately, battered women and anti-rape organizations ignore queer survivors by focusing on heterosexual relationships and a strict binary gender system. While these organizations certainly have made very positive social changes in the past ten years, by portraying rape as a crime that men perpetrate against women they are ignoring the problem of rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse within the lesbian, gay male, bisexual, transgendered and queer community. “The domestic violence movement is a movement to protect women from men’s violence...Lesbians and gay men fall outside the limit of the domestic violence community by and large...” simply by not participating in heterosexual relationships. (Snow, 63) Heteronormative stories teach that LGBTQ communities are miniscule and thus do not need to be specifically addressed; however, a commonly accepted statistic reveals that as many as one in ten people in the United States are lesbian, gay, bisexual or transsexual. (Tillman, 247) By invalidating the very existence of queer people, heterosexist practices erase the discussion of queer relationships and queer rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse.

## Stories about Rape and their Implications for Queer Communities

A large problem facing queer survivors of rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse is that many feel that the very terms used do not apply to them. Rape is popularly defined as a man forcing sex on a woman<sup>143</sup>; if someone does not identify as either a man or a woman, or the act did not involve a penis, then they will most likely not identify the act as rape. And since rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse are constantly portrayed as ‘straight’ issues, some queer victims can not believe it would happen to them. However, the queer community is particularly vulnerable to rape, sexual assault and domestic violence due to their marginalized position in society. According to fairly recent studies, men who abused their partners (in heterosexual relationships) show “clinically elevated levels of distrust, isolation, insecurity, and alienation.” (Edleson, 4) Heterosexist practices cause

---

<sup>143</sup> The official legal definition, as provided to me by the Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center in training, is unwanted sexual penetration of the fingers, tongue or penis into the vagina or anus.

LGBTQ people to feel these very emotions; thus, queer people are more vulnerable to becoming abusers themselves.

Because of strict societal visions of gender roles and heterosexism, reactions to and about lesbian and gay male rape and battering can take different forms. People tend to accept that men will attack other men since it fits into the gender stereotype of violent men. Since male-to-male rape is not constructed as being sexually motivated (since the majority of perpetrators identify as straight (Hickson, et. al)) then forced sexual activities within the context of a sexual encounter (cruising, with a partner, etc) often are not recognized as being rape.

Stereotypes of gay men as effeminate and promiscuous also prevent people from recognizing male rape. The public images of bathhouses and back alley encounters as essential gay male spaces reinforce the idea that gay men are always asking for and wanting sex, no matter what form. “Finally, the gay community is reluctant to acknowledge that gay men intimidate, exploit, and sexually assault other gay men; it is politically embarrassing to the gay movement (in the same way as pedophilia is embarrassing), and it is dangerous ammunition for an oppressive majority.” (Hickson, et. al.) In domestic violence situations, gay men may blame themselves for not fighting back against their partner; social conditioning teaches that men are always aggressors, and never victims. One man, hospitalized after his partner beat him to near death with a lead pipe, still seriously asked, “Well, do you really think that was domestic violence?” (Snow, 61) If the abusive partner is physically smaller, people may not believe that the physically larger victim is trying to fight back.

Lesbians also face a complete lack of recognition of their problem based on the belief that women are always non-violent and loving partners. “Lesbian, or woman-to-woman, rape survivors often experience a sense of betrayal and disbelief that a woman could assault another woman. Some survivors speak of entering relationships with a certain romanticism that women are nonviolent and nonabusive.” (King and Evans, 71) As Arlene Istar explains,

“It had never occurred to me in 1988 that I could be a battered woman...After all, I was a strong, articulate, political dyke. I *knew* that men battered women, that women are not violent, and that lesbians were changing the world to end violence. I knew this despite the physical, emotional, and sexual abuse I lived with on a daily basis.” (Snow, 60)

Queer victims of rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse also must contend with internalized homophobia and fear of being ‘outed’ by their abusive partners. Those who are not out as being queer to their family or employer may have their sexual identity held against them by their partner in order to keep them in an abusive relationship or keep them from revealing an assault. As Beth Zemsky, a clinical social worker explained, “If I go home and pop my lover in the mouth – and I know she doesn’t want to be outed or no one will believe it – it’s more likely that I’m going to get away with it.” (Snow, 61) Stories about “lesbian bed death” – or the myth that once in a relationship, lesbians cease to have sex – fuel many victim’s and perpetrators’ belief that a sexually abusive relationship is preventing them from becoming sexless. (Girshick) For example, a lesbian who is being

forced into sexual situations by an abusive partner may be told that she should be glad that she is having sex at all.

### **Structural Inadequacies**

If and when LGBTQ survivors recognize their predicament and decide to seek help, they are faced with yet more obstructions. Rape advocates typically advise survivors to do two things after their rape: go to a hospital for a physical examination, and report to the police. In the case of queer rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse these two options are rarely if ever used. “In direct contrast to the documented experiences of battered heterosexual women, [a researcher] found that her respondents [battered lesbians] were significantly less likely to turn to relatives, police, attorneys, medical professionals, and battered women’s shelters.” (Merrill and Wolfe, 2000) Since a fair amount of violence towards the queer community comes from the police themselves, LGBTQ survivors are understandably reticent to report to the police. In cases where police have responded to queer domestic abuse calls, they have often responded inadequately. Domestic abuse situations between women are categorized as “cat fights,” and the women have often been handcuffed together, and housed overnight in the same jail cell. (Interview with Jolie Snow, 2003)

Often the police place the blame on the victim of the attacks based on gender portrayal; the larger man or the butch lesbian will face being labeled as the perpetrator based on their more “masculine” gender appearance. Police assume “that men use fists to deal with emotions and lesbians fight because they’re butch and tough.” (Snow, 62) In many cases, the police will completely ignore or dismiss a case of same-sex rape or domestic assault. When Gail, a lesbian, called the police to report her rape by her partner, “It took them two hours to arrive, and when I told them I had been raped by Joan, they just got up and left.” (Brownworth, 62) Furthermore, there may be pressure by queer friends or community to ignore the abuse because they don’t believe abuse can occur in queer relationships. “As a result, victims of same-sex battering may be hesitant to report domestic violence incidents to the police because they fear ostracism by the gay community.” (Kuehnle and Sullivan, 88)

If LGBTQ survivors manage to report to the police and attempt to find help, their options of support services are painfully slim. While straight women often use battered women’s shelters, practically no shelters provide services for lesbians, gay men, bisexual men or transgendered people. If they do offer services to a lesbian, shelters often do not provide adequate protection; while they do prevent men from entering the shelter they do not screen women, and batterers often do not have a problem locating their partner, especially in towns where there are only a few shelters. Some shelters will not even offer their services to lesbians. Pam Elliott, a coordinator of the Gay and Lesbian Community Action Council’s domestic violence program said she encountered shelters which told her that they “only had space for real battered women” when presented with a battered lesbian. (Snow, 61) By using stereotypes of lesbians as being attracted to every woman they meet, and thus likely to prey on the women in the shelter, battered women’s shelters alienate and perpetuate the self-loathing of lesbian domestic abuse survivors.

### **Transgender Problems – “What are you?”**

While studies and organizations are starting to pay attention to the problems of gay male, lesbian and bisexual survivors of rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse, the issue of transgendered survivors and their unique situations are generally overlooked. The transgendered community is rapidly growing in the United States; despite this, little to no attention is paid to domestic abuse or sexual assault in trans communities. Part of the difficulty is the lack of stories about healthy relationships in the queer community. A transgendered person in an abusive relationship may not have any other experience of a relationship, or have an idea of what a healthy relationship is supposed to be like. Social practices which privilege heterosexuals and gender stereotypes label transgendered people as mentally ill and disabled; any abusers will use this against their victims to perpetuate feelings of shame and self-doubt, and convince victims that no one else wants them. “Combined with stories of dating violence...these “warnings” can convince trans...survivors that they are lucky just to have a partner who doesn’t kill them.” (Courvant and Cook-Daniels) For LGBTQ in small communities, they may believe that their only option to have a relationship with their desired partner is to be in an abusive relationship; someone who is not out and has no knowledge of the queer community may not see any other option.

Going to the hospital or the police in order to report a rape, sexual assault or domestic abuse proves especially difficult for transgendered people. Many doctors and police officers are not familiar with transgendered women or men, and tend to view them not as survivors or victims, but as medical oddities. As such, the institutions that are supposed to be helping transgendered survivors end up harming them further. In Washington D.C. transgendered woman Tyra Hunter “was allowed to die by paramedics and emergency room staff who discovered her trans status, then decided to mock her rather than provide aid.” (Courvant and Cook-Daniels) In the highly publicized case of Brandon Teena, the sheriff asked Brandon “What are you?” and refused to investigate his rape; later, Brandon’s rapists returned and killed him and two of his friends for reporting the rape. (Courvant and Cook-Daniels)

Transgender people also face huge obstacles in locating services which will allow them safety and the resources to leave abusive relationships. Many of these battered women’s shelters have very strict ideas of what a “woman” is; that is, they will focus on providing services to biological women who, by simply being a woman, are suffering from violence by men. If a person’s driver’s license does not say “female”, no matter if the person is living fulltime as a woman, then she will not be allowed to stay at the shelter. Jolie expressed her frustration as these barriers during an interview;

“To get into the shelter as a domestic violence victim as a trans woman, your ID has to say you’re female. That’s not an option in the state of Minnesota, unless you get surgery, and surgery is not an option, because insurance companies don’t pay for it.” (Interview with Jolie Snow, 2003)

Many battered women’s shelters present this as “protecting” the women who are in the shelter; this is based on the assumption that anyone who is not a straight woman will take advantage or attack the women in the shelter. This also applies to gay men; while it may seem antithetical that a man who identifies as being attracted to men would sexually as-

sault women, shelters will often not admit gay men because they are perceived to be threatening or dangerous to the women in the shelter.

Jolie also related to me a disheartening story about a shelter that did decide to help a transgendered woman trying to escape an abusive relationship with her pimp. “Anne” had called the anti-violence hotline looking for help; after calling many shelters, Jolie finally found one that would take her. However, they would not allow Anne to stay in the shelter with the other women; they offered to put her in a hotel for two days. The first day they forgot to feed her; the second day they let Anne, despite her drug problem, go to a pharmacy near her old apartment to pick up a prescription without an advocate. Jolie hadn’t seen or talked to her since. While the shelter was offering services to Anne, they were incredibly limited; two days is not long enough for anyone to pack their entire apartment, move out and find a new residence. The fact that they did provide the hotel cannot erase the painful reality that they forgot to provide any food for her the entire first day of her stay. As Jolie related to me, many organizations claim that they are providing for LGBT communities because they may have a queer person on staff, or give a transgendered woman two days in a hotel room.

“I’ve been trying to make this point...that there’s a real discrepancy between being culturally competent, and culturally sensitive. Because everybody will go, “Oh, yeah, we work with the GLBT community, or we will,” but how that gets done is ...they leave out the T...[or] they don’t have anything specific, and most of the training and most of the materials have a heterosexual focus, or you get really old material.” (Interview with Jolie Snow, 2003)

### **Organizations and Queer Support**

A major problem for queer rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse activists is the lack of statistical proof of the violence in their community. For organizations to get grants they must prove that their community is suffering from a problem which they can help solve; however, the US Census does not yet ask any questions about sexuality. The police often do not record queer domestic assault or rape cases as such; this makes it incredibly difficult for organizations or people to speak about queer rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse as a dire problem. Those domestic abuse and anti-rape organizations who attempt to include queer issues often face backlash from their former supporters. “The Georgia Network Against Domestic Violence lost its state funding in 1988 and splintered into three different coalitions after it added sexual orientation to its antidiscrimination policy.” (Snow, 61) This highlights the importance of funding for domestic abuse, anti-rape and queer organizations; without the funding, it is nearly impossible to provide the necessary services to all who need them.

LGBTQ responses are forming, slowly but surely, against heteronormative teachings that invalidate queer experiences of rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse. The most important response is the beginning of primary prevention plans for rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse in queer communities. These programs start with education about the existence of queer rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse, and offer resources to

LGBTQ communities like specifically same-sex assault hotlines, legal resources and help finding shelters which will provide hotel rooms for LGBTQ survivors.

It is crucial to recognize that homophobia and heterosexuality alone are not responsible for rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse in queer communities; many members of LGBTQ communities face discrimination and oppression based on many different factors, including gender, sexuality, race and class. In many of the studies which I read, the experiences of queers of color experiencing rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse were not touched upon at all, despite the additional pressures of racism which affect the responses of both perpetrators and victims. Those organizations which are developing primary prevention programs reaching out to the queer community should take into mind the unique circumstances of LGBTQ communities of color, religious communities and economic classes which are mainly overlooked by both society and mainstream queer organizations.

Heteronormativity is far beyond an academic concept; while the language may be restricted to scholarly and activist debates, the process continues in the lives of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people. One of many manifestations of social sexual and gender oppression is through rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse within the queer community. Without concrete examples of healthy queer relationships, support from community or resources to turn to, queer survivors are left without a solid foundation in their lives. The "authorities" which are supposed to be helping them often contribute to their suffering. While battered women's and anti-rape organizations have made incredible progress in their arenas, they have tended to ignore LGBTQ problems and instead have focused on the dichotomy of male violence against women victims. This dichotomy must be constantly challenged and reexamined in order for queer survivors to be recognized and receive the help they desperately need.

### **Personal Activism and Primary Prevention**

My experience with anti-rape activism started at a rape crisis center in New Mexico, at which I volunteered both as part of the crisis line and a hospital advocate. Although I had to go through about fifty hours of training in order to become an advocate, I never went through any training which was LGBT-specific. Male-on-male rape was touched on briefly in conversations about child abuse; female-on-female rape was never mentioned at all. When I continued anti-rape activism at Macalester College in a student organization, Students Against Rape and Sexual Assault, the issue of rape in the queer community was never a point of discussion. I was not aware that rape, sexual assault or domestic abuse occurred in queer communities until the subject was broached tentatively in a Women and Gender Studies class.

As part of this class I started an internship at OutFront Minnesota, a queer organization founded in 1999 and based in Minneapolis. Their mission is "to make our home a place where GLBT Minnesotans have the freedom, power, and confidence to make the best choices for their own lives." (Outfront.org, 2003) I began working with Jolie Snow, the anti-violence program manager to develop a primary prevention program which would target and prevent rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse within the queer community. This will most likely be the first queer-oriented primary prevention program of its nature in the country. It will become part of a manual which will include resources, policy papers and

tools for educators, advocates and organizations to use to start a primary prevention program which focuses on LGBTQ communities.

Any primary prevention program aimed at the queer community which intends to prevent rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse would benefit from a focus on three areas: public awareness, education and support. Because rape and domestic abuse in the queer community is rarely if never discussed, it must be brought forward as a major issue in LGBTQ communities. This can be accomplished through vigorous public awareness campaigns with posters and pamphlets specifically targeted towards lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered survivors and perpetrators of sexual and domestic violence.

Education is perhaps the most important factor of any primary prevention program. The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force's 2003 report on education policy revealed that in recent studies between three to six percent of youth have reported same sex attraction or experience. This puts a conservative estimate of the population of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered youth in the United States at 689,000. (Cahill and Cianciotto, 11) High school programs should be developed which talk about queer rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse alongside both straight abuse situations, and in conversations about sexuality. In this way violence both within and against the queer community can be anticipated and addressed. I believe the importance of education to queer youth should be at the forefront of every primary prevention program.

It is especially important that education is not limited to schools; health professionals should be focused on as a target group who needs education so that they can provide the kind of services that queer survivors and perpetrators are lacking. The rather unique situation of queer primary prevention education is that it must include education on LGBTQ communities and people within its structure. Many communities are not educated about queer people; they have stereotypes of feminine men and butch women in their minds, but do not understand the multiplicity of identities of queer people. This includes doctors, nurses, law enforcement, paramedics, crisis line operators, advocates and shelters whose services are incredibly important in the lives of survivors and perpetrators. Workshops specifically structured for law enforcement and health care professionals would cover what a lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgendered person is, what their specific needs are, and how to respond to domestic abuse and rape situations concerning queer people.

The ideal primary prevention program would also provide education for the queer community on rape, sexual assault, domestic abuse and what constitutes a healthy relationship. This would take the form of workshops for transgendered people on gaining access to shelters, friendly medical professionals and what a healthy relationship would look like. Coupled with a public awareness campaign, offering such education would most likely allow many survivors to ask for support. Organizations such as OutFront are providing an incredibly important service with their crisis hotline for violence situations; crisis lines for survivors and perpetrators are important to help redirect and recommend organizations, services and emotional support.

The subject of queer rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse, not matter how uncomfortable it may be, must be approached by queer activists. In order to implement a primary prevention program to target queer violence, it is important to examine the structural violence that privileges white, middle class monogamous straight relationships and their position in society over any other. By not challenging such a privilege organizations are ignoring and invalidating the experiences of queer people who need support and ser-

vices in order to survive and escape violent situations. Educating people about violence in the lives of queer people and the effects of heterosexism and homophobia is necessary to preventing rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse in LGBTQ spaces.

---

### **Bibliography**

Baron, Larry and Murray A. Straus. Four Theories of Rape in American Society. New Haven: Yale University, 1989.

Brownworth, Victoria A. "An Invisible Crime: Lesbian Rape." The Advocate (the national gay and lesbian newsmagazine) June 2, 1992 n604 p62.

Cahill, Sean and Jason Cianciotto. "Education Policy: Issues Affecting Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Youth" The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force. November 17, 2003.

Courvant, Diana and Loree Cook-Daniels. "Trans and Intersex Survivors of Domestic Violence: Defining Terms, Barriers, & Responsibilities." [www.amboyz.org/articles/dv.html](http://www.amboyz.org/articles/dv.html)

Edleson, Jeffrey L. "Primary Prevention and Adult Domestic Violence." Presented February 17-18<sup>th</sup>, 2000.

Girshick, Lori B. "Sexual Violence Within Lesbian Battering." off our backs 39, no. 9 (2001): 31.

Hickson, Ford C.I., Peter M. Davies, Andrew J. Hunt, Peter Weatherburn, Thomas J. McManus and Anthony P.M. Coxon. "Gay men as victims of nonconsensual sex." Archives of Sexual Behavior 23, no. 3 (1994): 281.

King, Anne and Jamie Lee Evans. "Same-Sex Abuse." Support for Survivors: Training For Sexual Assault Counselors. CALCASA; 1999, 71.

Kuehnle, Kristen and Anne Sullivan. "Gay and Lesbian victimization: reporting factors in domestic violence and bias incidents." Criminal Justice and Behavior 30, no. 1 (2003): 85.

Merill, Gregory S. and Valerie A. Wolfe. "Battered Gay Men: An Exploration of Abuse, Help Seeking, and Why They Stay." Journal of Homosexuality 39, no.2 (2000) : 1.

OutFront Minnesota. "Definitions of terms associated with the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Communities." [www.outfront.org](http://www.outfront.org); November 2003  
OutFront Minnesota. "Mission Statement." [www.outfront.org](http://www.outfront.org); November 2003

Snow, Jolie. Interview, October 29<sup>th</sup>, 2003.

Snow, Katrin. “The Violence at Home.” The Advocate (the national gay and lesbian news-magazine) June 2, 1992 n604 p60(4).

Tillman, Danielle. “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Survivors.” Support for Survivors: Training For Sexual Assault Counselors. CALCASA; 1999, 247.