Last week, Roland McKay stated in his article “Six Things the Left Can Learn from the Right,” that left-leaning American intellectuals have failed to “articulate a bold alternative vision of America’s role in the world that reaches beyond the platitudes about global peace and justice and addresses the major strategic issues of the day.” However, the six suggestions he generously recommends liberal intellectuals follow if they are to achieve this goal are all either unrealistic or redundant. If liberals were to abide by McKay’s rules of thumb, they would be, well, conservatives.

Liberalism is inherently an inclusive philosophy, one that is more prone to compromise and, consequently, less driven by hard-nosed ideology. A singular articulated vision of a liberal foreign policy is, therefore, virtually impossible. For these reasons, the Democratic Party framework can afford to make room for the likes of Zell Miller. Three Republicans were supposedly on Kerry’s ‘short list’ of 50 potential vice-presidential candidates, if we are to believe the popular media. It is almost impossible to imagine a similar scenario if the parties were reversed.

Washington may be largely comprised of conservative-leaning think tanks and lobby-groups that focus their efforts on specific causes. However, McKay characterizes the two major “liberal-leaning” think tanks, the Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment, as “filled with conservatives and [having] no ideological coherence.” Both these institutions are, in fact, self-described non-partisan organizations that house intellectuals from a range of political leanings. Strobe Talbott, Clinton’s former Deputy Secretary of State, is the president of Brookings and a member of the Board of Trustees of Carnegie. Prominent Democrats, including Vernon Jordan, Robert McNamara and Teresa Heinz Kerry are all actively involved with Brookings as well. McKay’s characterization of these institutions as inclusive and irresolute is in fact an apt description of American liberalism in general.

American conservatism is, in opposition, a closed doctrine: espoused by few, but with a distinct, well-defined ideology. Virtually every influential conservative intellectual argues for a slightly varied version of the same spiel: an aggressive ideologically-driven foreign policy implemented by unilateral, preemptive military action. There is, therefore, no room in Washington for the liberal think tanks that McKay envisions. Liberal intellectuals are content with analyzing the world from the safe pedestal of a tenured position at a major university.

The liberal ambition for the future of American diplomacy is not one that can be presented aggressively, as McKay proposes. The liberal doctrine, as it came to be defined in the Clinton years, is based on negotiation and compromise, and of course the hope that everyone can leave the table on chummy terms. Unfortunately, this apparent lack of a well-defined vision of America’s role in the world makes it easy for neo-cons to label liberals as naÔve, unpatriotic and indecisive, and John Kerry has found himself at the receiving end of many of these accusations.

Seymour Hersh rather unfairly labeled the rise of neoconservatism as “a coup.” That term, however, is deceiving. The neoconservatives were not responsible for bringing Bush to power—they simply bided their time and looked for an ideal opportunity to implement their plans. Rumor has it that the war on Iraq was in the works as Bush was being inaugurated, long before September 11th. By following the passively resistant path, as their conservative counterparts did in the ’90s, the Left does not risk alienating fence-sitters, and may find itself in a better position regarding both international allies and the United States military.

McKay underestimates the abilities of the liberal academe and the efforts it is making to present its vision of America’s role in the world. One need only scan the pages of The New York Times, Harper’s or The Atlantic Monthly to see hundreds of well-crafted arguments by liberal thinkers. The steps that McKay suggests the Left pursue are already being followed—whether it is establishing think tanks or endearing itself to the military—or are so narrow as to render it little more than a cheap imitation of the Right.