Introduction

In 1975, in her book New Woman, New Earth, theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether wrote:

Women must see that there can be no liberation for them and no solution to the ecological crisis within a society whose fundamental model of relationships continues to be one of domination. They must unite the demands of the women's movement with those of the ecological movement to envision a radical reshaping of the basic socioeconomic relations and the underlying values of this society.(1)

According to Ruether, the women's movement and the ecology (or environmental) movement are intimately connected. The demands of both require "transforming that worldview which underlies domination and replacing it with an alternative value system."⁽²⁾

The thoughts expressed by Ruether in this passage changed my scholarly orientation as a graduate student in philosophy beginning to write a doctoral dissertation in 1975. Ruether's book, and subsequent readings of works by Susan Griffin, Carolyn Merchant, and Ynestra King, provided not only the "relevance" piece I needed (which was lacking from my graduate training in philosophy); it also provided the feminist piece I thirsted for in both philosophy and the environmental movement. Through the eyes of these scholars, I gradually came to see myself as an ecofeminist philosopher.

Historically, ecofeminism grew out of grassroots political actions initiated by women; it has found diverse expression in the arts, literature and language, science and technology, philosophy and religion, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Ecofeminism has been advocated by scholars and practitioners across academic disciplines, from all walks of life, from all parts of the globe.

As a professional philosopher, my primary interest is in ecofeminism as a philosophical position. This book is an outgrowth of that interest. It is premised on the conviction that ecofeminist philosophy has enormous potential and power to generate insights and recommendations for any theory, practice, or policy that is feminist, ecofeminist, or environmental. My main goal in this book is to present and defend a particular version of ecofeminist philosophy, one that is grounded in my own Western historical experience and academic feminist perspective as a Euro-American woman living in the United States.

The distinctively Western philosophical perspective on ecofeminism provided in this book is just one of many possible perspectives. In this vein, I do not assume that a philosophical approach to ecofeminism is better than nonphilosophical approaches (e.g., to grassroots ecofeminist organizing, or to ecofeminist art, music, literature, or spirituality). Nor am I assume that the Western perspective is a genuinely inclusive perspective--one that captures the diversity of multicultural perspectives on issues of interest to ecofeminists. I am not claiming that the perspective offered in this book is the only or the definitive or the best perspective among ecofeminist philosophical perspectives. It is simply one perspective--the perspective of someone who thinks philosophically about ecofeminism.

Conceptual issues are at the heart of Western ecofeminist philosophy. Not surprisingly, then, a good portion of the content of this book focuses on conceptual issues. One central conceptual issue concerns the nature of the interconnections, at least in Western societies, between the unjustified domination of women and "other human Others," on the one hand, and the unjustified domination of nonhuman nature, on the other hand. Throughout this book, I refer to these unjustifiably dominated groups as "Others." Reference to "Others" (or "other Others") is to those who are excluded, marginalized, devalued, pathologized, or naturalized--who become "Others"--in Western systems of unjustified domination-subordination relationships. In Western, Euro-American cultures, "Others" includes both "human Others," such as women, people of color, children, and the poor, and "earth Others," such as animals, forests, the land.

"Ecological feminism" (or "ecofeminism") is an umbrella term for a variety of different positions concerned with these connections, what I call women--other human Others--nature connections. The reference to "Others" highlights issues of domination, exploitation, and colonization of certain groups ("Others") who have subordinate status in institutions and relationships of domination and subordination. As I will show, a central project of ecofeminist philosophy from a Western perspective is an exploration of conceptual aspects of women--other human Others--nature connections.

Organization of the Book

In chapter 1, "Nature Is a Feminist Issue," I motivate ecofeminist concerns by focusing on empirical examples of women--other human Others--nature connections. Appeal to this data suggests why any adequate analysis and resolution of such environmental issues as deforestation, water pollution, farming and food production, and toxins and hazardous waste location must be integrally connected to an understanding of the plight and status of women, people of color, the poor, and children. Explication of such empirical data early-on is also meant to suggest one crucial reason ecofeminist philosophy matters: it helps one understand how mainstream environmental practices and policies often reflect, reinforce, or create practices and policies that devalue, subvert, or make invisible the actual needs and contributions of women, people of color, the underclass, and children.

In chapter 2, "What Are Ecofeminists Saying?" I provide an overview of a variety of ecofeminist perspectives on women--other human Others--nature interconnections. Ten such types of interconnections are discussed: historical and causal, conceptual, empirical, socioeconomic, linguistic, symbolic and literary, spiritual and religious, epistemological, ethical, and political interconnections. Through this overview, I familiarize the reader with the range of different, sometimes competing, perspectives that have been advanced in the name of ecofeminism, especially since issues in ecofeminist philosophy arise with regard to each type of connection.

In chapter 3, "Quilting Ecofeminist Philosophy," I offer my version of ecofeminist philosophy. I begin by characterizing the version of "ecofeminist philosophy" I am defending, providing a visual representation of it as centrally concerned with issues that arise out of the intersection of three distinct but overlapping spheres: (1) feminism; (2) science (including the science of ecology), development, technology, and "nature"; and (3) local or indigenous perspectives. In the remainder of the chapter, I provide conceptual clarification and argumentation for the version of ecofeminist philosophy I defend in this book. I end the chapter with a discussion of ecofeminist philosophical theorizing as quilting.

Chapter 3 is not a quick read. The conceptual analysis and argumentation requires thoughtful engagement with the text on the reader's part. But it is a pivotal chapter of the book since it provides the conceptual props and argumentation on which much of the rest of the book relies.

In chapter 4, "How Should We Treat Nature?" I turn to a discussion of "environmental ethics," the arena in which much of the scholarship of ecofeminist philosophy has taken place. "Environmental ethics" is concerned with human ethical responsibilities toward nonhuman nature. I describe a range of positions in contemporary Western environmental ethics--from mainstream, "canonical" positions in Western philosophy to more radical positions. Although the version of ecofeminist philosophy I defend shares important concerns with several of these positions, I argue that an ecofeminist perspective is a distinctively feminist and potentially transformative perspective in environmental ethics.

Two sorts of worries about the nature and plausibility of an ecofeminist ethic frequently surface in discussions of ecofeminist philosophy. In fact, sometimes these worries have the effect of eliminating ecofeminist ethics from any serious consideration as an environmental ethic. The first sort of worry is raised by critics who subscribe to the view that a universal ethic is both possible and desirable. Given the centrality of issues of cultural diversity and context to ecofeminist philosophy, they worry that, from an ecofeminist philosophical perspective, a universal ethic is neither possible nor desirable. If this is true, they suggest, it is not a plausible position. The second sort of worry is from critics who claim that ecofeminist ethics is at best a set of loosely organized claims, but that it is both not a theory and anti-theory. As such, it does not constitute a bona fide ethic.

I address these two worries in chapter 5, "Ethics in a Fruit Bowl." I argue that, properly understood, a universal ethic is both possible and desirable, and that the version of ecofeminist ethics I defend is such an ethic. Using the metaphor of a fruit bowl, I defend my answer by arguing for three features of what I call "care-sensitive ethics." First, an essential aspect of moral reasoning and moral motivation is the "ability to care about oneself and others. I call this the "ability to care" condition. Second, the universality of ethical principles is as "situated universals," in contrast to the traditional notion of "universals" as ahistorical, transcendent, absolute universals. I call this the condition of "situated universalism." Third, the appropriateness or suitability of any ethical principle in a given context is determined by considerations of care. I call this the "care practices condition." I argue that care-sensitive ethics honors traditional values such as utility, self-interest, duty, and rights, to be morally salient, even if not overriding, features of ethical situations. I end the chapter by showing how an ecofeminist ethic can be helpful in understanding and resolving ethical issues in environmental contexts, and why the versions of ecofeminist ethics and ecofeminist philosophy I defend constitute bona fide theoretical positions.

In chapter 6, "Must Everyone Be a Vegetarian?" I consider the issue, controversial among ecofeminists, of universal moral vegetarianism. Some ecofeminists argue that moral vegetarianism is a necessary condition of any ecofeminist practice and philosophy. Others either are not so sure or disagree. I argue for a version of what I (along with a few other ecofeminist philosophers) call "contextual moral vegetarianism," showing the significance of a care-sensitive approach to issues of hunting and vegetarianism.

Some critics worry that ecofeminist philosophy is not sufficient ecological to be a bona fide basis for environmental (read: ecological) ethics. I address this worry in chapter 7, "What Is Ecological about Ecofeminist Philosophy?" I answer the question in two distinct but related ways: First, I discuss the leading position to date in ecosystem ecology known as "hierarchy theory." I argue that there are six key features of hierarchy theory that make it both compatible with and a theoretical ecological grounding for ecofeminist philosophy. Second, I discuss what is probably the most widely known and popular text in environmental ethics among naturalists, foresters, fish and wildlife managers, parks and recreation ecologists, and field ecologists--the late Aldo Leopold's 1949 essay, "The Land Ethic," from his collection of essays The Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There. I argue for an updated interpretation of Leopold's land ethic that makes its basic ecological claims compatible with a hierarchy theorist's perspective on ecosystems and its basic ethical claims compatible with the version of ecofeminist philosophy I am defending. I argue that, taken together, these two different ecological starting points--hierarchy theory and an updated version of Leopoldian land ethics--provide independent and sufficient evidence of the ecological grounding of ecofeminist philosophy. Stated differently, together they show the respects in which ecofeminist philosophy is sufficiently "ecological."

But the argument of chapter 7 does not stop there. I also argue that there are important contributions ecofeminist philosophy can make to both the theory and practice of the discipline of ecology. After saying what these contributions are, I end the chapter by arguing for the potential fruitfulness of coalition-building and ongoing dialogue among ecosystem ecologists (especially hierarchy theorists), Leopoldian land ethicists, and ecofeminist philosophers like myself.

Throughout the book evidence is offered about the disproportionate and unjustified environmental harms to women, other human Others, and nonhuman nature. This evidence raises issues about "environmental justice." In chapter 8, "With Justice for All," I argue for an inclusive concept of justice that has three features. First, it retains aspects of the familiar, distributive model of social justice, while revising that model to accommodate feminist critiques. Second, it incorporates nondistributive aspects of social justice overlooked or improperly construed by a distributive model of justice. Third, it shows why an adequate concept of social justice includes issues of environmental justice. I conclude that a reconceived and transformed concept of justice takes women--other human Others--nature connections seriously and ensures that the moral considerability of nonhuman nature is included in conceptions and practices of social justice.

I end the discussion of ecofeminist philosophy on a somewhat autobiographical note by discussing the importance of spirituality to ecofeminist philosophy in chapter 9, "Surviving Patriarchy." Discussions of spirituality do not figure prominently in ecofeminist philosophical accounts. Issues about spirituality are either dismissed out of hand as outside the province of philosophy or declared to be sufficiently muddled or conceptually problematic as to not warrant serious philosophical attention.

The view advanced in chapter 9 is different. I begin the chapter by offering philosophical reasons for exploring the potential of ecofeminist spiritualities to intervene in and creatively change patriarchal (and other) systems of domination. I then describe what I understand to be the nature of ecofeminist spirituality and connections between ecofeminist spirituality and power, nonviolence, and care. I then turn to a discussion of a model of patriarchy as an unhealthy human social system, showing that ecofeminist spiritualities do (or could) play important interventionist and creative roles in dismantling patriarchy as a social system.

Closing Remarks

This book is the book I wanted to write about ecofeminist philosophy for a reflective audience. My hope is that you, the reader, will find in these pages ideas and arguments which are interesting, engaging, and useful. Perhaps you will be motivated to engage in dialogue with others about some of the issues raised here. It is my hope that this book stimulates such conversation.

Notes for Introduction

1. Rosemary Radford Ruether, New Woman, New Earth: Sexist Ideologies and Human Liberation (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), 204.

2. Ruether, New Woman, 204.

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