CURRENT POSITION

Andrew W. Mellon Post-doctoral Fellow in the Social Sciences, Economics Department,

Macalester College, August, 2002 to present

EDUCATION

Ph.D. Economics, University of Maryland at College Park, expected May 2002

M.A. Economics, University of Maryland at College Park, December 1996

B.A. Economics, Maxima Cum Laude, LaSalle University, Philadelphia PA, May 1994

DISSERTATION

Free-Riding and Lobbying for Trade Protection: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of

Olson’s “Logic of Collective Action”

Committee Chairs: Dr. Mancur Olson, Jr. and Dr. Thomas Schelling

FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

Primary: Institutions, Economic Growth and Economic Change

Secondary: Public Finance

Additional Field Courses: Public Choice I & II, Comparative Economic Systems & Economies

In Transition, Economic Development, History of Economic Thought, Normative Analysis

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor: Principles of Economics, Macalester College, Fall, 2002.

Instructor: Macroeconomic Principles, Towson University, Spring, 2002.

Personal Tutor: Macroeconomics, Microeconomics, Public Economics, Public Policy,

International Economics, Development Economics, September, 1994 - present.

Personal Tutor: Microeconomics, Algebra, Calculus I, Statistics, Tutorium Inc.,

September, 1999 - present.

Instructor: Introduction to Macroeconomics, LaSalle University, Summer 1999, Summer 2000.

Instructor: Introduction to Microeconomics, LaSalle University, Summer 1997, Summer 1998,

Summer 1999, Summer 2000.

Instructor: Intermediate Macroeconomics, University of Maryland-College Park, Fall 1998 – Spring 1999.

Teaching Assistant: Introduction to Microeconomics, University of Maryland at College Park,

Fall 1996 – Spring 1997.

Head Tutor: Economics Department, LaSalle University, Fall 1992 - Spring 1994.

PUBLICATIONS AND PAPERS

“The Beautiful Game Shows Hope for a Beautiful Future,” forthcoming, International Mensa Journal.

“Capability and Disability in Developing Countries,” work in progress.

“If Only the PLO Could Take a Cue from the IRA,” The Minneapolis Star-Tribune , Counterpoint, p. A19,

Saturday, August 3, 2002.

“Voters Need the Good, the Bad – and the Ugly,” The Philadelphia Daily News, Op/Ed Section,

Thursday, May 16, 2002.

“On the Revolutions in Economics: Copernicus’ Contributions to Economics,” The Polish American

Journal, March, 2001.

“John L. Kelley’s Bringing the Market Back In: The Political Revitalization of Market Liberalism:

A Note,” The Economic Journal, November 1998.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant, Mancur Olson, The Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector

(IRIS), Fall 1997 – Spring 1998.

Publications Manager/Librarian, IRIS, May 1996 – May 1997.

Assistant Project Coordinator for Central and Eastern Europe, IRIS, April 1996 – October 1996.

Research Assistant, Economics Department, LaSalle University, May 1992 - April 1994.

HONORS AND AWARDS

Andrew W. Mellon Post-doctoral Fellowship in the Social Sciences, Macalester College.

Graduate School Fellowship, University of Maryland at College Park.

James F. Prescott Academic Scholarship for Graduate Studies.

President, Omicron Delta Epsilon, LaSalle University chapter.

LaSalle University Christian Brothers Scholarship.

REFERENCES

Professor Thomas Schelling Professor David Crocker Professor Mark Ratkus

Dept. of Economics Institute for Philosophy & Chair, Dept. of Economics

University of Maryland Public Policy LaSalle University

College Park, MD 20742 School of Public Affairs 1900 W. Olney Ave

ts57@umail.umd.edu University of Maryland Box 319

301-405-3494 College Park, MD 20742 Philadelphia, PA 19141 dc134@umail.umd.edu ratkus@lasalle.edu

301-405-4763 215-951-1178

THESIS ABSTRACT

In the United States, many highly concentrated industries, such as sugar and automobiles, traditionally have benefited enormously from trade protection, subsidies and other forms of government assistance while many less concentrated industries, such as ready-mix concrete and lime production, are left to face market forces with relatively little help from the government. While quotas keep the domestic price for sugar at almost twice the world price, resulting in huge profits for sugar producers, there is little protection for a host of industries that employ as many or more domestic workers.

One possible explanation for this discrepancy lies in Mancur Olson’s “Logic of Collective Action.” According to Olson, industry-level government assistance, such as trade protection, is a public good for the firms in an industry and lobbying for such assistance by firms is a form of collective action subject to the “Free Rider” Problem. A firm that sells only a small fraction of an industry’s output obtains relatively small benefits from trade protection for the industry and so does not have a strong incentive to spend much of its own funds on lobbying activities to bring about such protection. Meanwhile, firms with very large market shares receive greater benefits from protection and, so, have much stronger incentives to invest in collective action. Highly concentrated industries, then, are more likely to overcome the “Free Rider” Problem and see more lobbying activity by individual firms and, consequently, greater government assistance.

This thesis theoretically and empirically evaluates Olson’s hypothesis. Olson’s conclusions are theoretically evaluated by presenting a mathematical model of collective action by firms for industry-level political benefits. The model is solved to obtain Olson’s prediction that collective action by firms increases with industry concentration and decreases with the number of firms in the industry.

Olson’s theory then is empirically evaluated by employing a unique data set on Political Action Committees (PACs) constructed from Federal Election Commission data for the 1987-88 election cycle. A series of 2-Step Heckit analyses of this data indicate that, consistent with Olson’s theory, industries with high concentration and few firms are more likely to be politically organized than more diffuse industries. However, among politically organized industries (which Olson terms “Privileged”), concentration and number of firms do not significantly affect the degree of political activity.

A series of Two-Stage Least Squares regressions indicate that political spending by industries is less important in explaining tariff rates than industry concentration but that certain industry political spending does significantly explain the total benefits of trade protection across industries.