

**Challenges to a Hemispheric Power:
Explaining International Influence of Latin American Leaders**

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Abstract

This paper argues that a Latin American leader who opposes U.S. design for the region attains international influence if he meets two critical conditions, but not to the exclusion of other, less critical factors that I consider. In concert with the Latin American tradition of personalism, the first condition dictates that the leader must comply with Weber's model of charismatic authority. In complying with this model, it can be assured that the leader has sufficient support at home such that he can look beyond the affairs of domestic administration. The second condition that I consider most critical requires that the leader maintain favorable relations with his country's military forces even if the government is not a military government. I argue these points in part based on the outcome of Fidel Castro's rule. I apply findings from his rule to explain the international influence or lack thereof of four other Latin American leaders: Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, Salvador Allende of Chile, Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala.

Introduction

As the health of Cuba's Fidel Castro falters, eyes are turning elsewhere in Latin America to determine who will take up the role of standard-bearer for those in the region who seek to emerge from under the auspices of the United States. Eyes are focusing in on Venezuela, where President Hugo Chávez eight years ago took the helm and began steering his country away from the influence of the United States and toward that of Cuba, the small Caribbean island-nation 90 miles to the south of Florida that has come to symbolize worldwide resistance to the global capitalist order. As time has progressed and Chávez has consolidated his hold on power, many see him emerging as the region's new standard-bearer. Observers are also keeping their eye on Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega, recently elected to serve another term as president of the second poorest nation in the western hemisphere.

What is it about these leaders that attracts so much attention and stokes so much speculation? What is it about such leaders that makes the global community brace to hear what they have to say? What is it about certain Latin American leaders that thrusts them onto the international stage while others remain at home, tackling domestic issues?

In this paper, I seek to answer those questions. I plan to establish a model that explains what I call international influence, the ability of world leaders to have an effect on global affairs. Since I seek to address these points in the Latin American context, I will draw extensively on the conditions that propelled Fidel Castro to a position of international influence. Scholars of Latin America can point to Castro as perhaps the quintessential, internationally influential, Latin American leader. In the following pages,

I will model international influence based on Fidel Castro, develop an explanation, and apply that to a set of Latin American leaders.

Objectives

A single leader's ability to transform the political landscape of an entire hemisphere is, to say the least, an expression of that leader's international influence. In this paper, I seek to explain the international influence of Latin American leaders using Castro as a starting point. This paper is a survey of five historically notable Latin American leaders, including Castro, who have posed the threat of an alternate economic or governmental model to that favored by the United States¹. I have developed a model based on the outcomes of Fidel Castro's rule to apply to four other Latin American leaders. Three leaders that this paper surveys—Salvador Allende of Chile, Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and Hugo Chávez of Venezuela—rose to power following Castro's Cuban Revolution. Thus, in large part, U.S. policy toward these leaders has been a direct product of the United States' desire to stifle Cuban-style politics and economics. The remaining case study—Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala—rose to power and fell before Castro took hold of Cuba. Arbenz is included among my case studies to test the integrity of the Castro-based model when applied to a case that occurred before Castro's rise.

This paper will point to the primary factors that contribute to the defined outcome: a leader's attainment of international influence. Based on the case of Castro, international influence can be considered the ability to change political landscapes and policy abroad. The paper will also seek to explain two current phenomena in Latin American leadership: Venezuela's Chávez as he emerges as a player on the international

stage and Nicaragua's Ortega in the wake of his recent resurgence to the presidency under the banner of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).

The current project will consider the following six factors and the designated outcome in the analysis of the five aforementioned Latin American leaders:

- Does the leader present a perceived or actual threat of an alternate economic model to that favored by the United States?
- Has the leader achieved longevity as a political force?
- Has the leader attained economic security in his country?
- What is the strength of the leader's internal opposition?
- Does the leader comply with Weber's model of charismatic authority?
- Does the leader have access to military force?
- Has the leader attained any degree of international influence (the outcome)?

The study will argue that the factors involving charisma and military force are the most critical to explaining the emergence of anti-U.S. Latin American leaders on the international stage. These factors are not critical, however, to the exclusion of others, such as economic security, longevity and the presence of internal opposition. Such factors indeed can affect the outcome of international influence, but are not the decisive factors for the leaders' attainment of the outcome.

I settle on charismatic authority and access to military force as the two primary factors in light of two works of scholarship: one that touches on charismatic authority and another that treats the relationship between military forces and the health of Latin American governments. I have also applied my own assessments of the tenure of Fidel Castro to the development of the above argument.

First, Richard Fagen sets out to make sense of Fidel Castro in the context of sociologist Max Weber's concept of charisma, a phenomenon which Fagen notes has often been equated with adjectives such as "demagogic," "irrational," "emotional," and "popular" (Fagen 1965: 275). In the Latin American context, the concept of charisma parallels the important tradition of leaders who exhibit *personalism*, which emphasizes the necessity of "a charming personal veneer," a "charismatic manner," and "personal warmth" for successful civil relations (Vanden and Prevost 2006: 180). Fagen demonstrates that Fidel Castro is a leader who derives his power through charismatic authority. Through personality and not necessarily through politics, Castro has been able to become a respected and revered authority in Cuba. Beyond the boundaries of Cuba, Castro's compliance with the Weberian model of charismatic authority has helped to secure a perpetual international prominence and influence for the socialist leader. In this paper, I will apply the model of charismatic authority to the other four leaders mentioned and further explain Castro's charismatic authority. The five elements of the Weberian model follow. They will be explained in greater depth later in the study (Fagen 1965):

1. A leader with charismatic authority is "always the creation of his followers."
2. A leader is not a universal charismatic. He may succeed in developing a relationship of charismatic authority in one context and fail in another.
3. A charismatic leader regards himself as moral and legitimate from an "abstract force such as God or history."
4. Such a leader exhibits "anti-bureaucratic" behavior. Daily affairs are not a top priority. Support staff are selected because of devotion rather than qualification.
5. "Charismatic authority is unstable, tending to be transformed through time."

The second pivotal work is a 1998 essay by Consuelo Cruz and Rut Diamint that analyzes the role of the military in Latin America after an era of military governments has ended. Cruz and Diamint also write about the challenges that newer, non-military Latin American governments face with regard to relations with their military forces. In their work, Cruz and Diamint point to a host of challenges that Latin American governments have historically encountered with regard to collaborating with and putting checks on military forces. Oversight by legislatures and defense ministries has historically been limited due to traditions of autonomy of the armed forces. Political leaders have largely been resistant to demanding greater accountability from military forces (Cruz and Diamint 1998: 120-121). In the face of a historical trajectory that points to high degrees of difficulty involved with encouraging militaries to cooperate with government objectives, it makes a leader's ability to do just that that much more significant. When a leader has military force at hand to use in support of his governmental objectives, this availability of force can prove pivotal in helping that leader attain international influence. When in this study I further explore two notable examples—Castro and Chávez—the true significance of a leader's productive relationship with his government's branch of force becomes clear. As I have stated, such a relationship serves as a critical step toward attaining international influence, which I will describe in greater detail in the following paragraphs.

Modeling International Influence

Castro, as I have begun to demonstrate, embodies a Latin American leader who has managed to exert a sizable influence over his home region and the rest of the world. Notably, Castro has managed to influence an entire generation of the United States'

foreign policy toward Latin America ever since his rise to power. Below, I describe Castro's decisive effect on the United States' Latin American foreign policy and the forms of international influence that Castro assumed.

The Monroe Doctrine, outlined by President James Monroe in 1823, essentially claimed that Latin America properly belonged within the United States' sphere of influence rather than within the sphere of European imperialism. Any incursion by foreign powers into the region would be perceived as a direct threat to American national security (Crandall 1996: 255). Gaddis Smith argues that the Monroe Doctrine retained its relevance throughout most of the Cold War and Cuba became a central part of the doctrine's application in the 1960s. "The Cuba of Fidel Castro" effectively became "an alien body no longer belonging to the American continents," Smith writes. A succession of U.S. presidents "sought, in effect, to expel Cuba from the Western Hemisphere. For those presidents, the Monroe Doctrine meant preventing another Cuba." The United States thus justified intervention throughout Latin America to prevent the spread of Castro's ideology in the interest of the United States' 'national security' (Smith 1994: 5).

Thomas C. Wright (1991) calls Castro's international influence *fidelismo*, using the term to refer to Castro's support for radical revolution throughout Latin America and the world. Wright asserts an explicit causal link between Castro's rise to power in 1959 and "a dramatic growth" in unrest and demands for political change in Latin America, which can be attributed to what Martin Needler calls a common political consciousness throughout Latin America (quoted in Lanning 1974: 369). Wright says: "In virtually every country [in Latin America, at least to start], the intensity of political activity increased after Castro's victory as new actors, new social issues, and more aggressive

challenges to the existing order came to the fore.” The international prominence following Castro’s rise to power assumed the form of widespread discussion and debate, the newly coined slogan “*Cuba sí, Yanqui no,*” (Yes to Cuba, No to the Yankees) and the emergence of the terms *fidelista* and *castrista* to describe revolutionary politics. Castro’s early international influence on politics in other nations was realized through support for revolutionary, *fidelista* movements through training for ideologically aligned guerillas and dispensing arms, propaganda, financial and, sometimes, personnel support for such movements (Wright 1991: 41-42). All in all, Wright argues, Castro’s Cuban Revolution had far-reaching effects in consolidating the left in other Latin American nations, thereby transforming the left into potent political forces (Wright 1991: 53-54).

The Cases: Determining International Influence

In the following sections, I consider each of the five leaders who are the subjects of this study in light of the seven conditions outlined in Table 1. The outcome to which the conditions lead is international influence, the item in the last row. After I describe each leader individually in terms of the model shown in Table 1, I will discuss all leaders jointly.

Table 1. Conditions Behind International Influence of Latin American Leaders²

	Castro	Chávez	Ortega	Allende	Arbenz
Threat of Alternate Economic Model	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Longevity	Yes	TBD	Yes	No	No
Economic Security	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Internal Opposition	Weak	First strong, now weak	Moderately Strong	Strong	Strong
Charismatic Authority	Yes	Yes	Limited	Limited	No
Access to Force	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Outcome: International Influence	High	High	Limited to region	Limited to ideology	None

Fidel Castro: Persistent International Influence

Despite the short-lived rhetoric promising genuine efforts at cooperation, the lines of battle between Cuba and its northern neighbor had already been drawn when Fidel Castro rose to power in Cuba in 1959, at the height of the Cold War. The bearded revolutionary (he promised Edward R. Murrow that he would clip his beard once he had achieved the ideal society) had first challenged the once-U.S.-backed, anticommunist dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1953, establishing himself as a prominent national figure in the process. Castro’s stature had undoubtedly aided him in his ultimately successful rise to power on New Years Day of 1959.

The first signs of a rift between the United States and Cuba became obvious during Castro’s first year in office. In 1959, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to meet with the revolutionary leader during his visit to the United States. Then-Vice President Richard Nixon, soon after meeting with Castro in the president’s place, called Castro a “Communist” and expressed support for his overthrow.

Castro indeed did pose the *threat of an alternate economic model* to that preferred by the United States. He was seen as ushering a socialist tide into Latin America that threatened the United States' desired economic model for the region. Castro's aggressive agrarian reform program that expropriated without compensation much of the 70 percent of Cuba's arable land that U.S. companies owned prior to Castro's rise to power sowed the seeds of an alternative economic model. Castro came to also present his threat of an alternate economic model abroad by supporting socialist revolution and leftist leaders in the Congo, Bolivia, Chile, Nicaragua, Angola, Vietnam and elsewhere (Bravo 2001).

If he survives until 2009, Fidel Castro will have remained in power for 50 years, clearly an exhibition of *longevity*. Much has been written in attempts to explain Castro's longevity. Some authors, including Jorge Domínguez and Wayne Smith, cite the United States' active enmity toward Cuba as a reason that Castro has been able to maintain his power. "The Castro regime endures in part because its enemies unwittingly help it to survive," writes Domínguez (1993: 103). Indeed, the United States' support of hard line policies against the Cuban government provides ideal fodder for supporters of the regime. Smith contends that U.S. legislation tightening economic sanctions against Cuba, such as the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, has fortified the resolve of Cubans to keep Castro in power even if they do not agree with his politics. Smith writes that such legislative initiatives play into the divide between Cuba's black majority and largely white exile population. Such lawmaking polarizes the two and "strengthens the resolve of the black majority and most other Cubans to stick with Castro" (Smith 1996: 108).

In 2002, a *USA Today* reporter asked Castro how he had managed to remain in power for over four decades. "Everyone has sympathy for anyone fighting someone

bigger,” Castro replied (Neuharth 2002). As this statement points out, Castro’s international prominence and, by extension, influence has come in large part because of his opposition to United States policies.

Castro has been aided by the presence of *economic security* in Cuba for the majority of his time in power. Sugar, often at inflated prices, provided the necessary support to Cuba’s economy for much of its colonial history. American consumption of sugar was the basis for a significant portion of Cuba’s economic function. When Cuba and the United States cut off economic relations shortly after Castro’s rise to power, Cuba’s alliance with the Soviet Union helped to sustain the island economically. In 1988, the Soviet Union was importing “63 percent of Cuba’s sugar, 73 percent of its nickel, 95 percent of its citrus products and 100 percent of its electrical exports. At the same time, Moscow sold the island 98 percent of its fuel...” according to a 2000 report prepared for the Canadian Foundation of the Americas (quoted in Chávez 2005: 2).

When the Soviet Union collapsed, little economic support for Cuba remained and the island saw its economic output drop 40 percent from 1989 to 1994 (Smith 1996: 102). As the island entered its “Special Period,” Castro’s regime was arguably in its most vulnerable state. Pundits around the world speculated that the island was in its last moments under Castro (Chávez 2005: 4).

Castro adapted, however, which Domínguez claims is a key reason for his survival (Domínguez 1993: 101). The island survived in part by becoming more economically self-sufficient. Urban gardens produced tons of organic vegetables to feed the island, for example. Castro’s adaptation to the circumstances preserved his state of power but did not completely preserve the integrity of his “socialist” regime. Small-scale

private enterprise became a centerpiece of Cuba's new economic existence. Exchange, especially that conducted in dollars, became central to Cuba's survival. In two years, remittances from abroad jumped ten-fold, from \$43 million in 1992 to \$470 million in 1994 (Chávez 2005). Smith writes that Cuba opened itself to most foreign investment and welcomed back exiles who wished to found their own businesses (Smith 1996: 101-103).

Cuba's economy sustained itself long enough in order to wait for its next economic savior. As Robert Collier points out, Venezuela under Hugo Chávez has come to replace the Soviet Union as Cuba's benefactor. "Chávez has single-handedly rescued Cuba's economy," Collier writes. Chávez has exchanged \$1.8 billion annually with Cuba in oil and other investments (Collier 2006). The economic security that Castro has managed to foster for his regime has been essential to his attainment of international influence in the sense that his country's economic security is one less worry for the leader, who can thus concentrate his efforts on applying his international leverage.

Though Castro has faced organized opposition from outside of Cuba, *internal opposition* is limited, another point that has helped Castro maintain his grip on power and attain international influence. As Domínguez writes, reform to bring about democratic dialogue in Cuba has come at a snail's pace, as Castro has internalized the lessons of his Soviet allies who liberalized too quickly and collapsed (Domínguez 1993: 99). Some minimal reforms include the elimination of discrimination against religious believers, which worked to broaden the Communist Party's appeal, and the introduction of direct elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies. Such moves are not backed with true democratic action, as opposition parties form at the risk of arrest and elections

remain uncompetitive. For a period during the 1980s, Castro's government allowed some small human rights and opposition groups to form, but the government retracted that pledge in 1991 (Domínguez 1993: 99-101).

In 1988, Paul Hollander noted that Cuba ranked among the highest in the world in the proportion of those termed political prisoners. Through an extensive propaganda operation, Castro has also silenced much independent journalism that could present a critique of his model of governance. It is also worth noting that Castro devoted significant resources to fortifying his armed forces to create among the largest contingents in Latin America (Hollander 1988: 47-48).

Indeed, due to such measures, the most vocal opposition to Castro's rule has emanated from Miami and Washington D.C. Hollander estimates that 10 percent of Cuba's population has left the country since Castro's rise to power (1988: 47). Chávez points out that Castro began to allow the "unhappy" to leave the island during the nation's "Special Period" following the collapse of the Soviet Union (2005: 7). Castro has also survived an active ouster attempt engineered by the United States and the imposition of economic restrictions by the United States that at times threatened the island-nation's existence. However, regardless of the fervency of this opposition and its financial backing—both are strong—Castro has a distinct advantage in that his harshest critics do not lie within his own borders. As with economic security, the absence of a strong internal opposition aids Castro in attaining international influence because he can focus his attention on international matters rather than negotiating with opposition politicians.

As Estela Bravo points out in *Fidel: The Untold Story*, Castro has largely established his international reputation as a result of his doctrine of exporting revolution. In multiple countries in multiple regions of the world, Castro has made use of his role as commander-in-chief of Cuba's *armed forces* and the loyalty he has earned from the armed forces to aid in revolution. Castro funded and supplemented force used in revolutionary struggle in Vietnam, where his regime offered economic assistance, doctors and teachers. In the Congo and Bolivia, Cuban armed forces, including fellow revolutionary Che Guevara, attempted to support revolutionary struggle largely through training troops. When Castro chose to support Angola's movement for independence in 1975, Castro sent 36,000 Cuban troops to the African nation and directed combat operations (Bravo 2001).

Cuba's role in Angola helped to foster Castro's international influence. In 1979, Castro was elected leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, through which he became an important player on the international stage (American Experience 2004). Directly through the use of force, Castro had propelled himself on the international stage, becoming an influential player at the U.N. and the representative voice for a bloc of over 100 countries.

Castro's *charismatic authority* has also acted to propel the leader to a global position of international influence. Essential to Castro's charisma is his overall way with words. The revolutionary's "History will absolve me" speech delivered publicly at his 1953 trial played a prominent role in fashioning Castro's image in Cuba. The leader used his special command with words in such a way as to create a personal bond with his people.

Fagen demonstrates Castro's compliance with Max Weber's five-pronged model of charismatic authority. First, polling in 1960, a year after Castro assumed power, showed that many Cubans viewed the revolutionary as a godsend. "I would kiss the beard of Fidel Castro," was one polling response. Second, Castro demonstrated his ability to create a relationship of charismatic authority with followers, who remained on the island. He failed in another instance—with detractors, most of whom fled to Miami following the revolution. Third, Castro viewed the Cuban Revolution as part of a larger historical trajectory—that of combating tyranny and oppression with Marxism-Leninism and not with capitalism (Smith 1996: 101). Fourth, Fagen's determination shows that "Castro is (or at least was) highly disdainful of and uninterested in the routine processes of public administration." In viewing the Cuban Revolution as part of a larger historical trajectory, it is reasonable to expect that Castro is more focused on a larger vision, rather than a day-to-day outlook. Fifth, Fagen finds that the reign of a ruler with charismatic authority is often marked by instability. Indeed, Castro faced much of his instability during the first several years of his rule, including President John F. Kennedy's failed Bay of Pigs invasion that attempted to overthrow Castro, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, which risked pitting Cuba in the middle of a war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

A charismatic leader lends himself to evaluation almost purely on personality without the proper weight given to issues. And over time, the character of Castro has become a fascinating one to those at home and abroad, to supporters and detractors. As Hollander claims, Castro's "image...has benefited from the eagerness of the American media to present colorful, photogenic characters" (1988). Alina Tugend (2002) describes

the assignments of some of the few American correspondents based in Cuba. Castro's health is often the issue to cover that draws them away from covering other, perhaps more substantive stories. "[T]he main job often seems to be keeping their fingers as close to Castro's pulse as possible" (Tugend 2002: 13). American media coverage has largely portrayed Castro as a character, thereby focusing little attention on Cuba's political and economic system. When it comes to Fidel Castro, character trumps the issues. And an important part of Castro's ability to attain international influence has come due to his charismatic character.

As I have demonstrated throughout this paper, Castro is perhaps the quintessential model of a Latin America leader with demonstrable international influence. All the factors mentioned in the preceding paragraphs have contributed to the Cuban leader's emergence as a player on the international stage. I have posited his threat of an alternate economic model to that preferred by the United States as a first step for a Latin American leader's emergence onto the international stage. The socialist revolutionary's longevity, economic security and absence of substantial internal opposition are important conditions that ensure Castro's stable hold on power, which allows the leader to focus on matters of importance to his international influence. In Castro's case, his use of force in international situations proved to be a decisive factor in elevating him to a position of international influence in the world. His charismatic authority over the Cuban people and over followers abroad ensures that Castro is a prominent figure and brings constant attention to be focused on the leader.

Chávez: Fitting the Castro Mold?

Hugo Chávez came to power in 1998 following two Venezuelan presidents—Carlos Andrés Pérez and Rafael Caldera—who had promised to resist the tide of neoliberalism that was sweeping through Latin America. Both leaders, however, did an about-face and implemented unpopular austerity measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund. Like his predecessors, Chávez, though not a traditional socialist like Castro, vowed to resist the American-favored order of neoliberalism that emphasized the privatization of nationalized economies throughout Latin America. Chávez, soon after coming to power, renationalized the Venezuelan oil company PDVSA and cut production in order to raise the price of oil to an economically sustainable one for Venezuela. Over the last several years, Chávez has directed this oil wealth to social programs aimed at Venezuela's poor. Chávez's complete disavowal of neoliberal measures and his early alliance with Fidel Castro aroused suspicion and opposition from the United States, who perceived the *threat of an alternate economic model*. Chávez has since also resisted U.S.-favored free trade measures, instead proposing a Latin America-wide alternative that is scarce on details. Chávez challenges the Monroe Doctrine's assumption that the United States is the preeminent power in the western hemisphere. By drawing himself as an opponent of the United States, Chávez clears the first step toward a Latin American leader's attainment of international influence.

As of this writing, Chávez has been in power for eight years. He has been reelected to the presidency twice, in 2000 and 2006, by commanding margins. He has survived one coup attempt and one recall vote. If all goes as expected, he will remain in power at least until 2012, at which point he will have clocked in at 14 years in power.

Chávez has recently begun to speak more seriously of altering the Venezuelan constitution to allow him to remain in power at least until 2021. Regardless of when he steps down, Chávez could still remain an influential figure in Venezuelan and international politics. Only time will tell whether Chávez attains *longevity*.

While his longevity may not be a sure thing, Venezuela's *economic security* is virtually assured by the vast reserves of oil the country holds—the fifth largest in the world—as long as the price in oil does not immediately drop. The presence of economic security in Venezuela assures that Chávez can afford to focus attention on matters concerning his international influence. Beyond that, Chávez has gained international influence directly from his oil wealth. In a politically shrewd move, Venezuela began offering discount heating oil to poor Americans last winter through PDVSA's American subsidiary Citgo. Oil wealth has also allowed Venezuela to buy \$3.1 billion in Argentine bonds, thus positioning Venezuela as a creditor, in place of the IMF (Economist 2006). In 2006, Chávez's aid to Latin America has exceeded that offered by the United States. Chávez has offered nearly \$5 billion in comparison to the United States' \$1.7 billion (Collier 2006).

When Chávez was first elected to the presidency in 1998 with 56 percent of the vote, he encountered a sizable and powerful *opposition* who controlled the media and commanded the support of the United States. The division between his followers and detractors fell largely upon lines of class. Support for Chávez was high among Venezuela's poor; his detractors were the elite. As noted, Chávez's opposition challenged the stability of the new leader's rule in its infancy with a failed 2002 coup and a failed 2004 recall effort. More recently, Chávez's internal opposition has largely

withdrawn from the political system set up by the 2000 constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Since his opposition within Venezuela's borders has largely faded, Chávez has one less worry, which allows him to concentrate on matters concerning his international influence.

Chávez generally complies with Fagen's adaptation of Weber's conditions of *charismatic authority*. Similar to Castro, it is largely Chávez's character that has propelled him to the international stage. First, Chávez meets Fagen's first condition in that Chávez is largely built up by his followers who admire him and "become a little crazy when [they] are up close to him" (Guevara 2005: 3). Chávez meets the second condition in that support for the leader is polarized along class lines. Although the potency of Chávez's political opposition has largely faded, his detractors have not disappeared. Every Sunday, Chávez's television program "Aló Presidente" airs. The audience the program attracts demonstrates that Chávez does not share a relationship of charismatic authority with all Venezuelans. "Millions are watching to know how to follow him, and millions are watching to try to destroy him," Zenndy Barrios, the show's executive producer, said (Lakshmanan, July 27, 2005). Third, Chávez views his rule as a part of a historical trajectory that emanates originally from the vision of a united Latin America pushed by Simón Bolívar. Chávez also sees his Bolivarian project as carrying on the work Fidel Castro originally set out to do. The fourth condition states that a charismatic leader expresses disdain for bureaucratic work. While it is impossible to declare positively that Chávez meets this condition, it does seem likely that he is more about the grand vision than the details. "Any president who can talk eight hours every Sunday [on 'Aló Presidente'] and one hour every other day on TV is a person who

doesn't work," says one detractor (Lakshmanan, July 27, 2005). As part of his effort to present an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas proposal favored by the United States, Chávez has proposed ALBA, a plan that continues to lack shape (Guevara 2005: 103). Fifth, Chávez complies with the condition of instability, having encountered both an attempted coup and a recall attempt that fell little more than two years apart.

Chávez's earlier membership in Venezuela's armed forces has helped establish the Venezuelan military as an ally to the government. Indeed, Chávez's military forces were the ones to restore the president to power when an elite coup displaced the former lieutenant colonel in April 2002 (Guevara 2005). Observers have noted that Chávez has begun to purchase \$18.6 million worth of assault rifles from Russia to update the Venezuelan military's outdated artillery. Chávez has also begun implementing plans to train up to two million Venezuelan civilians to repel a possible invasion by the region's "imperialist" power (Lakshmanan, July 17, 2005). In Chávez's case, his international influence is not derived from force, as is the case with Castro. However, the availability of force at hand allows Chávez to focus his attention elsewhere.

I have noted some examples of Chávez's international influence, including the redirection of PDVSA oil wealth to buy Argentine debt and to provide low-cost heating oil to poor Americans. Chávez is also rapidly becoming the chief source of aid to Latin American nations. In addition, Chávez has emerged as a major player in the Non-Aligned movement, seeking out allies in Cuba, China, Iran, Russia and other nations that do not count themselves among the United States' most loyal allies. Chávez's other expressions of international influence have come at hemispheric conferences (Québec City, Canada, 2001 and Mar Del Plata, Argentina, 2005) and at the United Nations where

Chávez has emerged as a vocal alternative to United States influence, calling President George W. Bush the “devil” in September 2006 (Cooper 2006) and unsuccessfully vying for a temporary regional seat on the U.N. Security Council. As a member of OPEC, Chávez has persuaded other oil-producing countries to scale back production in order to raise prices and has persuaded OPEC to affirm itself as a body that serves the interest of the under-developed world (Hellinger 2003: 46). Chávez’s international influence is likely to continue to grow. Clearly, Chávez derives his international influence at least in part from the economic means available to him, which afford him leverage on the world stage. However, Chávez’s access to force and his charismatic authority continue to be the critical factors for his international influence because they have provided the foundation for Chávez to emerge as a world player. Previous Venezuelan leaders possessed the same oil wealth but failed to attain international influence because they were not charismatic and were not closely aligned with Venezuela’s armed forces.

The security Chávez’s alliance with the armed forces affords him allows the leader to exert international influence without fear of losing power at home. His compliance with Fagen’s model of charismatic authority signifies that Chávez’s preferred focus lies in the international arena rather than in active involvement with domestic governance.

Daniel Ortega: Regional Influence Then, Even Less Influence Now

As Thomas C. Wright notes, the 1979 rise of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua represented the “first successful revolutionary insurrection” in Latin America since the Cuban Revolution (Wright 1991: 176). The Sandinista Revolution, as the insurrection came to be known, thus immediately put the United States on guard. U.S. foreign policy

toward Central America during the Reagan years was almost exclusively directed at efforts to topple Daniel Ortega, who had emerged as the leader of Nicaragua's *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (FSLN). Ortega had actively taken part in the removal of U.S.-backed dictator Anastasio Somoza. What follows is a synopsis of Ortega's compliance and non-compliance with the conditions I view as pivotal in attaining international influence. Ortega, I conclude, ultimately attains limited international influence, confined to the Central American region.

The Reagan administration's reception of Nicaragua's Sandinista Revolution was far from enthusiastic. The changing of the guard stoked fears that Nicaragua would become "a second Cuba" in Latin America because of the Sandinistas' Marxist roots, alliance with Castro and ties to the Soviet Union (Smith 1994: 200; Wright 1991: 175). Those who treated the Monroe Doctrine as a foundational element of United States foreign policy deemed the Sandinistas' rise a violation of the historic doctrine on par with the Cuban case. "The Soviet Union had violated the Monroe Doctrine and gotten away with it twice," Ronald Reagan wrote in his memoirs, "first in Cuba, then in Nicaragua" (Smith 1994: 161).

Despite the Sandinistas' Marxist roots, the United States' fear that Nicaragua would replicate Cuba's socialist system was largely unfounded from the beginning. The *threat of an alternate economic model* was thus a threat merely perceived by the United States. Indeed, Ortega's early impact on the FSLN before the movement's major success was to mitigate the Sandinistas' Marxist influence. Ortega, his younger brother Humberto Ortega and Victor Tirado López pioneered the *terceristas*, or the Third Way,

within the FSLN. This segment of the party eventually opened up FSLN membership to less-than-staunch Marxists (Wright 1991: 182-183).

The economic policies eventually pursued by Ortega's government from 1979 to 1990 and institutionalized in the 1987 constitution proved to be notably more moderate than those followed under Cuban socialism. Although the state sector's share of the economy increased from 15 percent to 45 percent in 1984, Ortega did not intend to eliminate the private sector. The Sandinista government's attempt at agrarian reform was also moderate; both peasants and landowners objected to aspects of the policy. Social service spending did increase under Ortega. His presidency saw the virtual elimination of university tuition, a jump in subsidies provided for food and health care, the institution of rent control and a "literacy crusade" (Wright 1991: 194).

Though he may not have, in reality, posed the threat of a radical economic model, Ortega's rise was an unsettling specter to the United States. From the beginning, the two sides were at odds. This opposition between Daniel Ortega and the United States signifies the Sandinista leader's compliance with the model's first condition of posing the threat of an alternative economic model to that preferred by the United States.

I point to *longevity* as the third condition in my model and Ortega satisfies the condition. Ortega initially spent 11 years at the helm in Nicaragua until he lost the 1990 election to Violeta Chamorro, a candidate backed by over \$12 million in U.S. funds (Wright 1991: 196). Though out of power, Ortega remained a potent political force in Nicaragua, heading the largest bloc of the opposition and perennially vying for the presidency—in 1996, 2001, and in 2006, when he finally secured another six-year term in office. Ortega's residual national influence became especially evident during the tenure

of Liberal President Arnaldo Alemán from 1996 to 2001. As Anderson points out, Ortega was so crucial to the advancement of certain elements of Alemán's agenda that the Conservative party became marginalized (Anderson 2006: 156).

His compliance with the first two conditions outlined aided Ortega in attaining some of his limited international influence. Nicaragua's lack of *economic security* during Ortega's rule, however, held the leader back. Indeed, the 1980s under the Sandinistas saw inflation of 1,700 percent, 25 percent unemployment and a 90 percent drop in real wage value (Moody 1990; Lakshmanan 2006). In battling the rise of a "second Cuba," the United States in May 1985 imposed economic sanctions on Nicaragua that amounted to an embargo, helping to paralyze the Central American nation's economy. Nicaragua, as a result, became more dependent on assistance from the Soviet Union. On top of an embargo, the resources needed to defend Nicaragua against the U.S.-funded Contra insurgency and the falling price of Nicaraguan exports did not bode well for Ortega in his efforts to achieve economic security for the country (Wright 1991: 194). A lack of economic security in Nicaragua helped to foment favor for the overthrow of Somoza in the late 1970s, limited Ortega in the international influence he attained in the 1980s and likely helped Ortega in his 2006 election victory after 16 years of neoliberal economics in Nicaragua had failed to advance the country's economic condition.

Opposition to Ortega from within Nicaragua has typically received a boost from the United States. That is not to say, however, that no genuine *internal opposition* to Ortega has existed in Nicaragua. Indeed, what I call a moderately strong internal opposition has been one factor at work in holding Ortega back from exerting significant international influence. The Sandinista government was one that generally accepted

political pluralism. Anderson contends that the Sandinistas' 1987 constitution institutionalized structures of horizontal accountability that created substantial political space for an opposition (Anderson 2006). Indeed, under the Sandinistas the legislative branch—which evolved from the Council of State to the National Assembly—included multiple opposition parties (21 total registered political parties in Nicaragua by the end of the 1980s) that participated in the political system the majority of the time (Wright 1991: 190-192). The mere presence of a critical press also contributed to an internal opposition (Anderson 2006). Although the Contras were backed by the United States, it is important not to overlook the effect of this form of opposition on Ortega. The Contra insurgency helped to sap enthusiasm from the Sandinista Revolution (Wright 1991: 195). As Ortega begins a new term in office, he can count on the presence of a significant internal opposition. In 2006, Ortega won only a plurality of the vote—39 percent—indicating that a substantial portion of Nicaraguan voters could count themselves among Ortega's opposition.

In considering, *charismatic authority*, I contend that, though Ortega can satisfy the conditions of Fagen's model, his charismatic authority is more limited than that of Castro and Chávez as demonstrated through imperfect compliance with Fagen's first and third conditions. The result contributes Ortega's more limited manifestation of international influence. Ortega is an imperfect fit with Fagen's first condition—that a leader with charismatic authority is the creation of his followers (Fagen 1965). As Wright (1991: 176) points out, the collective leadership structure of the FSLN in its early days precluded the emergence of a charismatic Castro-like figure. Ortega's initial charisma was thus limited in this regard. The Sandinista leader's compliance with

Fagen's third condition of deriving authority from an "abstract force such as God or history" is also limited. After all, the perception that the Sandinista Revolution does fit within a historical trajectory begun by the Cuban Revolution (Wright 1991) is more an outside perception and scholarly consensus than an impression originating from Ortega himself.

Ortega's most clear exertion of international influence came through his *use of force* as a result of his command of the Sandinista People's Army. Ortega's rise to power under the FSLN banner was based on the use of force. Thus, the use and control of Nicaragua's armed forces—the Sandinista People's Army—largely defined Ortega's tenure in office during the 1980s. With his brother, Humberto Ortega, at the helm, Nicaragua's army grew into a force of 100,000 active-duty troops and another 160,000 troops on reserve duty. By 1986, military spending subsumed half of Nicaragua's national budget.

Daniel Ortega had attained his limited international influence early on in his tenure as Nicaragua's leader when he began funneling arms to guerilla groups in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras (Smith 1994: 190). This exertion of international influence was a direct result of Ortega's command of military resources. And it was this expression of international influence, though restricted, that inspired Reagan to begin covertly training and funding the Contra insurgency. Once the Contra insurgency began, Ortega's international influence became even more constrained as Nicaragua directed resources toward self-defense. The degree of international influence which Ortega exerted—limited international influence—correlated directly with his measured level of charismatic authority as Nicaragua's Sandinista leader.

It remains to be seen what type of international influence Daniel Ortega will come to exert once he begins another presidential term in 2007. Based on news reports, I predict that Ortega will exert little to no international influence as president because of the new Ortega's questionable compliance with even the first condition of my model—posing a perceived threat of an alternate economic model to that preferred by the United States. Although Ortega retains ties to Castro and Chávez and the United States once again opposed his election, Ortega has reached out to his traditional opposition in his recent campaign. Ortega has named a former Contra as his running mate, is considering the appointment of pro-free trade members to his economic team, and has come to favor the U.S.-backed CAFTA, the Central American Free Trade Agreement (Rogers 2006). If Ortega were to exert any substantial international influence either regionally or worldwide in his new presidential term, he would pursue a different set of policies from the ones he is expected to follow. But perhaps a newly ascendant Ortega does not seek to be the Daniel Ortega of old.

Salvador Allende: Little Time, but a Measure of International Influence

Chile's Salvador Allende, when elected in 1970, promised the world's first peaceful path to socialism under the banner of the *Unidad Popular* (UP) coalition. Allende ascended to power through elections and, as Nathaniel Davis (1985: 51) notes, he did not seek to fundamentally alter the foundation of Chile's system of political pluralism (though he did call for some structural reforms). He called his path to socialism the "Chilean Way," which ended abruptly when a CIA-backed coup deposed Allende three years after he had assumed the office of the presidency. In fewer than three years in office, Allende did make significant headway in transitioning Chile to a socialist

economy. The avowed Marxist also managed to achieve a limited measure of international influence. In the following paragraphs, I will weigh Allende against my model of international influence and argue that the conditions of *charismatic authority* and *access to force* are the decisive factors that determine Allende's ability to reach an outcome of limited international influence.

Allende easily satisfies my model's first condition in that he posed the *threat of an alternate economic model* to that preferred by the United States. The Chilean leader was an open adherent to Marxist doctrine, a critic of capitalism and consequently established diplomatic relations with the communist governments of China and Cuba and commercial relations with North Korea and North Vietnam as president (Smith 1994: 132, 135; Fortin 1975: 221). The election of a socialist in Chile 11 years after the Cuban Revolution was unsettling to the United States, which had funneled funds to support Allende's opponents in the presidential elections of 1958, 1964, and 1970. When Allende captured the presidency, U.S. President Richard Nixon called for a change in tactics to prevent the spread of communism. The new tactical agenda involved efforts aimed at the active overthrow of sitting governments, to which the U.S. subjected Allende. After all, not only did Allende embody the threat of an alternative economic model in Chile, but the United States perceived a communist threat to all of Latin America with Allende's rise. An Italian businessman's synopsis of the situation for Nixon embodied the U.S. government's mentality toward the situation. "If Allende should win, and with Castro in Cuba, you will have in Latin America a red sandwich. And eventually it will all be red" (Smith 1994: 133).

Factors both international and internal refused to work in Allende's favor and resulted in a shortened term in office for the socialist leader. Though he did not attain *longevity*, I contend that this did not preclude him from attaining restricted international influence. An internal factor that acted to cut short Allende's tenure in office was Chile's lack of *economic security* under Allende's rule. The early days of the Allende administration saw a "mini-boom" due to some of the president's early economic initiatives. These included the provision of additional social services (such as free milk for school children and nursing mothers), the institution of rent control, wage adjustments that added 25 percent to the real value of wages, and increased social security and pension payments. As a result of more "money in their pockets," Wright (1991: 143) describes a "year-long consumption spree [among workers] that touched off a minor boom in industry and services and raised the level of employment."

The economic euphoria was not to last, however. By May 1973, Chile's economy was "near collapse" (Wright 1991: 151). The consumption spree of Allende's early days was unable to sustain itself. Shortages abounded in light of an insufficient productive capacity that failed to meet the demand of a population with expanded buying power. Other complications to Chile's economic project included the consumption of a large portion of the country's foreign currency reserves that Allende had dipped into to compensate the owners of companies he chose to nationalize. Allende was still unable to fully compensate those whose property he expropriated. The result was a credit boycott by the United States. At home, businesses opposed to Allende's program of nationalization undertook efforts to undermine economic growth by hoarding what they produced and selling it on the black market. By September 1973, inflation in Chile had

reached 300 percent, essential goods were in short supply, deficits were mounting and little new investment was on the way (Power 2002: 29-30; Wright 1991: 145-146, 151). The lack of economic security worked to destabilize Allende's rule, but did not completely prevent him from attaining any international influence.

Internal opposition to Allende further complicated Chile's stabilization under his presidency. Even considering the \$8 million total the United States spent in efforts to destabilize Allende's presidency, I call internal opposition to Allende strong because of the opposition's breadth and the high level of its activity. "He...would have been in deep trouble even if the United States had remained passive," writes Gaddis Smith (1994: 136). As I have noted, business leaders were largely opposed to Allende's program of nationalizing industries. Power notes that both poor and rich, men and women, counted themselves among the ranks of those opposed to Allende (Power 2002: 1-3). Wright notes that the tactics of agitation the opposition eventually settled on largely echoed those of the left wing. Borrowing from the playbook of labor, truckers, with the support of truck owners, staged *gremios*, or strikes, in 1972 to protest Allende's nationalization of the trucking industry. The *gremios* followed earlier manifestations of opposition, such as housewives' "Marches of Empty Pots and Pans" in December 1971, student demonstrations and general street "agitation." The right's use of tactics of the left, especially strikes, came to be called "the mass line of the bourgeoisie" (Wright 1991: 150).

Opposition to Allende penetrated the upper levels of government, causing what Wright calls a high level of polarization in the Chilean government. Outside of the executive branch, Allende encountered the opposition's dominance in Congress, the

judiciary and the leadership of the armed forces (Wright 1991: 146). Though internal opposition did not completely prevent Allende from exerting any international influence, it is likely that Allende would likely have been more effectively able to concentrate on international matters in the absence of a strong opposition.

Since the armed forces counted themselves among the ranks of the opposition, Allende had no *access to force* that he could have employed to defend his rule, much less exert international influence, as Castro did. Indeed, it was Chile's armed forces that the CIA most actively supported in executing the coup that deposed Allende. Officially, Chile's military was not intended to be a political force, however, the political leanings of its leaders quickly became evident. In an effort to stabilize his loosening grip on power, Allende made overtures to military leaders following the *gremio* movement, appointing three military officers to his cabinet. Their appointment did not have the effect of stabilizing the government, as had been the intention. Notes Wright (1991: 150):

“Many officers disliked the...identification of the armed forces with UP policies, and as the government's problems continued to mount, they came...to reject participation, preferring to let the government sink on its own until public opinion would welcome a coup.”

The clear lack of support from the armed forces, I argue, greatly limited Allende's ability to attain international influence. Command of the military and access to the use of force, as I have demonstrated, proved to be the critical factor in propelling Castro, Chávez and Ortega onto the international stage.

For the limited degree of international influence he did attain, Allende had to rely on the limited *charismatic authority* he had established with his followers in Chile. When weighed against Fagen's model of charismatic authority, Allende complies with most factors, though not to the same degree of compliance as Castro and Chávez. Allende's *international influence* came chiefly as a result of his compliance with Fagen's

first condition, that a leader with charismatic authority is “always the creation of his followers.” Indeed, Davis notes that Allende took on an “international role,” in that he was “hailed as the first Marxist anywhere on the globe to be so selected through democratic balloting.” Davis contends that Allende’s international role was more “symbolic” for the potential implications of his presidency on world socialism than practical in terms of exerting substantial diplomatic weight (Davis 1985: ix-x). It is for this reason that I label Allende’s international influence limited. Its reach was confined to those in favor of revolutionary government. Allende’s diplomatic weight was limited to his assumption of diplomatic relations with China and Cuba and economic relations with North Vietnam and North Korea, a move likely intended to express support for other revolutionary governments (Fortin 1975: 221). Although Allende aligned Chile with other powers opposed to U.S. dominance, Chile never became a formidable international player in those circles (Fortin 1975: 224).

Arbenz: Effective Governance, Strong Resistance at Home and Abroad

Aside from Castro, each of the three leaders so far examined in this study rose to power after the Cuban Revolution, which, as I stated, sparked a major reevaluation of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America and influenced the rise of other Latin American leaders. I thus include Guatemala’s Jacobo Arbenz, who rose to power eight years before Castro, to demonstrate the model’s relevance to the pre-Castro era. As with the other leaders examined in this study, I will argue that the same two conditions—access to or use of force and the presence of charismatic authority—are key in explaining Arbenz’s lack of international influence.

Elected in 1950, installed as president in 1951 and deposed in 1954 following a CIA-backed insurrection, Arbenz can count a long list of accomplishments to his name for merely three years in office. His lengthy agenda called for major infrastructural improvements to spur economic growth and an ambitious agrarian reform program that the president treated as his “pet project” (Gleijeses 1989: 456). By the time Arbenz left office in June 1954, this agrarian reform program had expropriated 1.4 million unused, productive acres of Guatemala’s countryside to approximately 100,000 rural families. To add to the immensity of this achievement, thanks in part to the \$9 million in credits the government granted to the new, small landowners, Guatemala’s agricultural production actually increased during the program’s first years, contrary to the fate of other attempts at agrarian reform (Gleijeses 1989: 466-467).

Arbenz’s dogged focus on implementing his political agenda had two effects that I consider critical in explaining his failure to achieve international influence. First, the president’s attention to detail and active involvement in the processes of governance precluded Arbenz from cultivating a relationship of charismatic authority with the Guatemalan people. As I have shown in this study, Latin American leaders who have attained international influence tend to be charismatic. Second, Arbenz’s focused, if not stubborn, approach to governance inspired detractors within Guatemala, the armed forces among them. His opponents’ ability to cut short Arbenz’s term in office depended in part upon their access to the resource of military forces. I will explore these themes in greater detail in the following paragraphs as I juxtapose Arbenz with my model of an internationally influential Latin American leader.

Without question, Arbenz satisfies my model's first condition of posing the threat, perceived or real, of an *alternate economic model* to that favored by the United States. The democratically elected president did not hold the same respect for the United States' economic dominance in the region as had Dictator Jorge Ubico, who held power in Guatemala until 1944. Arbenz's ambitious agrarian reform program threatened some of the vast land holdings of the United Fruit Company. As Smith portrays it, a threat to the United Fruit Company was a threat to overall U.S. economic interests in the region. For this reason, the U.S. State Department acted as a vocal advocate on behalf of the United Fruit Company when the prospect of expropriation first entered the picture and later when the Guatemalan government and the United Fruit Company debated the value of the company's expropriated property (Smith 1994: 73-74; Gleijeses 1989: 464). Another cause of concern to the United States was Arbenz's reliance on a small group of advisors from the Guatemalan communist party who played a preeminent role in drafting the administration's agrarian reform legislation (Gleijeses 1989: 456). At this pivotal period in the Cold War, the United States tolerated no sign of "communism," especially not within its own sphere of influence.

As stated, Arbenz was out of power merely three years after he assumed the presidency, his tenure cut short with the help of a CIA-funded offensive. It can safely be said that Arbenz did not achieve *longevity* as president of Guatemala. Indeed, Arbenz did manage to have a major impact on Guatemala in his three years as president. With additional time in office, however, Guatemala would likely have realized the full extent and intent of Arbenz's policies, which generally proved to be popular.

Arbenz's popularity can be owed in large part to his administration's shrewd implementation of his legislative agenda, which helped to ensure overall *economic security* for Guatemala during the president's time in office. Although Guatemala could not count on the constant economic boon that Venezuela could with its oil, Arbenz and his administration managed to rely on the gains from agricultural production to further their agenda. When the Arbenz administration first started planning to carry out its agrarian reform agenda, economic security was far from certain. First, Guatemala was forced to act without the help of foreign capital. The United States, then the only available creditor in the Americas, would not offer aid due to the perception of Arbenz's communist leanings. Second, Arbenz's administration had to wager that international coffee prices would remain high, ensuring the vitality of a major Guatemalan export. Guatemala was fortunate in that the absence of violence in the countryside helped to boost agricultural production during the first years of Arbenz's agrarian reform program, a time when production has usually fallen in other countries implementing agrarian reform (Gleijeses 1989: 453-454, 468). The added revenue to the government from the increased economic activity ensured that Arbenz's administration could grant \$9 million in total credits, or \$225 each, to new recipients of land at a time when annual per capita income in the countryside was \$89 (Gleijeses 1989: 466).

Although Guatemalans generally enjoyed economic security during Arbenz's tenure, three years of economic health did not change the nation's overall economic reality. Inequality persisted in Guatemala and, as Forster points out, grave inequality easily led to class tensions. After all, the agrarian reform law, Forster writes, threatened a "new social order" (Forster 2001: 2, 5). The landowning class, largely rural, white

ladinos, thus came to form the foundation of *internal opposition* to Arbenz's rule.

Internal opponents also included "partisans from the identical professional and middle sectors," the Catholic Church, and military forces. The armed counterrevolutionary forces came to be known as *liberacionistas*. Due to the active United States support of opposition efforts, it could be assumed that internal opposition was inconsequential in the face of covert CIA-backed actions against Arbenz. However, Forster contends that the U.S. simply enabled the last, "fatal blow" against the president and that "[t]he destruction of the October Revolution was ten years in the making, a process that weakened the state's legitimacy long before the United States helped build the opposition" (Forster 2001: 197). The persistence of internal opposition in Guatemala can be added to the factors that prevented Arbenz from emerging on the international stage.

As I have stated, Arbenz's approach to governance was dogged and focused, if not stubborn. It did not embody the governing approach of a leader with *charismatic authority* who often shuns the processes of governance in order to rise to the international stage. Arbenz's failure to establish charismatic authority among his followers signifies simply that Arbenz focused almost strictly on domestic matters, thus precluding him from emerging as a major player in international affairs. Here I point to two elements of Fagen's model of charismatic authority with which Arbenz fails to comply.

First, Arbenz's tenure did not demonstrate that the president viewed his rule as moral and legitimate from an "abstract force such as God or history." Gleijeses notes that the middle-class Arbenz was likely motivated by a desire for social justice, not by a desire to continue a historical trajectory or to fulfill a mandate that he specifically serve as leader. Indeed, Arbenz chose to step down under intense pressure in June 1954.

Gleijeses writes that Arbenz made this decision to save as many aspects of the October Revolution as possible (quoted in Handy 1993: 563). Unlike leaders with charismatic authority, Arbenz was more invested in his legislative agenda than in his power.

Second, Arbenz does not comply with Fagen's condition that a leader with charismatic authority exhibits "anti-bureaucratic" behavior. Arbenz was highly involved in shaping the details of his legislative agenda, albeit with the help of his closest advisors. In a symbol of his commitment, Arbenz did not treat bureaucratic appointments as rewards to party members. "Arbenz wisely concentrated his small pool of efficient bureaucrats in the most critical programmes," Gleijeses writes (1989: 456, 458, 478).

The armed forces revoked their support for Arbenz once suspicions of his association with the communist party and the Soviet Union arose. The armed forces became a part of Arbenz's internal opposition and Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas largely took charge of staging the coup with CIA backing (Smith 1994: 82). Arbenz was thus without *access to force* that he could have employed in order to defend his rule, much less any internationally-focused actions he may have otherwise chosen to pursue. Without access to force and without the international focus he would have taken up with charismatic authority, Arbenz exercised no international influence during his time in office. Had he remained in office longer, I argue that Arbenz still would have exerted little to no international influence because of his close involvement with the internal processes of governance in Guatemala and an ambitious legislative agenda, resulting in a lack of charismatic authority. His continuing lack of access to the use of force would have complicated Arbenz's rise to the international stage.

Charismatic Authority, Access to Force: Requirements for International Influence

Throughout this paper, I have repeatedly argued that if an anti-U.S. Latin American leader has charismatic authority and access to military force, he will become an internationally influential leader. Using the five historical cases I have, I argue for the importance of charismatic authority because such leaders are more likely to concentrate on cultivating their international influence even to the detriment of their domestic work. I also argue for the equal importance of access to military force because in multiple cases force has proven essential to backing up and extending a leader's international influence. One also cannot overlook the fact that a strong military not aligned with a leader can destabilize that leader's rule, precluding him altogether from attaining international influence.

In reading this study, one can argue that factors built into my model other than charismatic authority and access to force prove to be just as convincing in explaining leaders' international influence. For example, a cursory examination of the case studies could support the impression that longevity is the critical factor in explaining international influence. After all, Castro, the quintessential manifestation of international influence, has remained in power many years and attained a high degree of international influence. Ortega has also achieved longevity and attained some international influence. However, leaders' longevity does not correlate to international influence in the cases examined. Allende did not remain in power a long time, yet he still was able to attain a degree of international influence, whereas Arbenz's tenure was also cut short and the Guatemalan leader was not poised to exert any international influence. Chávez's

longevity has not yet been determined, but it can be safely said that he has attained a high degree of international influence in a short period.

Economic security, one could say, is also a factor just as critical to explaining international influence. Certainly, Chávez has employed his economic security through oil reserves to attain international influence. However, Chávez, as I have shown, would have no focus on international affairs without charismatic authority and he would have no means of fortifying his international influence without access to force. Castro's Cuba has been economically secure for most of his nearly 50 years in power but economic security has not been the outlet through which Castro has attained international influence. When Ortega, Allende and Arbenz are added to the mix, it throws off any correlation between economic security and international influence. While Ortega and Allende have not seen economic security during their time in office, they have attained limited international influence. Arbenz achieved economic security but attained no international influence.

The presence or absence of internal opposition would also appear to be a critical factor in explaining international influence. While it does have some bearing, the factor cannot be universally applied to explain international influence. Castro and Chávez have faced little internal opposition while attaining a high measure of international influence. Allende and Ortega have encountered varying degrees of internal opposition while both attaining limited international influence.

Charismatic authority has correlated well with the outcome of international influence. Those leaders with definitive charismatic authority—Castro and Chávez—have attained a high degree of international influence. Those with limited charismatic

authority—Ortega and Allende—have attained limited international influence. Arbenz ruled without charismatic authority and attained no international influence as a result.

Leaders' access to military force generally correlates with the degree of international influence attained when considered with the condition of charismatic authority. The armed forces in Cuba and Venezuela, for example, are closely aligned with Castro and Chávez, respectively. Coupled with their high degrees of charismatic authority, their access to force has assured them international influence. Daniel Ortega, a leader of limited charismatic authority, had access to force through the Sandinista People's Army during the 1980s. His access to force thus assured him the limited international influence his level of charismatic authority afforded him. Allende did attain limited international influence, but of a sort different from Ortega's. As I have stated, Ortega more actively influenced regional politics by funneling arms to guerilla groups in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Allende's international influence was more an influence of ideas that did not require reinforcement by force. Arbenz was assured no international influence because he was not focused on attaining any and, through a lack of access to military force, had few means available to attain it.

Conclusion: New Generation, Same Critical Conditions

A new generation of Latin American leaders is taking hold. The high points of Castro, Allende and Arbenz have passed and much scholarship has been based on their experiences governing their respective nations. Chávez, Ortega of 2006 and others represent a new generation of Latin American leader, who scholars are only beginning to assess. Though I have examined leaders from separate generations in this study, I have found that the same factors and methodologies apply when explaining their time as

president. I attribute this ability to the consistent presence of the United States in Latin American affairs. It was through the Cold War that the United States intervened in the early years of the mid-twentieth centuries. Today, the implementation of U.S.-imposed neoliberal economics affords Latin American leaders the same opportunity of resistance as the Cold War did to past leaders. As this new generation of leaders in Latin America takes command, it can be assured that contestation of the dominant power will act as the threshold for attaining influence. Those with force and charisma will prevail.

Notes

1. I have chosen to bind my study by considering anti-U.S. leaders for the simple reason that those who fall into this camp have become some of the most internationally influential leaders from Latin America. Certainly, the twentieth century saw a variety of Latin American leaders who allied with the United States and gained international *prominence*. Their alliances with the United States, however, kept them from charting their own course on the international stage, thus preventing such leaders from attaining veritable international *influence*.
2. I have deliberately chosen to frame some variables in this study dichotomously and others with more than two degrees in accordance with my argument and the way in which it considers some variables and not others.

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