I found Gardner’s argument compelling. Gardner offers ample textual support, assisted immeasurably by Wollstonecraft’s own criticism of her contemporaries, for her claims about Wollstonecraft’s notion of sensibility. Unfortunately, Gardner’s essay ends with no suggestions about how to resolve the problems created by this new interpretation of the Vindication. One could agree (as I do) with Gardner’s position that acceptance of the key roles that emotion and sensibility play in Wollstonecraft’s work presents a challenge to the dominant model of modern moral philosophy. One could also accept (as I do) Gardner’s critique of the traditional disciplinary divisions, especially between philosophy and literature. “Accepting that Wollstonecraft was not making any rigid distinctions between politics/morality and poetry requires us to include in our discussion of political or moral theory elements that fall into the category of the ‘non-philosophical’ on the dominant model of moral philosophy” (118). Nevertheless, despite such arguments, Gardner offers few clues as to what this implies about philosophical methodology or how to manage this integration of philosophy and poetry. Indeed, the main role Gardner attributes to Wollstonecraft’s use of sensibility and emotion is to hold our attention and capture our imaginations. This function is insufficient to establish sensibility and emotion as an essential part of Wollstonecraft’s philosophy. If poetry is to be accepted as a part of philosophy, it must have more influence than to merely enliven the presentation of rational ideas. It must be shown to be significant in and inseparable from the philosopher’s argument.
Thus, although Gardner’s ideas are well supported and provide an unusual but informative perspective on Wollstonecraft’s work, they are, at best, preliminary. This is not to say that Gardner’s work is of little value. To the contrary, her essay does adequately establish that the current classification of Wollstonecraft’s work ignores many of its subtleties and creates problems with her ideas and her writing that would otherwise not be there. The essay also points out how the dominant model of philosophy supports and entrenches these types of interpretations. What is missing is a more nuanced or explicit account of what constitutes philosophical methodology and how the traditional disciplinary divisions between philosophy and literature may be bridged. Having not addressed these issues—issues raised by her critique of traditional readings of Wollstonecraft’s Vindication, I conclude that Gardner’s work is just the first step in what will hopefully be a fruitful path for investigation.
1 Catherine Villanueva Gardner, Rediscovering Women Philosophers: Philosophical Genre and the Boundaries of Philosophy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000): Chapter "Mary Wollstonecraft and the Separation of Poetry and Politics," pp. 81-122. Since this essay is a response to Gardner's argument in this chapter, the only source used is Gardner's book. All page references in the text are to Gardner's book.