

Nationalism as an Impediment to Democratic Reform:

A Comparative Analysis of Iranian and Russian Nationalism

GRANT STEGNER AND CORY TURNER

Edited By: Arin Khodaverdian and Paul Loughman

This paper observes the ways in which forms of nationalism change over time, as well the ways in which these changes affect a particular country's political institutions. Specifically, this study observes the nationalisms of Iran and Russia, their historical roots, and the impediments that they present to democratization. In both cases, nationalism is rooted in a conservative ideology that, for varying reasons, rejects democratization. Iran's institutional impediments are grounded in its Islamic tradition, which designate political primacy to the conservative clerics through the constitution. Russian nationalism, on the other hand, may present greater impediments to democratization because of its politically passive and disjointed citizenry. While the Iranian government currently faces opposition from an active and progressive Iranian culture, the Russian citizenry is less united in challenging their ideologically conservative government.

In crucial respects, comparison reveals most nationalisms as complex balancing acts, attempting to reconcile diverse impulses. The differences among them are less a matter of stark contrasts than of their precise blend of components. Nationalism, in this sense, though subject to change, mirrors a society's past, summing up distinctive features of that society's position in world history both recent and remote."

— Peter N. Stearns

Although the term *nationalism* generally refers to a common trend of "advocacy of and popular support for" the interests of a particular nation, this term carries different meanings for different countries; meanings which, as Peter Stearns observes, wholly depend on the "precise blend of components" and the "distinctive features" particular to each country's "position in world history both recent and remote."¹ Nationalism, as a uniting definition of national culture, largely depends on characteristics unique to a particular country and therefore varies from study to study, and from perspective to perspective. Observation of these differences is important, for it illustrates nationalism's varying affects on particular issues within modern-day society. This paper will focus on nationalism as an impediment to the implementation of democratic reform, specifically with

regards to Iran and Russia. In order to observe the similarities and differences between each country's form of nationalism, it is important to first establish a theoretical framework that facilitates a comparative analysis of Iranian and Russian nationalisms.

After observing the similarities and differences between these nationalisms, it becomes possible to discuss the relationship between forms of nationalism and democratic reform. Because Iranian and Russian nationalisms are similar in a number of different respects, this paper draws particular conclusions regarding nationalism's relationship with democratic reform: 1) nationalisms rooted in "dominance proclivities" (i.e. aversions toward external influences) are often reluctant to adopt Western ideals regarding democratization; 2) nationalisms that marginalize citizens' interests or discourage political plurality hinder mobilization among democratic reformers; 3) nationalisms rooted in conservative ideologies, or those reluctant to change, are similarly reluctant to democratize. By observing nationalism's affect on democratic reform in Iran and Russia, this paper will remain sensitive to, as Stearns puts it, "the precise blend of components" in each country's nationalism, as well as their varying modern-day implications.²

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF NATIONALISM

In the following excerpt, scholar Peter N. Stearns demonstrates that "diverse impulses" within different forms of nationalism require a "systematic comparison" grounded in a definite and theoretical framework:

The missing analytical component that is needed to help sort out the qualities of particular nationalisms, rather than assuming a vaguely common cluster of features or simply reciting the particular events in the emergence of one national movement, is an explicitly comparative effort, in which key aspects of nationalism can be actively assessed.³

Therefore, this framework provides the necessary "analytical component" for comparing different forms of nationalism. After demonstrating the origins of nationalism and its formation as a modern political concept, we can observe prominent dichotomies within different forms of nationalism.

Nationalism in General Terms

The concept of nationalism originated during the Enlightenment in "response to an intellectual and political crisis that accompanied the desacralization of the monarchy and the rise of individualism."⁴ In embracing the concept of individualism, the Enlightenment provided a "powerful ideal for those who challenged monarchical authority, but it also threatened to destroy the foundations of social solidarity."⁵ With "declining allegiance to sacred authority," it became necessary for the nation to find a means of achieving societal order while maintaining the "autonomy of the individual."⁶ In response to this crisis, Jean-

Jacques Rousseau created the concept of nationalism, a theory that encouraged "direct participation by everyone in their own government."⁷ As an ideal, Rousseau's conception of nationalism seemed plausible, however, because nationalism "works with abstractions," implementation of this concept within actual governments has proven challenging.⁸ Rousseau himself realized that it was necessary to establish a civic religion as a means of shaping the citizens into a national community.⁹ In this sense, nationalism began to imply "persuasion, integration, and coercion," rather than individualism and solidarity.¹⁰

Because nationalism depends "on a unified government as a national expression" it should be viewed as an "explicit definition of the qualities of a national culture."¹¹ This common perception of culture within a nation creates a "special consciousness" among citizens, which consequently fosters a convergence of citizens' loyalty to their country.¹² Usually, this cultural unification emanates from either feelings of dissatisfaction regarding issues of social influence, or from citizen anxiety over their nation's inferiority vis-à-vis other nations.¹³ It follows that nationalists, in general, attract followers from groups that are losing or seeking to gain social status.¹⁴ Therefore, nationalism does not express or reflect a natural, primordial reality, but is instead an unremitting process of social construction, a process of defining friend and enemy.¹⁵

As a political movement, nationalism "holds the nation and sovereign nation-state to be crucial indwelling values, and manages to mobilize the political will of the people."¹⁶ An emergence of nationalism consequently spurs the creation of new "political units" which are unusual to a country's particular history.¹⁷ This desire for change is largely shaped by a nation's culture and the methods it implements to communicate that culture: "Reading the stories of their nations in schools, literature and newspapers, individuals came to identify with public communities that were vastly larger than the local worlds in which they lived their daily lives."¹⁸ As a "highly normative ideology" among citizens, nationalism can have "powerful legitimating effects that can determine the fate of states and their ruling elites."¹⁹ Therefore, nationalism forces ruling elites to "articulate or defend" evolving popular interests.²⁰

However, despite the compelling need to change existing political and social constructs, nationalism must also support certain traditions rooted in a country's past.²¹ Through embracing its national history, nationalism can appeal to both those who seek change, as well as those who oppose it.²² However, these "traditions may, of course, be in part invented" by nationalists as a means of uniting otherwise opposing groups.²³ As Peter Stearns observes, "nationalism inherently poses a set of questions: what reforms will be seen as essential for national strength and progress, what traditions will be highlighted or concocted, and how will the overall amalgam be presented?"²⁴ Such questions regarding the difficult balance between change and preservation allude to the varying ways in which different nationalisms can be constructed. Traditions within different countries may be rooted in areas such as religion or political ideology. Yet,

because the "origins of most nations are shrouded in obscurity or symbolized by semi-mythical figures," nationalists are able to utilize obscurity (i.e. religious fanaticism and historical figures) within their nation's past as a means of portraying their country "as an object of reverence."²⁵

Dichotomies of Nationalism

Because the dynamic process of identity formation within a nation largely depends on particular dichotomies that differ from other places or people, the meanings of nationalism in different countries typically vary.²⁶ Observing the dichotomies between different forms of nationalism at the theoretical level allows for the creation of a framework of analysis; a comparative tool that dissects the characteristics of nationalism.

For instance, some forms of nationalism have more "cultural referents than others and move less quickly to demand political expression in a single, nation state."²⁷ Likewise, nationalisms can vary along the spectrum of "liberal versus dominance proclivities."²⁸ Liberal nationalists typically insist on national particularities and generally seek freedom for all nationalities, not merely their own.²⁹ On the other end of the spectrum, many dominant nationalists hold the common belief that their own nation is not only distinctive, but also superior.³⁰ Similarly, depending on how nationalist leaders choose to define a coherent culture, there is a "diversity of nationalist impulses toward the treatment of internal minorities."³¹ Inclusive forms of nationalism typically seek to embrace internal minorities by including them in the national arena, either through an outgrowth of liberal generosity or by building a seamless, largely populated nation.³² Discriminatory forms of nationalism, on the other hand, "insist on the otherness of certain internal minorities, using this target to weld the national majority even more tightly together."³³ Yet, this aversion towards *otherness* can be expressed as either internal (i.e. ethnic minorities) or external (i.e. anti-imperialism).³⁴ Furthermore, the dichotomy of internal vs. external aversions is an effective analytic tool because it can often determine the extent of a nation's liberalness. Likewise, Ghia Nodia asserts that the mistreatment of ethnic minorities—an internal aversion—is the main reason that nationalism is often said to be "inherently illiberal."³⁵ Nodia further contends that nationalists with external aversions typically blame current or past imperial powers for imposing their unwelcome will.³⁶

These differences often form a "persistent criterion for comparing nationalism and also for charting shifts" in political clout.³⁷ Historically speaking, nationalism is most often a creation of the *left* as a challenge to the existing conservative order. While this bond between personal and national freedom long confirmed nationalism's ties to the left, the twentieth century illustrated the first explicit conversion of conservatives to a nationalist cause.³⁸ Because nationalism attracts groups of people whose self-interest inclines them to protest the established order, nationalism is attractive to those politicians who desire to maintain existing political institutions.³⁹

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF NATIONALISM

This section utilizes the theoretical framework established above to observe Iranian and Russian nationalisms. Upon separately characterizing each country's form of nationalism, this section will comparatively discuss their similarities and differences.

The Historical Context of Nationalism in Iran

The following section focuses on Iranian nationalism in a historical context, specifically with regards to the literal and ideological transitions between Pahlavi rule (1921–1979) and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's rule (1979–1989); a regime shift commonly referred to as the Islamic Revolution of 1979.⁴⁰ Through historical analysis of Iranian nationalism, this section will assert that the shift in nationalistic ideology, resulting from the overthrow of the Shah, produced a distinctive nationalism rooted in a revolutionary Muslim culture vehemently opposed to Western cultural imperialism.⁴¹ Additionally, this section will contend—using the previously defined theoretical framework—that Iranian nationalism under Khomeini rule was characterized by “dominance proclivities,” aversion towards internal otherness (i.e. women), aversion towards external otherness (i.e. Western imperialism or Westernization), and finally inclinations toward conservatism. However, it is necessary to first illustrate the emergence of cultural nationalism following the Islamic Revolution in order to later analyze the development of political nationalism under the Khomeini regime.

While nationalism can generally be viewed as an “explicit definition of the qualities of a national culture,” Nahid Yeganeh asserts that the Islamic Revolution was founded in a cultural nationalism linked with the “adoption of Islamic ideology by the revolutionary leadership.”⁴² In other words, the Islamic Revolution emphasized cultural independence by establishing an indigenous and authentic Islamic model. Khomeini's attempts to establish a cultural nationalism were aided by his denouncement of cultural imperialism, which symbolically implemented a unique Iranian culture and nationality. Here, Khomeini's pursuit of a distinctively Islamic culture and nation, compounded with his belief that Islamic nationalism was superior to Western culture, illustrates his role as a “dominant” nationalist. Similarly, in terms of Iran's nationalistic ideology, the shift from Pahlavi rule to Khomeini rule can be illustrated by the development of a “special consciousness” among underrepresented citizens, which emanated from their dissatisfaction regarding their lack of social influence. Towards the end of Pahlavi rule, the government was coercively stifling the views of independent newspapers, creating widespread resentment among professional associations, the intelligentsia, and the clergy. Consequently, the Pahlavi regime's repression of individual's rights and restriction of the collective Iranian voice left much of civil society intellectually and culturally suffocated.⁴³

Widespread dissatisfaction with the political units of the Pahlavi regime allowed Khomeini and his revolutionary supporters to pursue a new, independent culture that included many underrepresented groups. Peter Stearns acknowledges this process by asserting that “*cultural* definitions had to precede claims of *political* definition” [emphasis added].⁴⁴ Similarly, Nahid Yeganeh contends that the Islamic Republic, to an extent, gave women a false sense of opportunity, belonging, and self-worth as evidenced by women's lack of participation in political spheres, their subservient role in the family, and their lack of individual rights.⁴⁵ Khomeini's aversion towards women's social, cultural, and political rights may have emanated from his aversion towards internal otherness. In an Iranian-state thoroughly dominated by men, women are treated as a political minority, and viewed as both psychologically and culturally inferior.

Moving back to the development of cultural nationalism in post-revolutionary Iran, it is necessary to follow the emergence and progression of Islam as the foundation of Iranian culture. Peter Stearns contends that despite the “pressing need to change” previous political and social constructs (i.e. those of the Pahlavi era), nationalism must also “support certain traditions” rooted in a country's past.⁴⁶ Furthermore, Stearns argues that “Arab nationalists always faced the issue of Islam as a source of tradition; few sought to oppose this clearly distinctive badge of culture and history.”⁴⁷ Yet, Nahid Yeganeh would perhaps argue that Khomeini's regime was “far from returning to traditional Islam.”⁴⁸ However, it is important to note that “traditions may, of course, be in part invented,” through nationalism's process of defining culture.⁴⁹

Khomeini's cultural nationalism evolved into an alliance between Islam and nationalism, which led to the establishment of the Islamic Republic.⁵⁰ The rise of the Islamic movement was largely due to the “fragile foundation of secularism” and the precarious secular-democratic institutions that characterized the Pahlavi regime.⁵¹ Because Khomeini's Islamic fundamentalism—Shi'i populism—was rooted in a conservative ideology, the rise of Islamic nationalism can be viewed as a “conversion of conservatives to the nationalist cause.”⁵² This conservative ideology can be defined as “religious dogmatism, intellectual inflexibility and purity, political traditionalism, social conservatism, rejection of the modern world, and the literal interpretation of scriptural texts.”⁵³ Similarly, Khomeini's “rejection of modernization and his articulation of resentments against the United States emanated from his aversion towards the external otherness of modern Western cultures and political structures. Additionally, promoting a connection between nationalism and Islam was viable under the Khomeini administration for two primary reasons. First, the citizens of the 1960s and 1970s largely detested the Shah, and second, Shiism—the most popular form of Islam in Iran—was the only cultural aspect that survived the political terror of the Pahlavi state.⁵⁴ Ali Mirsepassi-Ashtiani describes the ideological shift from the Pahlavi regime to the Khomeini regime as a “shift in the Iranian intellectual paradigm from secular modernist to Islamic romanticist.”⁵⁵ Furthermore, Ashtiani argues that

Islamic nationalism was viable because, "in an age of republicanism, radicalism, and nationalism, the Pahlavis appeared in the eyes of the intelligentsia to favor monarchism, conservatism, and Western imperialism."⁵⁶ However, a counter-argument to the notion that the Pahlavi regime was more conservative than Khomeini's regime could assert that Khomeini's Islamic nationalism was—though perhaps not overtly—grounded in a static, fundamentalist, and conservative interpretation of Islam. Thus, aspects of the Iranian state became interdependent. Because Islamic nationalism under Khomeini permeated the cultural, social, and political spheres in Iran, religion could not be separated from other aspects of Islamic life.⁵⁷ Ashtiani's assertion that "there was an attempt to support Islam as a total way of life" can be supported by Islamic principles presented in both the Revolutionary Constitution, and in the modern-day social hierarchy of Iran as constructed through interpretations of the Koran.

Subsequently, the emergence of cultural and Islamic nationalism in Iran fostered a creation of new "political units" that were unusual to the country's history:

The development of Islamic nationalism in the 1970s as a revolutionary discourse facilitated the emergence of the Islamic Republic. After the consolidation of the Islamic Republic into an Islamic theocracy, nationalism as a mobilizing force was politically marginalized. The state achieved this marginalization by representing nationalism as synonymous with anti-imperialism on the one hand, and replacing nationalism with Islam as the main mass mobilization force, on the other.⁵⁸

Above, Yeganeh argues that Khomeini's Islamic nationalism, entrenched in anti-imperial ideology, produced a marginalized political unit in Iran.⁵⁹ Similarly, certain political groups were politically marginalized as political power shifted to the hands of unelected clerics. Khomeini legitimized Iranian nationalism as an Islamic theocracy by injecting a radically new meaning into the old Shi'i term *velayat-e faqih*, or "jurist's guardianship."⁶⁰ Khomeini asserted that jurist's guardianship gave the senior clergy an "all-encompassing authority over the whole community...he insisted that only the senior clerics had the sole competence to understand the *shari'a* [the body of Islamic law]...He further insisted that the clergy were the people's true representatives, since they lived among them, listened to their problems, and shared their everyday joys and pains."⁶¹ Khomeini's redefinition of jurist's guardianship combined with the Revolutionary Constitution granted profound political power to the clerics and further fostered an Islamic nationalism that would later hinder reformist efforts. For example, this political marginalization became apparent during Mohammad Khatami's presidency as "the state rested on two unequal pillars: one clerical, the other republican."⁶² Much of this political marginalization resulted from the Revolutionary Constitution of 1979, which granted political primacy to the unelected Supreme Leader, Guardian Council, and Expediency Council. In other words, President Khatami's political power was extremely marginalized, leaving him unable to carry out his reform

agenda, which included the "Twin Bill" proposal that would have changed the national election laws and defined the President's power to prevent constitutional violations by state establishments.⁶³ Therefore, Khomeini's Islamic nationalism greatly constrained future attempts among reformers to democratize Iran. Likewise, Khomeini's illiberal, undemocratic, and conservative nationalism solidified a future of autocratic, repressive Iranian regimes.

The Historical Context of Nationalism in Russia

The following section will define nationalism in modern day Russia by analyzing the historical context in which it has risen, specifically with regards to the transition of power upon the collapse of the Soviet Union. This section will assert that the nationalism that emerged during the collapse of the Soviet Union was largely an elite driven attempt to achieve political and economic stability. Given the considerable lack of stability within the political and economic realms of Soviet society, there was an impending need to change existing political and social constructs. This necessity for change was first realized by President Gorbachev, as he enacted a transition path of perestroika and glasnost.⁶⁴ This transition path, however, embraced liberalization over democratization, and "eroded the party-state's ideological, coercive, and economic control capacities."⁶⁵ Therefore, this conservative nationalism was a half realized effort to achieve democratization. The fact that this conservative nationalism is still present within modern-day Russia reflects that Russian society has neither forgotten its nation's past as a leading communist superpower, nor has it become fully acclimated to democracy as its form of government. Despite Boris Yeltsin's claims of intending to democratically consolidate Russia upon assuming the presidency, Russia never fully devoted itself to the prospect of democratic consolidation.

The conservative nationalism that developed under President Yeltsin similarly characterizes modern-day Russia. While claiming to desire democracy, President Putin has further centralized the executive branch in recent years, moving the Russian state away from a democracy and closer to an authoritarian regime. This centralization is due primarily to Putin's desire to maintain a strong executive branch that can withstand the democratization efforts of the Russian citizenry and other branches of government. Furthermore, Putin views democratization as a potential threat to Russia's future stability. Yet, this conservative ideology among Russian political elites has also prevented a full dictatorship within Russia, as most elites are unwilling to appear overly authoritarian, in fear of breaking economic ties with the United States. Russia's conservative nationalism has largely resulted from three main factors: 1) Russia's history as a leading superpower and opponent of the United States hinders cultural willingness to fully accept Western ideals regarding democratization; 2) elites have diminished pluralism and competition within Russian society because they lack trust in the Russian citizenry; and 3) economic dependence on the United States requires that elites maintain an awkward common ground, somewhere in-between democracy and

authoritarianism. Furthermore, this nationalism is characterized by “dominance proclivities”: aversions toward external influences (i.e. Westernization), a lack of cohesion over the definition of a national culture, and an insistence on the otherness of certain internal minorities.

In his argument regarding the origins of nationalism, Lloyd Kramer contends that individuals illustrate a desire for change through attempts to communicate a common culture (i.e. literature, newspapers, etc.). President Gorbachev attempted to achieve such cohesion through rhetoric that was simultaneously patriotic and critical of Russia’s past. For example, he began his famous book, *Perestroika*, with claims that “the country was verging on crisis,” as a result of slow economic growth and eroding ideological and moral values.⁶⁶ Thus, Gorbachev encouraged servility and argued that “Perestroika is our urgent necessity.”⁶⁷ As Peter Stearns explains, however, nationalism must always “support certain traditions rooted in a country’s past”; therefore, Gorbachev carefully balanced these criticisms with patriotic rhetoric that glamorized the Soviet legacy: “The USSR represents a truly unique example in the history of human civilizations. These are the fruits of the nationality policy launched by Lenin... The Revolution and socialism have done away with national oppression and inequality, and ensured economic, intellectual and cultural progress for all nations and nationalities.”⁶⁸ Here, Gorbachev clearly incorporates the Soviet legacy into Russia’s nationalist ideology. This Soviet nostalgia has guided modern-day Russia’s political ideology away from democratic principles. A survey in June 2005 confirmed that most young Russians attribute the occurrence of street protests against the Kremlin to “interference by foreign intelligence agencies.”⁶⁹ Likewise, the study illustrates a wavering commitment to democracy, as forty percent believe that the ideal government should be democratic, but should also maintain elements of authoritarianism.⁷⁰ These statistics reveal Russian citizens’ nostalgia, as well as their particular misgivings with pure democracy as a form of government. Therefore, it seems that many Russians are “anxious to see a mighty nationalistic state respected and feared by the West.”⁷¹

This ambivalence of political ideology—alleging democratic principles yet maintaining a decidedly anti-western nationalism—directly stems from Boris Yeltsin’s presidency. Yeltsin’s attempts to reform the Russian government were largely ineffective as a result of the implementation of ambivalent principles. Herrera claims that the ultimate failure of Yeltsin’s economic reform programs resulted from a “fundamental misunderstanding” of the relationship between political and economic issues in the context of a weak Russian state.⁷² Furthermore, this misunderstanding consequently prevented the establishment of the institutions that are necessary to support a market economy.⁷³ The Yeltsin administration was under the impression that the process of economic reform would naturally create these democratic institutions. Reformers, therefore, supported “destatization,” calling for policies designed to prevent the construction of state institutions.⁷⁴ In privileging economic modifications over democratic state modifications,

Yeltsin “further weakened an already weak state,” which resulted in a “mutual delegitimation” of the branches of government.⁷⁵

Herrera refers to Yeltsin’s unwillingness to construct the necessary institutions as a “misunderstanding,” yet there is considerable evidence that Yeltsin understood the situation quite well, and rather purposely chose to limit the degree of democratization within Russia.⁷⁶ The previously established theoretical framework stated that an emergence of nationalism consequently spurs the creation of new political units that are unusual to a country’s particular history. Similarly, Yeltsin argued for a “preponderant Russian state that would eclipse the Soviet regime.”⁷⁷ Additionally, Yeltsin hindered the democratization of Russia by choosing to limit the construction of those democratic institutions that were necessary to support his policies of economic liberalization. This aversion towards Westernization, or democratization, categorizes Yeltsin’s nationalism as *dominant* rather than liberal. Because of Russia’s distinct past, Yeltsin chose to refrain from implementing full democratization, a choice that may reflect the nationalistic belief that Russia is not only distinctive, but also superior.

Russian elites also insisted on the otherness of popular interests that differed from their own, therefore excluding a large portion of the population. These internal aversions have been particularly, and increasingly, prevalent thus far in Putin’s presidency. In order to consolidate Yeltsin’s weak and ineffective government, Putin has further repressed the internal influence of opposing views. Because this stands in stark contrast to the liberal conception of nationalism, which embraces internal minorities in an attempt to achieve national cohesion, this form of nationalism should be categorized as *discriminatory*. As a result, Russia is neither a democracy, nor an authoritarian regime, but most easily characterized as a “monarchy on the basis of mass consent.”⁷⁸ The result is a government that contains many authoritarian features and embraces “bureaucratic structures and methods that are crowding out much of what might otherwise be the realm of political activity.”⁷⁹ This lack of political pluralism illustrates that Russian elites intend to maintain a sense of conservatism, and that they do not fully trust the Russian citizenry to uphold this intention.

Comparing Iranian and Russian Nationalism in a Historical Context

After analyzing both Iranian and Russian nationalisms in a historical context through the previously established theoretical framework it appears that both forms of nationalism emerged during periods of ideological and political transition. While Russian elites promoted a conservative form of nationalism that prevented a complete ideological shift towards democracy, Khomeini’s “attempt to present Islam as a total way of life” illustrates that Iran’s ideological shift was far more extreme.⁸⁰ Second, using the previously established theoretical framework, both Iran and Russia can be characterized as having external aversions toward Western culture and political systems. However, this aversion towards Westernization is demonstrated more overtly in Iran than in Russia,

as witnessed in Khomeini's denouncement of the United States as the "Great Satan."⁸¹ In Russia, however, the aversion towards Western influence is far less explicit, but illustrated through an unwillingness among elites to adhere to Western ideals regarding democracy. Additionally, both forms of nationalism are characterized by aversions toward internal otherness. In Iran, Islamic nationalism holds explicit internal aversions toward women, as observed in the repression of female participation in the country's political and social spheres. Likewise, Russia's conservative nationalism holds explicit internal aversions toward those members of the population who maintain different ideological views than the elite. Third, following these formations of nationalism in Iran and Russia, both leaders acted as *dominant* nationalists.⁸² In Iran, Khomeini's pursuit of a distinctive culture rooted in fundamentalist Shiism and rejection of Westernization illustrate extensive inclinations towards "dominance proclivities." Similarly, Russia's *dominant* nationalism rejects notions of a consolidated democracy. While a "new revolutionary and authentic Muslim culture" propagated Iranian nationalism, Russian nationalism was an *elite driven* attempt to achieve economic and political stability.⁸³

MODERN-DAY IMPLICATIONS

Upon discussing the implications of nationalism in both Iran and Russia, particularly with regards to its effects on democratic reform, this section will provide a comparative analysis of the varying implications for each country's form of nationalism.

Islamic Nationalism in Modern-Day Iran

As shown in the previous analysis of Iranian nationalism in a historical context, the Islamic nationalism that emerged as a result of the Islamic Revolution is still present in modern-day Iran. Likewise, the conditions of the theoretical framework that defined Iranian nationalism under Khomeini are also apparent in modern-day Iran: a *dominant* nationalism grounded in Islam, aversion towards internal otherness (i.e. women), aversion towards external otherness (i.e. Westernization), inclinations towards conservatism (i.e. the constitution as an impediment to democratic reform), and political marginalization. The following section will examine the consequences of these aspects of Islamic nationalism and determine the extent to which they hinder political pluralism and the reformation of women's rights.

The political marginalization that resulted from Khomeini's Islamic nationalism currently hinders political pluralism in Iran. Similarly, the clerics and the Guardian Council, which hindered the "reformist" efforts of former President Mohammad Khatami, still maintain political primacy and veto power. Mehrangiz Kar asserts that the most profound institutional impediment to both political pluralism and democratization is the Revolutionary Constitution of

the Islamic Republic: the "ultimate institutional determinant of contemporary Iranian politics."⁸⁴ It is important to note that the Revolutionary Constitution was a product of Islamic nationalism and rule of law that developed under Khomeini's regime. Likewise, the Iranian constitution, which is "quite clearly not conducive to liberal-democratic reform," demonstrates the ramifications of Islamic nationalism in modern-day Iran.⁸⁵

Moreover, the Iranian Constitution hamstringing the legislative productivity of existing political pluralism in the Majlis. The constitution determines that the Majlis is inferior to the authority of two other superior organs: the Guardian Council and the Expediency Council.⁸⁶ Consequently, the Guardian Council has impeded nearly "every single reform law that the Majlis has passed over the last two years."⁸⁷ Furthermore, because the Guardian and Expediency councils, as appointed by the Supreme Leader, maintain the power to remove Majlis candidates and validate election results, the election process is largely undemocratic.⁸⁸ These corrupt processes result in extreme political marginalization, with minimal distinction between appointed and elected bodies. For example, clerics disqualified forty-four percent of the prospective candidates in the last parliamentary elections, which proved to be a substantial factor in the failure of the reformist movement.

Consequently, it may be argued that there is no future for reformist participation in the government, much less a future for democratization under the current institutional and constitutional constraints. Likewise, Kar argues: "one would have to be idealistic to the point of naivety to think that genuine democratization will come simply by a continuation of the current process. The obstacles in the Constitution and legal framework of Iran are simply too profound."⁸⁹ However, it seems that Kar may be overlooking the notion that the Iranian government, to some extent, will have to answer to its citizens. Hashem Aghajari, a historian at Tehran's Tarbiat Modares University, provides a valid counter-argument to Kar's assertion. Aghajari contends that because hard-liners now hold complete control of the government, they are no longer able to blame the reformists for Iran's shaky economy.⁹⁰ Furthermore, he argues that the seventeen million Iranians that voted for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will most likely become angry with his inability to fulfill promised economic changes.⁹¹ Already, Ahmadinejad has answered the requests of his constituency by setting aside more than a billion dollars in grants for newlyweds.⁹² Even Aghajari, a persecuted dissident, seems optimistic: "The people of Iran should experience this period so that things go better in the future. If the people hadn't experienced theocracy, they would still be waiting for it. But now that we have experienced theocracy, there is no future for it here."⁹³ Still, less institutionalized aspects of society, such as the rules of public discourse established by the clerics, hinder political pluralism. Laura Secor argues that these explicit rules are both "fixed and unforgiving: you cannot criticize the Supreme Leader, the clergy, or the judiciary. The government frequently circulates a list of specific 'red-lined,' or forbidden, subjects to the

country's media."⁹⁴ For example, Human Rights Watch researchers recently reported that bloggers in Iran are being beaten, tortured, stripped, and sexually taunted during interrogations.⁹⁵ This lack of freedom within public discourse results in extensive democratic deficits. Aghajari describes the suppression of free speech in Iran, saying, "They may take me to prison. I'm ready for that. In this society, we have no freedom to speak or to write. This is a prison, too."⁹⁶

Currently, the media is fully controlled by governmental regulation or coercion, specifically by the chief prosecutor of Tehran's judiciary, Saeed Mortazavi: the so-called "butcher of the press."⁹⁷ Mortazavi recently shut down dozens of newspapers, jailed numerous journalists, and participated in the conspiracy and murder of Zahra Kazemi, a female journalist accused of espionage.⁹⁸ Kazemi had been caught taking pictures outside a prison in Tehran. Mortazavi was never disciplined, and only one newspaper printed the story. Mortazavi forced the Iranian media to ignore the story by threatening to shut down all newspapers that reported it. These explicit governmental regulations of the media withstood the reformist efforts of former President Khatami, as well as attempts by reformist legislators to foster political pluralism.⁹⁹ Thus, it appears that the Islamic nationalism that emerged during Khomeini's rule has hindered political pluralism and democratization efforts in modern-day Iran by marginalizing any cultural, social, or political opposition to the Iranian regime.

However, the Islamic nationalism that developed under Khomeini not only has negative implications for political pluralism in modern-day Iran, but also greatly represses the status of women. As Kramer asserts that "the dynamic of modern nationalisms was built upon the ideal of manliness," it appears that the consonance between manliness and nationalism results from a historical, internal aversion towards women.¹⁰⁰ In other words, Iranian nationalism places men atop the social and political hierarchy as a means of rectifying historical aversions toward women. Furthermore, nationalism puts forward a largely passive feminine ideal that distinguishes females as subordinate to male authority.¹⁰¹

The Family Protection Law of 1967 and a new civil, Islamic code, which emanates from the clerics' interpretation of the Koran, give overpowering social privileges to men in matters of marriage, divorce, and parental authority.¹⁰² Consequently, following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the civil code was increasingly associated with Islamic principles of male domination, and thus became more stringently enforced. Similarly, Azam Taliqani, a modern-day Iranian activist, argues that "poverty and polygamy are the only things that poor women have obtained from the revolution."¹⁰³ However, despite pro-life traditions within Iran, the government allowed the use of birth control among women in 1988. Yet, such concessions are few and far between, and often used to mitigate burgeoning criticism from female reformists. For example, in 1988, the Social and Cultural Council of Women was supposedly established to detect "problems and shortcomings and to propose solutions to ameliorate women's status and their economic, social, cultural and political role."¹⁰⁴ While Azadch Kian argues that

this committee was linked to broader transformations with regards to women's rights, it appears that this committee was merely a means of deceptively silencing female critics.¹⁰⁵ Likewise, during the Islamic Revolution, Khomeini gave women a false sense of opportunity, belonging, and self-worth. In attempting to appeal to those "who feel the least respected," Khomeini integrated uplifting principles of Islam into Iranian nationalism. Furthermore, Khomeini's misleading rhetoric not only hindered the progression of women's rights during his era, but also projected ramifications for modern-day women's rights in Iran.

Subsequently, while female deputies in the current Majlis are "far more vocal, courageous, and determined than their predecessors," the constitutional constraints and the political primacy of the Supreme Leader and Guardian Council have impeded the majority of reformist legislation regarding women's rights.¹⁰⁶ For example, the Guardian Council nullified the fifth Majlis elections of two women in Isfahan and Malayir for no valid reason.¹⁰⁷ Clerical corruption developed during the Islamic Revolution when clerics became the most powerful figures in the social and political spheres of Iran. Consequently, because most clerics in Iran are interested in maintaining their power, the Guardian Council ignores any reform initiative that threatens the status quo.

Many Iranian intellectuals and media sources maintain that inequality between men and women "is not initiated by the Qur'ân [Koran], but rather by the interpretations of religious authorities of the divine laws."¹⁰⁸ Likewise, it is widely viewed among more liberal Iranians that patriarchal social order in Muslim societies is ironic because it cannot be accounted for in scriptural terms.¹⁰⁹ Yet, the Iranian government ignores these convictions. Still, Kian argues that "the Islamic state has thus no other choice but to accommodate the participatory aspirations of moderate and modernist women whose partaking in politics will undoubtedly implement democratic change in the political system."¹¹⁰ In asserting that "the Islamic state has thus *no* other choice" but to "accommodate" the aspirations of women, Kian seems overly optimistic.¹¹¹ Kian presents abundant examples of religious, social, and political barriers to the progression of women's rights, which contradict her optimism, and illustrate that the Islamic state can neglect to accommodate the women of Iran.¹¹² Kian not only notes minimal female membership in the Majlis and their lack of efficacy, but also cites secular women's hindered access to the political sphere.¹¹³

Consequently, the subordination of women's rights in Iran is one of the country's most prominent impediments to democratization. Many scholars of Muslim states, such as Steven Fish, have pointed to the subordination of women as a factor that contributes to the democratic deficit in Muslim societies.¹¹⁴ As illustrated in Table 1, Steven Fish claims that Muslim countries are democratic underachievers. To make a connection between Islam and authoritarianism, Fish observes that Muslim societies are distinct in their treatment of females. Fish mentions that there are an unusual number of subordinate women in Muslim societies and various forms of "lifelong discrimination against girls and

Table 1

Variable	Muslim Countries	Non-Muslim Countries
Freedom House "Freedom rating" from 1991-1992 to 2000-2001 (7=most free, 1=least free)	2.61	4.74
Freedom House "Polity score" from 1991 to 1998 (10=most democratic, -10=most autocratic)	-3.11	4.86

Source: "Islam and Authoritarianism" by Steven Fish

women—particularly inferior nutrition and health care early in life and during childbearing years as well as...sex-selective abortions or infanticide."¹¹⁵ In observing authoritarian tendencies within Islamic societies, Fish reinforces this paper's argument that the Islamic nationalism that developed under Khomeini is impeding democratization efforts in modern-day Iran.

Conservative Nationalism in Modern-Day Russia

As proven in the previous section, nationalism in modern day Russia is based in conservatism and characterized by both dominant and discriminatory proclivities. In demonstrating aversions toward Western democratic influences and inner pluralism, Russian nationalism hinders reformists' democratization efforts. Likewise, these aversions toward popular interests have caused much of the population to become politically apathetic.

Putin's authoritarian reforms have diminished the Russian government's potential for achieving democracy. Moreover, Putin has "decisively turned his back on the liberal side of Yeltsin's legacy and opted for a made-over authoritarianism."¹¹⁶ President Yeltsin was a "genuinely torn figure, poised uneasily between his roots in the old Soviet era and a desire—often acted upon—to break with them, supporting such things as press freedom, open public debate, and political pluralism."¹¹⁷ Though Yeltsin's political ideology oscillated between progressive and conservative inclinations, overall, his policies were more democratic than those of the Putin administration. Furthermore, despite growths in economic prosperity, Putin has compromised Russia's past democratic principles, moving the state towards authoritarianism. This refutes Ghia Nodia's claim that "Putin may be building a new-model of Russian nationalism that is friendlier to Western-style institutions."¹¹⁸ Likewise, Nodia claims that the potential for democratic reform under Yeltsin greatly suffered as a result of the "smoldering tension between democracy and nationalism" that "undermined the popular legitimacy of democratic market reforms."¹¹⁹ Here, Nodia suggests that Putin has increased the potential for legitimate democratic reform by uniting broader popular support.¹²⁰ This, however, ignores the undemocratic measures utilized by the Putin administration in order to achieve this cohesion. Putin has achieved greater popular support by creating a decidedly less liberal form of democracy that diminishes political pluralism. As discussed in the historical section, this

lack of political pluralism is primarily due to the increased centralization of the executive, as well as the Kremlin's control over the media.

Russia's current government is neither a full democracy nor an authoritarian regime, but a "monarchy on the basis of mass consent."¹²¹ Similarly, Putin has increased political aversions toward inner-influences in order to increase stability within the Russian state. For example, the Kremlin's control and censorship of the independent media has hindered the opposing parties' ability to challenge Putin's administration. In 1996, Michael McFaul wrote of a recent election: "In historical perspective, the conduct of this election must be seen as a positive step toward democratic consolidation."¹²² This comment, however, illustrates the degree to which the situation has worsened, as recent elections have moved the Russian state further from democratic consolidation. For example, in recent elections government controlled TV stations explicitly ignored laws that require equal media coverage of all candidates.¹²³ Consequently, election opportunities for opposing candidates and parties have significantly decreased. As Valerie Bunce observes, pure democracy is largely dependent on unrestricted pluralism, and therefore "more voices are preferable to fewer."¹²⁴

Furthermore, Putin's attempts to "fully subordinate the whole structure of power to his will alone" are undemocratic and unrepresentative of the Russian people.¹²⁵ Michael McFaul and Nikolai Petrov have attempted to defend Putin's policies by claiming that "Russian society seems content with the current quasi-democratic, quasi-autocratic order," and that "Russians are too exhausted, from decades of turmoil, to fight for better democracy."¹²⁶ There is significant evidence, however, that these assertions falsely portray the Russian citizenry. For example, Dmitry Shlapentokh argues that Russians citizens are not "too exhausted" to fight for a "better democracy," but rather have "a general sense of passivity about all matters."¹²⁷ Furthermore, this passivity stems directly from the fact that most citizens detect only minimal differences between candidates, and therefore generally view voting as unimportant. This passivity within Russia's population could hinder Russia's future for democratic consolidation.

While Putin's decidedly conservative ideology has achieved economic prosperity uncharacteristic to Russia's recent past, Russia's future may contain a serious lack of stability. The current administration has the appearance of stability and seems free from conflict or crisis, yet "the basis of this putative stability may be far from firm" as there is no uniting ideology in Russia.¹²⁸ It seems that Putin maintains these authoritarian measures because he "lacks the sense that there are any alternatives," he "fears of upsetting the status quo," and he is unwilling "to think seriously about the future."¹²⁹ Therefore, through rejecting Western ideals regarding full democracy, this conservative nationalism, as an attempt to maintain stability, ironically poses a serious threat for future stability in Russia.

Comparing Modern-Day Implications of Nationalism in Iran and Russia

As nationalism in modern-day Iran and Russia emanates from a transitional period—the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the collapse of the Soviet Union in Russia—it seems that there are many similarities between each country’s forms of nationalism. Yet, as the following comparative analysis will illustrate, the particular implications of nationalism in each country are somewhat dissimilar. These differing implications, however, are not due to disparate characteristics of nationalism, but rather to the extent which each country upholds similar characteristics. For example, while both Iranian and Russian nationalisms are based in dominance proclivities, particularly in their aversion towards Western democratic ideology, it is important to note that Iranian elites are far more radical in their aversions toward external influences.

In explicitly stating its aversion towards Western influence, Iran illustrates its unwillingness to cooperate with the United States and United Nations concerning its nuclear power program. On the other hand, because Russian elites desire a stable and conservative political system, they are reluctant to adopt ideals of Western democratization. Next, it appears that in both Iran and Russia, a significant portion of the citizenry is politically disillusioned and politically passive. In Russia, citizens are infused with “a general sense of passivity about all matters,” especially those political. In the previous Iranian presidential election, student-led opposition groups staged election boycott’s, stating, “We aren’t interested in seeing who will be President. We are just interested in constructing democracy.”¹³⁰ By refusing to vote as a symbol of dissent against Iran’s authoritarian regime, younger generations of Iranians are hindering the process of democratization. Similarly, the only way to loosen institutional constraints in Iran is to subvert the system from within by electing more and more reformist government officials. Likewise, in Russia, democratic reforms become less viable as reformers and liberal-minded citizens become less active in the political system. Therefore, while Russia appears to be more politically passive than Iran, passivity is impeding democratization in both countries.

The implications for limited political pluralism in Iran and Russia, while emanating from different sources, are distinctly similar. Likewise, a monopoly of power characterizes the political systems of both countries: Iran’s political system is rooted in the primacy of the clerics, while Russia’s political system is based in the centralization of Putin’s administration. Therefore, both Iranian and Russian nationalisms pursue extreme policies in order to achieve their forms of conservative nationalism. While, Iran represses the media through coercion and violence, Russia represses the media through a corrupt rule of law. Furthermore, both Iran and Russia attempt to reinforce the political, social, and cultural status quo through their aversions toward internal otherness. Though the Iranian and Russian governments target different demographics, their targets are both “internal,” and their aversions illustrate significant democratic deficits. Here, it must be noted that modern-day Iran has more extensive and profound institutional

Table 2

Characteristics of Iranian and Russian Nationalism	Iran	Russia
“Dominance Proclivities” and Aversion to Western Ideals	More Explicitly Stated	Less Explicitly Stated
Political Passivity Among Citizens	Less Politically Passive	More Politically Passive
Conservative Nationalism	Less Conservative	More Conservative
Lack of Political Pluralism	Produced by Constitution and the Primacy of the Clerics	Produced by Putin’s Control of the Media and the Lack of Mobilization Among Opposition Parties
Aversion Towards Internal Otherness	More Oppressive	Less Oppressive
Institutional Impediments to Democratization	More Constraining	Less Constraining

impediments—the Iranian Constitution and the composition of its hierarchical and Islamic-based government—to democratization than modern-day Russia. Table 2 summarizes the modern-day implications of Iranian and Russian nationalisms.

CONCLUDING STATEMENTS

As we have seen, particular forms of nationalism present impediments to democratic reform. In observing the cases of Iran and Russia, the following characteristics of nationalism impede democratization: 1) “dominance proclivities”; 2) aversions toward external, and/or internal *otherness*; and 3) conservative ideologies. Because Iranian and Russian nationalisms encompass all three characteristics, each country’s form of nationalism, to varying degrees, hinders political mobilization among democratic reformers. While, presently, it is clear that Iranian and Russian nationalisms are impeding democratization, it is unclear what will occur in each country’s future. However, historical observations of nationalism, both its emergence and tendencies, allow for some speculation. As stated earlier, Iran’s institutional impediments to democratization, emanating from its constitution and the political primacy of the conservative clerics, are more stringent and vast than those of Russia. However, the Iranian government currently faces more dissent from a society that increasingly desires political activism and social progression. Subsequently, because nationalism adapts to the “qualities of a national culture,” this prevalent dissatisfaction within Iranian society and culture may foster an evolving and potentially more progressive form of Iranian nationalism.¹³¹ In other words, as the Iranian culture becomes increasingly progressive, the ruling elites will be forced to “articulate or

defend" these popular interests, consequently reshaping Iranian nationalism.¹³² Furthermore, the emergence of a newly evolved Iranian nationalism may spur the creation of new "political units" that are less authoritarian.¹³³ By contrast, the Russian citizenry is politically passive and democratic reformers are less united in challenging the ideologically conservative government. Therefore, because there is "no common ideology uniting" Russian culture, the potential for a new and progressive nationalism seems less likely. Similarly, the passivity of Russian citizens allows the ruling elites to maintain Russia's conservative nationalism, rather than creating more progressive "political units."¹³⁴ This assumes that new forms of nationalism often provide the building ground for political change. Yet, these new forms of nationalism require a non-passive population, aware of political and social marginalization and willing to fight for reform.

Notes

¹ Peter N. Stearns, "Nationalisms: An Invitation to Comparative Analysis," *Journal of World History*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1997), pp. 62–63.

² *Ibid.*, 62–63

³ *Ibid.*, 62

⁴ Lloyd Kramer, "Historical Narratives and the Meaning of Nationalism," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 58, No. 3 (1997), pp. 528.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 528

⁶ *Ibid.*, 528

⁷ George L. Mosse, "Can Nationalism be Saved? About Zionism, Rightful and Unjust Nationalism," *Israel Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1997), pp. 159.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 159

⁹ *Ibid.*, 159

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 159

¹¹ Peter N. Stearns, "Nationalisms: An Invitation to Comparative Analysis," (1997), pp. 60.

¹² *Ibid.*, 62

¹³ Lloyd Kramer, "Historical Narratives and the Meaning of Nationalism," (1997), pp. 531.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 530

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 526

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 525–526

¹⁷ Peter N. Stearns, "Nationalisms: An Invitation to Comparative Analysis," (1997), pp. 61.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 527

¹⁹ Astrid S. Tuminez, "Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (2003), pp. 86.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 86

²¹ Peter N. Stearns, "Nationalisms: An Invitation to Comparative Analysis,"

(1997), pp. 70.

²² *Ibid.*, 71

²³ *Ibid.*, 71

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 71

²⁵ Lloyd Kramer, "Historical Narratives and the Meaning of Nationalism," (1997), pp. 532.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 526

²⁷ Peter N. Stearns, "Nationalisms: An Invitation to Comparative Analysis," (1997), pp. 63.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 66

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 63

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 63

³¹ *Ibid.*, 64

³² *Ibid.*, 64

³³ *Ibid.*, 64

³⁴ Ghia Nodia, "Ten Years After the Soviet Breakup: The Impact of Nationalism," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2001), pp. 31.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 31

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 31

³⁷ Peter N. Stearns, "Nationalisms: An Invitation to Comparative Analysis," (1997), pp. 61.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 64–65

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 65

⁴⁰ Ervand Abrahamian, "The Making of the Modern Iranian State," *Introduction to Comparative Politics*, 3rd ed., edited by Mark Kesselman et al. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, (2004), pp. 572–587.

⁴¹ Nahid Yeganeh, "Women, Nationalism and Islam in Contemporary Political Discourse in Iran," *Feminist Review*, Vol. 1 No. 33 (1993), pp. 7.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 7 & Peter N. Stearns, "Nationalisms: An Invitation to Comparative Analysis," (1997), pp. 60.

⁴³ Ervand Abrahamian, "The Making of the Modern Iranian State," (2004), pp. 580.

⁴⁴ Peter N. Stearns, "Nationalisms: An Invitation to Comparative Analysis," (1997), pp. 68.

⁴⁵ Nahid Yeganeh, "Women, Nationalism and Islam in Contemporary Political Discourse in Iran," (1993), pp. 7.

⁴⁶ Peter N. Stearns, "Nationalisms: An Invitation to Comparative Analysis," (1997), pp. 70.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 71

⁴⁸ Nahid Yeganeh, "Women, Nationalism and Islam in Contemporary Political Discourse in Iran," (1993), pp. 7.

⁴⁹ Peter N. Stearns, "Nationalisms: An Invitation to Comparative Analysis," (1997), pp. 71.

- ⁵⁰ Nahid Yeganeh, "Women, Nationalism and Islam in Contemporary Political Discourse in Iran," (1993) pp. 7–8.
- ⁵¹ Ali Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, "The Crisis of Secular Politics and the Rise of Political Islam in Iran," *Social Text*, Vol. 1, No. 38 (1994), pp. 51.
- ⁵² Peter N. Stearns, "Nationalisms: An Invitation to Comparative Analysis," (1997), pp. 61.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*, 64–65 & Ervand Abrahamian, "The Making of the Modern Iranian State," (2004), pp. 581.
- ⁵⁴ Ali Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, "The Crisis of Secular Politics and the Rise of Political Islam in Iran," (1994), pp. 60.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 59
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 60
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 71
- ⁵⁸ Peter N. Stearns, "Nationalisms: An Invitation to Comparative Analysis," (1997), pp. 61 & Nahid Yeganeh, "Women, Nationalism and Islam in Contemporary Political Discourse in Iran," (1993), pp. 16.
- ⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 16
- ⁶⁰ Ervand Abrahamian, "The Making of the Modern Iranian State," (2004), pp. 581.
- ⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 581–582
- ⁶² Laura Secor, "Fugitives." *The New Yorker*, 11 December 27 (2005), pp. 2.
- ⁶³ Mehrangiz Kar, "The Deadlock in Iran: Constitutional Constraints." *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2003), pp. 133.
- ⁶⁴ Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, "The Problem of 'Stateness' and Transitions: The USSR and Russia," *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins (1996), pp. 367.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 367
- ⁶⁶ Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, "The Problem of 'Stateness' and Transitions: The USSR and Russia," (1996), pp. 368.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 368
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 368
- ⁶⁹ Sarah E. Mendelson and Theodore P. Gerber, "Soviet Nostalgia: An Impediment to Russian Democratization," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2005), pp. 85.
- ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 88
- ⁷¹ Dmitry Shlapentokh, "The Illusions and Realities of Russian Nationalism," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1999), pp. 174.
- ⁷² Yoshiko Herrera, "Russian Economic Reform, 1991–1999," *Russian Politics: Challenges of Democratization*, eds. Zoltan Barany and Robert Moser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2001), pp. 137.
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*, 137
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 137
- ⁷⁵ Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, "The Problem of 'Stateness' and Transitions: The USSR and Russia," (1996), pp. 368.

- ⁷⁶ Yoshiko Herrera, "Russian Economic Reform, 1991–1999," (2001), pp. 137.
- ⁷⁷ Astrid S. Tuminez, "Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union" (2003), pp. 126.
- ⁷⁸ Lilia Shevtsova, "Russian Democracy in Eclipse: The Limits of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2004), 67–77.
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 69
- ⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 72 & Ali Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, "The Crisis of Secular Politics and the Rise of Political Islam in Iran," (1994), pp. 72.
- ⁸¹ Ervand Abrahamian, "The Making of the Modern Iranian State," (2004), pp. 573.
- ⁸² Peter N. Stearns, "Nationalisms: An Invitation to Comparative Analysis" (1997), pp. 66.
- ⁸³ Nahid Yeganeh, "Women, Nationalism and Islam in Contemporary Political Discourse in Iran," (1993), pp. 7.
- ⁸⁴ Mehrangiz Kar, "The Deadlock in Iran: Constitutional Constraints," (2003), pp. 132.
- ⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 133
- ⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 135
- ⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 134
- ⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 136
- ⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 136
- ⁹⁰ Laura Secor, "Fugitives." *The New Yorker*, 11 December 27 (2005), pp. 14.
- ⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 14
- ⁹² *Ibid.*, 14
- ⁹³ *Ibid.*, 14
- ⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 2
- ⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 5
- ⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 14
- ⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 4–5
- ⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 4–5
- ⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 7–11
- ¹⁰⁰ Lloyd Kramer, "Historical Narratives and the Meaning of Nationalism," (1997), pp. 532.
- ¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 539
- ¹⁰² Azadeh Kian, "Women and Politics in Post-Islamic Iran: The Gender Conscious Drive to Change," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1997), pp. 81.
- ¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 82
- ¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 83
- ¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 82
- ¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 87
- ¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 87
- ¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 92

- ¹⁰⁹ Steven M. Fish, "Islam and Authoritarianism," *World Politics*, Vol. 55, No. 1 (2002), pp. 5.
- ¹¹⁰ Azadeh Kian, "Women and Politics in Post-Islamic Iran: The Gender Conscious Drive to Change," (1997), pp. 96.
- ¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 96
- ¹¹² *Ibid.*, 96
- ¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 95
- ¹¹⁴ Steven M. Fish, "Islam and Authoritarianism," (2002), pp. 5.
- ¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 27
- ¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 67
- ¹¹⁷ Lilia Shevtsova, "Russian Democracy in Eclipse: The Limits of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism," (2004), pp. 67.
- ¹¹⁸ Ghia Nodia, "Ten Years After the Soviet Breakup: The Impact of Nationalism," (2001), pp. 33.
- ¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 67
- ¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 33
- ¹²¹ Lilia Shevtsova, "Russian Democracy in Eclipse: The Limits of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism," (2004), pp. 68.
- ¹²² McFaul, Michael, "The Vanishing Center," *The Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1996), pp. 90–104.
- ¹²³ "Putin's Way," *The Economist* (December 13) (2003), pp. 152.
- ¹²⁴ Valerie Bunce, "Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lesson from the Post-Communist Experience," *World Politics*, Vol. 55, No. 2 (2003), pp. 168.
- ¹²⁵ Lilia Shevtsova, "Russian Democracy in Eclipse: The Limits of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism," (2004), pp. 67.
- ¹²⁶ Michael McFaul and Nikolai Petrov, "Russian Democracy in Eclipse: What Elections Tell Us," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2004), pp. 22.
- ¹²⁷ Dmitry Shlapentokh, "The Illusions and Realities of Russian Nationalism," (1999), pp. 182.
- ¹²⁸ Lilia Shevtsova, "Russian Democracy in Eclipse: The Limits of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism," (2004), pp. 71.
- ¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 71
- ¹³⁰ Laura Secor, "Fugitives." *The New Yorker*, 11 December 27 (2005), pp. 7.
- ¹³¹ Peter N. Stearns, "Nationalisms: An Invitation to Comparative Analysis," (1997), pp. 60.
- ¹³² Astrid S. Tuminez, "Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union," (2003), pp. 86.
- ¹³³ Peter N. Stearns, "Nationalisms: An Invitation to Comparative Analysis," (1997), pp. 61.
- ¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 61

References

- Abrahamian, Ervand. 2004. "The Making of the Modern Iranian State." *Introduction to Comparative Politics*, 3rd ed., edited by Mark Kesselman et

- al. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, pp. 572–587.
- Bunce, Valerie. 2003. "Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lesson from the Post-Communist Experience." *World Politics*, Vol. 55, No. 2: 167–192.
- Fish, Steven M. 2002. "Islam and Authoritarianism." *World Politics*, Vol. 55, No. 1: 4–37.
- Herrera, Yoshiko. 2001. "Russian Economic Reform, 1991–1999." *Russian Politics: Challenges of Democratization*, eds. Zoltan Barany and Robert Moser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 135–173.
- Kar, Mehrangiz. 2003. "The Deadlock in Iran: Constitutional Constraints." *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January): 132–136.
- Kian, Azadeh. 1997. "Women and Politics in Post-Islamic Iran: The Gender Conscious Drive to Change." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1: 75–96.
- Kramer, Lloyd. 1997. "Historical Narratives and the Meaning of Nationalism." *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 58, No. 3: 525–545.
- Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan. 1996. "The Problem of 'Stateness' and Transitions: The USSR and Russia." *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, pp. 366–400.
- McFaul, Michael. 1996. "The Vanishing Center." *The Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2: 90–104.
- McFaul, Michael and Nikolai Petrov. 2004. "Russian Democracy in Eclipse: What Elections Tell Us." *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No. 3: 20–30.
- Mendelson, Sarah E, and Theodore P. Gerber. 2005. "Soviet Nostalgia: An Impediment to Russian Democratization." *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1: 83–96.
- Mirsepasi-Ashtiani, Ali. 1994. "The Crisis of Secular Politics and the Rise of Political Islam in Iran." *Social Text*, Vol. 1, No. 38: 51–84.
- Mosse, George L. 1997. "Can Nationalism be Saved? About Zionism, Rightful and Unjust Nationalism." *Israel Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1: 156–173.
- "Putin's Way." 2003. *The Economist* (December 13): 152–154
- Nodia, Ghia. 2001. "Ten Years After the Soviet Breakup: The Impact of Nationalism." *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 12, No. 4: 27–34.
- Secor, Laura. 2005. "Fugitives." *The New Yorker*, 11 December 27.
- Shevtsova, Lilia. 2004. "Russian Democracy in Eclipse: The Limits of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (July): 67–77.
- Shlapentokh, Dmitry. 1999. "The Illusions and Realities of Russian Nationalism." *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 1: 173–186.
- Stearns, Peter N. 1997. "Nationalisms: An Invitation to Comparative Analysis." *Journal of World History*, Vol. 8, No. 1: 57–73.
- Tuminez, Astrid S. 2003. "Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union." *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 4: 81–136.
- Yeganeh, Nahid. 1993. "Women, Nationalism and Islam in Contemporary Political Discourse in Iran." *Feminist Review*, Vol. 1 No. 33, pp. 3–18.